The effect of institutional shareholders on the level and mix of South African chief executive officers' compensation by Surve, Yaser
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND 
SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTANCY 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH REPORT 
 
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Commerce in Accounting (50% Research) 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS  
ON THE LEVEL AND MIX OF  
SOUTH AFRICAN CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS’ 
COMPENSATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared by: 
 
 Yaser Survé 
Student number: 295105 
Email: yaser.surve@gmail.com 
 
Supervisor: 
 
Mr. Gary Swartz 
 
Date of submission: 
 
November 2008 
 2 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 PAGE 
Declaration………………………………………………………………………………. 6 
  
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………. 7 
  
List of Figures and Tables……………………………………………………………. 8 
  
List of Appendices……………………………………………………………………... 9 
  
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….. 10 
  
Chapter I: Introduction………………………………………………………………… 11 
  
   1.1. Background…………………………………………………………………………………………... 11 
   1.2. The South African context………………………………………………………………………….. 12 
   1.3. Research problems and objectives………………………………………………………………... 13 
       1.3.1. Main problem and objective…………………………………………………………………… 13 
       1.3.2. Sub-problems and objectives…………………………………………………………………. 14 
   1.4. Relevance of the study and expected outcomes………………………………………………… 14 
   1.5. Organisation of the study…………………………………………………………………………… 15 
  
  
Chapter II: Literature Review…………………………………………………………. 16 
  
   2.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 
   2.2. Agency theory………………………………………………………………………………………... 16 
         2.2.1. Mechanisms for reducing agency costs……………………………………………………. 19 
                  2.2.1.1. Organisational mechanisms……………………………………………….……….. 19 
                  2.2.1.2. External mechanisms………………………………………………………………... 20 
   2.3. Institutional investors………………………………………………………………………………... 20 
         2.3.1. South African institutions…………………………………………………………………….. 21 
         2.3.2. Institutional shareholder activism…………………………………………………………… 22 
         2.3.3. South African institutional shareholder activism…………………………………………… 24 
 3 
                  2.3.3.1. Comparex case study……………………………………………………………….. 25 
                  2.3.3.2. The PIC – champion for shareholder activism?………………………………….. 26 
                  2.3.3.3. Other significant institutional shareholders……………………………………….. 28 
                             2.3.3.3.1. Frater Asset Management………………………………………………... 28 
                             2.3.3.3.2. Allan Gray…………………………………………………………………... 30 
                             2.3.3.3.3. Other companies…………………………………………………………... 30 
                             2.3.3.3.4. The current state of shareholder activism in South Africa…………….. 31 
         2.3.4. Empirical evidence on institutional shareholders………………………………………….. 33 
                  2.3.4.1. Corporate anti-takeover amendments……………………………………………... 33 
                  2.3.4.2. Innovation/research and development…………………………………………….. 33 
                  2.3.4.3. Corporate diversification…………………………………………………………….. 34 
                  2.3.4.4. Dividend policy……………………………………………………………………….. 34 
         2.3.5. Barriers to effective governance……………………………………………………………. 34 
                  2.3.5.1. Business relationships………………………………………………………………. 35 
                  2.3.5.2. Barriers from the regulatory environment…………………………………………. 35 
                  2.3.5.3. Barriers due to monitoring costs and organisation capability…………………… 36 
                  2.3.5.4. Barriers as a result of being an active trader……………………………………… 36 
         2.3.6. A survey of South African institutional shareholders……………………………………… 37 
   2.4. CEO compensation………………………………………………………………………………….. 38 
         2.4.1. Components of CEO compensation………………………………………………………… 38 
         2.4.2. Trends in the level and mix of compensation……………………………………………… 38 
         2.4.3. Share options………………………………………………………………………………….. 39 
                  2.4.3.1. The mechanics of share options…………………………………………………… 39 
                  2.4.3.2. Accounting implications……………………………………………………………... 40 
                  2.4.3.3. Tax implications……………………………………………………………………… 42 
                  2.4.3.4. Adverse effects of awarding share options……………………………………….. 42 
                  2.4.3.5. Recent developments: phantom cash options……………………………………. 43 
         2.4.4. Legislation……………………………………………………………………………………... 43 
         2.4.5. Remuneration committees…………………………………………………………………… 45 
         2.4.6. Controversies surrounding executive remuneration………………………………………. 46 
                  2.4.6.1. Option schemes……………………………………………………………………… 46 
                  2.4.6.2. Macroeconomic influences………………………………………………………….. 46 
                  2.4.6.3. Excessive remuneration…………………………………………………………….. 46 
   2.5. Previous research and their findings………………………………………………………………. 48 
   2.6. Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………... 49 
  
  
Chapter III: Research Hypotheses, Methodology and Data…………………….. 50 
  
   3.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 50 
 4 
   3.2. The research hypotheses…………………………………………………………………………... 50 
         3.2.1. Hypothesis 1…………………………………………………………………………………... 50 
         3.2.2. Hypothesis 2…………………………………………………………………………………... 51 
   3.3. Research design and methodology……………………………………………………………….. 52 
         3.3.1. Population, samples and delimitations……………………………………………………... 52 
         3.3.2. Data collection………………………………………………………………………………… 53 
         3.3.3. Techniques of analysis……………………………………………………………………….. 53 
                  3.3.3.1. Regression models…………………………………………………………………... 53 
                             3.3.3.1.1. Dependent variables….…………………………………………………… 54 
                             3.3.3.1.2. Independent variables…………………………………………………….. 55 
                             3.3.3.1.3. Control variables…………………………………………………………… 55 
                  3.3.3.2. Tests for differences of means……………………………………………………... 58 
                             3.3.3.2.1. Owner-controlled firms versus management-controlled firms….…….. 58 
                             3.3.3.2.2. Key variables……..….…………………………………………………….. 59 
   3.4. Employee share option valuation………………………………………………………………….. 61 
         3.4.1. The requirements of IFRS 2: Share-based payments……………………………………. 62 
         3.4.2. Differences between conventional share options and employee share options……….. 62 
         3.4.3. Black-Scholes and adjusted Black-Scholes……………………………………………….. 64 
         3.4.4. Binomial models………………………………………………………………………………. 64 
                  3.4.4.1. Rubenstein (1995)…………………………………………………………………… 64 
                  3.4.4.2. Carpenter (1998)…………………………………………………………………….. 65 
                  3.4.4.3. Hull and White (2004)……………………………………………………………….. 66 
         3.4.5. The valuation model used in this study…………………………………………………….. 66 
         3.4.6. Valuation model inputs and assumptions made…………………………………………… 67 
   3.5. Assumptions underlying the study…………………………………………………………………. 70 
   3.6. Limitations……………………………………………………………………………………………. 70 
         3.6.1. Sample size……………………………………………………………………………………. 70 
         3.6.2. Differences in institutional investors………………………………………………………… 71 
   3.7. Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………... 71 
  
  
Chapter IV: Results and Discussion………………………………………………... 72 
  
   4.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………… 72 
   4.2. Sample description………………………………………………………………………………….. 72 
         4.2.1. Analysis by years…………………………………………………………………………….. 75 
                  4.2.1.1. Compensation………………………………………………………………………... 75 
                  4.2.1.2. Institutional holdings…………………………………………………………………. 79 
                  4.2.1.3. Board membership, Board ownership and CEO ownership…………………….. 80 
         4.2.2. Analysis by sector…………………………………………………………………………….. 80 
 5 
                  4.2.2.1. Compensation………………………………………………………………………... 80 
                  4.2.2.2. Institutional holdings…………………………………………………………………. 85 
                  4.2.2.3. Board membership, Board ownership and CEO ownership…………………….. 86 
   4.3. Regression results………………………………………………………………………………...… 86 
         4.3.1. Level of compensation……………………………………………………………………….. 88 
                  4.3.1.1. Cash component (OLS regression)………………………………………………... 88 
                  4.3.1.2. Options component (tobit regression)……………………………………………... 89 
                  4.3.1.3. Total compensation (OLS regression)…………………………………………….. 89 
                  4.3.1.4. Overall comments……………………………………………………………………. 89 
         4.3.2. Mix of compensation………………………………………………………………………….. 90 
                  4.3.2.1. Cash percentage (OLS regression)………………………………………………... 90 
                  4.3.2.2. Options percentage (tobit regression)……………………………………………... 90 
                  4.3.2.3. Overall comments……………………………………………………………………. 91 
         4.3.3. Alternative specification – lagged compensation variables………………………………. 91 
   4.4. Tests of differences of means……………………………………………………………………… 94 
         4.4.1. Sample description…………………………………………………………………………… 94 
         4.4.2. Choice of test………………………………………………………………………………….. 95 
                  4.4.2.1. Tests for normality…………………………………………………………………… 96 
         4.4.3. Level of compensation……………………………………………………………………….. 97 
         4.4.4. Mix of compensation………………………………………………………………………….. 97 
   4.5. Summary and overall conclusion of statistical tests……………………………………………... 98 
  
  
Chapter V: Summary and Conclusion……………………………………………… 100 
  
   5.1. Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………... 100 
   5.2. Results and findings………………………………………………………………………………… 101 
   5.3. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………. 102 
   5.4. Limitations……………………………………………………………………………………………. 102 
   5.5. Directions for future research………………………………………………………………………. 102 
  
  
References………………………………………………………………………………. 104 
  
  
Appendices…………………………………………………………………………….... 115 
  
 
 6 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
I declare that this research report is my own original work and that all sources have been 
accurately reported and acknowledged. It is submitted for the degree of Masters of Commerce 
to the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. This research is a continuation and 
expansion of the research report that was submitted for my B.Com (Hons) degree in Financial 
Accounting at the University of Cape Town. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
          Yaser Survé                   Date 
 7 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Mr. Gary Swartz, for his continuing 
guidance, support and insight, and to my wife, Mrs. Humaira Survé, for her love, care and 
patience during the writing of this report. 
 
 8 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
 
 PAGE 
Table 1: South Africa‟s 15 largest asset managers at 31 December 2007 21 
Table 2: Top 10 holdings of the Public Investment Corporation at 31 March 2008 27 
Table 3: The effect of expensing options for a sample of South African companies for the year ended 1996 40 
Table 4: Total compensation for executives in different countries compared with the wage gap in that 
country 
46 
Table 5: Summary of regression variables, their measures/proxies and sources of information for the 
regression models 
57 
Table 6: Mean and median compensation data sorted by year 72 
Table 7: Mean and median institutional data sorted by year 72 
Table 8: Mean  and median control variables sorted by year 73 
Table 9: Mean options component sorted by year (with abnormal awards removed) 75 
Table 10: Distribution of sample by sector 79 
Table 11: Mean and median compensation data analysed by sector over the period 2002-2006 80 
Table 12: Mean and median institutional data analysed by sector over the period 2002-2006 80 
Table 13: Mean and median control variables analysed by sector over the period 2002-2006 81 
Table 14: Summary of regression coefficients for original models 86 
Table 15: Summary of regression coefficients for lagged models 92 
Table 16: Mean and median data for management-controlled and owner-controlled firms over the sample 
period 2002-2006 
94 
Table 17: Summary of results of Lilliefors tests 95 
Table 18: Summary of results of Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests (level of compensation) 96 
Table 19: Summary of results of Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests (mix of compensation) 97 
  
Figure 1: Cash component of compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 74 
Figure 2: Options component of compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 75 
Figure 3: Total compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 76 
Figure 4: Cash percentage of total compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 77 
Figure 5: Options percentage of total compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 77 
Figure 6: Percentage of companies owned by institutions over the sample period (2002-2006) 78 
Figure 7: Mean compensation data analysed by sector over the sample period (2002-2006) 82 
Figure 8: Median compensation data analysed by sector over the sample period (2002-2006) 83 
Figure 9: Cash percentage of total compensation analysed by sector over the sample period (2002-2006) 84 
Figure 10: Percentage of shares owned by institutions analysed by sector over the sample period (2002-
2006) 
85 
 9 
 
List of Appendices 
 
 
 PAGE 
APPENDIX A -  A note on tobit regression models 115 
  
APPENDIX B -   List of companies included in the sample 116 
  
APPENDIX C -   List of companies excluded in the sample 117 
  
APPENDIX D -   Original regression model results  118 
  
APPENDIX E -   Lagged regression model results  123 
  
APPENDIX F -   Lilliefors test results (Management-controlled firms) 128 
  
APPENDIX G -   Lilliefors test results (Owner-controlled firms) 138 
  
APPENDIX H -   Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results 163 
 
 
 
 10 
Abstract 
 
 
Agency theory would predict that, given the presence of large or powerful shareholders in a 
company, agency costs would be reduced. Excessive executive compensation can be regarded 
as being an externality problem that stems from the agency problem. Agency theory would also 
then predict that executives in companies with large shareholders would receive less 
compensation and a larger proportion of long-term incentive-based compensation than 
companies with smaller shareholders.  
 
The validity of these two hypotheses has been tested using a unique cross-sectional, time 
series dataset and two statistical techniques. The first set of tests involve the construction of 
multiple regression models in order to provide evidence as to whether Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) compensation is affected by institutional shareholders. The second method, using 
statistical tests of differences between means, involves separating the sample into two sub-
samples, namely management- and owner-controlled firms, to ascertain whether these two 
groups remunerate their CEOs differently to each other, thus testing the hypotheses in an 
alternative manner to the regression models. 
 
This report examines whether the presence of institutional shareholders affects the level and 
mix of CEO compensation for 50 companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange over the 
five-year period 2002-2006. Original findings on the value of share options awarded to CEOs 
are presented, along with the trends in the level and mix of CEO compensation. Further 
research findings also include trends in the level of institutional ownership of listed companies 
over this period. 
 
The results of both the regression models and tests for differences of means provide statistical 
evidence in support of the assertion that the presence of institutional shareholders do not have 
an effect on either the level or mix of CEO compensation. Suggested reasons for this result 
range from shareholder apathy, to not considering executive remuneration to be a significant 
enough issue for institutional shareholders, and finally to the suggestion that institutional 
shareholders perceive the level and mix of compensation paid to South African CEOs to be a 
fair reflection of their value to their company.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
“Compensation is a function of the balance of influence and power in an organisation.”  
- Jensen and Meckling (1976 : 306). 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The documented agency problem, first put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976), holds that 
top management pursue personal goals that are incongruent with the profit maximisation goal of 
the firm. Agency costs have been particularly telling in the last ten years, given the plethora of 
corporate scandals that have occurred internationally.  
 
In the past, managers benefited from “a regime of dispersed and powerless shareholders” 
(Davis and Thompson, 1994 : 142), which ultimately exacerbated the agency problem. 
However, as more people have invested their capital with institutions over the years, and funds 
under management have grown, institutional shareholders have emerged as the biggest 
potential force to mitigate agency costs – what Davis and Thompson (1994 : 144) describe as a 
“social movement in corporate control”. 
 
It is undeniable then, that institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to safeguard the 
investments they have made on behalf of their many clients. With the sheer amount of funds 
under management, it has become imperative for them to intervene and participate more 
actively in firm activities. Institutional investors are therefore in a position to reduce the overall 
cost of monitoring activities through their different investments, and hence are in a better 
position to influence firm policies. 
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to just divest in a firm should they be unhappy – they cannot simply 
just “take the Wall Street walk” (David and Kochhar, 1996 : 459), i.e. sell their shares. David and 
Kochhar (1996 : 459) elucidate on this: 
 
“An attempt to offload large blocks of shares in a single firm adversely affects its stock  
price. As such, the selling institution will obtain a price that is well below market value  
and will be faced with an even greater loss in value of their holdings. Furthermore, it is  
difficult for institutional investors to find appropriate alternative investments considering  
they already own significant stakes in most firms in the economy. Their increasing  
presence in the capital markets implies that the opportunity set of new, profitable equity 
investments is greatly reduced.” 
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Even in larger companies where selling large shareholdings may not affect the market price 
materially, some institutional investors may be constrained by the requirements from indexing: 
“Tracking errors constrain how much one can deviate from the index, thus even active 
managers are required to hold big stock, such as BHP [Billiton], so one has to concentrate more 
on influencing a company rather than threatening to sell” (Ramsay, Stapledon and Fong, 1998 : 
34). 
 
In recent years, increasing incidences of excessive executive remuneration have been 
documented by the press (e.g. Crotty 2005a, Crotty 2005b, Crotty 2005c). It is within this 
context then that it is considered whether institutional investors have any reason to be 
concerned about executive remuneration. According to Dyl (1988 : 21): 
 
“Excessively high levels of management compensation, relative to normal or expected  
levels, are an important component of the residual loss resulting from the agency 
problem.”  
 
In an attempt to reduce this “loss”, institutional investors have started opposing excessive 
executive pay in force: In Britain, shareholder activists, led by institutional shareholders, voted 
against GlaxoSmithKline's $35.7m golden handshake to CEO J-P Garnier (The Economist, 
2003).  In 2002, executive pay was fiercely debated at Boeing, CitiGroup and General Electric, 
and over the period 1999-2000, the California Public Employees Retirement System pension 
fund (CalPERS) “not only voted against 43% of executive [share] plans...but also withheld votes 
from members of compensation committees who had authorised outrageous compensation for 
top executives” (Khan, Dharwadkar and Brandes, 2005 : 1078).  It is also no surprise then, that 
in Germany and Japan (where institutional intervention is encouraged), CEOs earn substantially 
less than their U.S. counterparts, despite having equalled or outperformed many of them during 
the last few decades (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999).  
 
 
1.2. The South African context 
 
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002 : 44) (“King II”) states that: 
“Institutional shareowners in South Africa have been notable in their apathy towards 
participating actively in shareowner meetings and it is recommended that the bodies 
representing these institutions look to the steps taken by bodies such as the National 
Association of Pension Funds and the Association of Pension Funds and the Association of 
British Insurers in the United Kingdom in setting benchmark standards expected of companies 
in relation to conformance with good corporate governance.”  
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Furthermore, the report states that, “the absence of shareowner activism in South Africa 
seriously undermines good levels of managerial compliance. Institutional investors and pension 
funds for the most part remain passive despite some very obvious instances of poor or 
undesirable corporate governance practices by South African companies. A moderate level of 
activism has recently emerged however” (King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa, 2002 : 143).  
 
The “moderate level of activism” mentioned above has emerged through a number of recent 
successes, most involving institutional investors placing pressure on management to change 
course. These include former co-operative OTK (now Afgri) being forced to adopt a new 
restructuring strategy, the Comparex (now called Business Connexion) and Kersaf boards being 
reconstituted and the delisting plans of Energy Africa and Mutual & Federal being rejected 
(Marrs, 2004).  
 
The Public Investment Corporation (PIC) has also become a more active shareholder in its 
investee companies. In recent years the PIC has challenged executive remuneration at a 
number of companies, including Dorbyl (who paid CEO Bill Cooper a R2.4 million bonus in 
2004, despite a 25% drop in earnings) and Aveng (who paid CEO Carl Grim a R166 000 bonus 
amid a 66% income drop) (Rose, 2004a).  
 
Despite the existence of these incidences of shareholder activism, there has been no formal 
South African study on the effects of institutional activism. This research report therefore intends 
to provide formal research on the topic of institutional shareholder activism, with regards to the 
specific issue of CEO compensation.  
 
 
1.3. Research problems and objectives 
 
1.3.1. Main problem and objective 
 
The primary aim of this research report is to establish whether institutional shareholders 
minimise agency costs by influencing CEO remuneration levels and structure (form), thereby 
fulfilling their requisite fiduciary duty in the manner predicted by agency theory. Data on 50 
companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange over the five-year period 2002-2006 will be 
used, resulting in a total sample size of 250 firm-year observations. Two main statistical 
methods will be used to test these hypotheses – multiple regression, and tests for differences of 
means. 
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1.3.2. Sub-problems and objectives 
 
There are two sub-problems. The first is to quantify the value of share options awarded to South 
African CEOs (as per the sample) as part of their remuneration packages over the period, and 
to provide meaningful interpretation of these results. This has not been done before in South 
Africa to date. Research has been done on the number of share options awarded to executives 
(Crotty, 2005c), but this provides little meaning unless their value has been estimated. The most 
likely reason for there being no prior research is due to the technical complexity of valuing share 
options, and the time required to gather the data. 
 
The second sub-problem is to determine the level of institutional shareholdings in companies 
and which institutions are dominant, including the role of the Public Investment Corporation. 
Much of the information on institutional shareholders is fragmented. This report intends to 
consolidate much of the information on institutional shareholders in South Africa, both 
qualitative and quantitative, and highlight their significance. For example, certain asset 
managers publish their voting records (e.g. Frater Asset Management) and have clear policies 
on specific corporate governance issues (e.g. Regarding Capital Management). This study 
intends to consolidate this information. 
 
 
1.4. Relevance of the study and expected outcomes 
 
Issues such as executive remuneration have received much publicity recently, ever since the 
increased disclosure requirements of the King II report. This has stimulated much debate, 
especially from the media, who have reported on it extensively. Corporate governance has also 
received much attention due to the corporate collapses of the recent past and the subsequent 
regulatory backlash. The fiduciary duty of those who are responsible for others' money has also 
been highlighted by a recent case against a pension fund trustee (Cameron, 2006).  
 
The main outcome of this study will provide evidence as to the effectiveness of institutional 
shareholders in minimising agency externalities. Secondary outcomes include providing 
information on CEO compensation and whether there have been any trends in the level and/or 
mix of compensation (e.g. has the structure of CEO compensation changed since the 
introduction of IFRS 2: Share-based Payments?). This will lead to the creation of a unique 
cross-sectional database of information that can be used for future research endeavours. This 
study also represents a refinement of previous (U.S.) studies because two methodologies are 
used, instead of one, and a superior option valuation model is used (the Hull and White (2004) 
model – refer to Section 3.4 for a more detailed discussion as to why this model is superior). 
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1.5. Organisation of the study 
 
Chapter II consists of a literature review which discusses the roots of this topic in agency theory, 
before moving on to a review of the empirical evidence on institutional shareholder activism, in 
particular from a South African perspective. Finally, a review of the controversies surrounding 
executive remuneration follows. Chapter III develops and presents the hypotheses to be tested, 
and discusses, in detail, the methodology used in testing these hypotheses. This is followed by 
a discussion of the various employee share option valuation models and the one used in this 
study, before concluding with the assumptions and limitations of the methodology employed. 
Chapter IV presents findings on the level of institutional shareholders over the period (in the 
sample), as well as trends in the level and mix of CEO compensation. An interpretation of the 
statistical test results follows. Chapter V concludes the study with a summary of the findings, 
discusses limitations, and identifies avenues for future research. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Agency theory is the foundation on which this research is based. This chapter first discusses the 
roots of agency theory, through the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) and later, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Next, methods of reducing agency costs are investigated, before the 
section on institutional shareholders. South African institutions, and in particular the increasingly 
important role that the PIC has come to take on, are also discussed. Much of the information 
regarding South African institutional shareholders was fragmented and has been consolidated 
in this section, particularly the information on the Public Investment Corporation and the other 
asset management companies. Finally, executive compensation is discussed, which includes a 
detailed discussion on share options and the controversies that have surrounded executive 
compensation in the recent history. 
 
2.2. Agency Theory 
 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people‟s money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master‟s honour, and very easily give 
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.” 
     -    Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776 : 700). 
 
Despite Adam Smith having alluded to the problems that existed in a firm due to the principal-
agent relationship, it wasn‟t until Berle and Means (1932), that agency theory became fully 
appreciated and recognised by academics and practitioners as a problem that had significant 
implications for the way that business would be conducted. They were the first to recognise the 
increasing separation of ownership and control, on which they wrote (Berle and Means, 1932: 
vii): 
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“The translation of perhaps two-thirds of the industrial wealth of the country from 
individual ownership to ownership by large, publicly-financed corporations vitally 
changes the lives of workers, and the methods of property tenure. The divorce of 
ownership and control consequent on that process almost necessarily involves a new 
form of economic organization of society.” 
 
Berle and Means (1932) recognised too, that stock ownership by ordinary Americans was 
increasing dramatically due to both the liquidity and wealth effects of owning shares. For 
example, they estimated that in 1929, approximately 1 million Americans owned shares, and at 
the close of 1967 (in their revised edition), conservatively estimated that figure at between 
twenty-two and twenty-three million people. As the number of shareholders in each corporation 
increased, each individual vote became less important and “the capacity of each to express 
opinions is extremely limited” (Berle and Means, 1932 : xvii). Even though each had a right to 
bring an action against the management of the company, this was very difficult to implement, 
becoming increasingly so the bigger the corporation became. Given that corporations would 
inevitably become larger and require more capital to fund their expansions, so too would the 
gap between the ownership and control of a firm become more pronounced.  
 
They also argued that, even if management owned some portion of stock, they could still 
undertake actions which, even though would decrease the value of the firm (and their own 
shareholdings), would still benefit themselves more, because they would only experience a loss 
equal to their share of the economic loss experienced by the firm. They used the numerous 
examples of railroad bankruptcies between 1900 and 1915, “as a result of financial 
mismanagement, apparently designed largely for the benefit of the controlling group, while 
heavy losses were sustained by the security holders” (Berle and Means, 1967 : 115). 
 
Yet, it would take more than 50 years after the original Berle and Means (1932) publication for 
agency theory to be revitalised through the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Their 
approach differed to the extant literature in that it investigated the incentives faced by each of 
the parties and the elements entering into the determination of the equilibrium of the relationship 
between agents and principals.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally defined agency costs as “a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976 : 308). Under such a theory, agents would tend to maximise their own utility, 
which may be at odds with acting in the best interests of the principal. This behaviour was 
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pervasive in all organisations where there are agents and principals, regardless of whether the 
firm operated in a monopolistic or competitive product or factor market. 
 
Furthermore they deconstructed agency costs into (1) monitoring costs by the principal (to limit 
deviant behaviour by the agent), (2) bonding costs that the agent may voluntarily incur to 
prevent him/herself from taking such actions or to ensure adequate compensation to the 
principal if such actions are taken, and finally, (3) a residual loss, being the “dollar equivalent of 
the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to this divergence” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976 : 308). 
 
They emphasised that every firm could be deconstructed into a nexus of contractual 
relationships amongst individuals, and that by analysing such relationships, one should be able 
to ascertain what the consequences are for the behaviour of the firm, and how they may be 
affected by exogenous changes to the firm.  
 
Thus, owner-managers will simultaneously maximise their own and their firm‟s utility, by 
benefiting from both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards. When equity is sold to outsiders, the 
owner will benefit less (due to their decreased shareholding), resulting in agency costs. These 
costs could be limited by monitoring costs (such as auditing, formal control systems and 
incentive compensation systems). It was also demonstrated that the owner would bear the 
entire wealth effects of these expected costs provided that the equity market anticipated these 
effects, i.e. the price paid for the firm‟s equity by prospective shareholders would reflect this 
divergence of interests. Hence, as the owner-manager‟s shareholding fell, so would the 
incentive to appropriate further perquisites increase, resulting in greater monitoring costs and 
reduced market value of the firm‟s equity. An important corollary to this was that as managers‟ 
fractional ownership decreased, the less their incentive was to search out new, value-creating 
ventures due to the effort involved. Such actions would result in a further deviation from the 
potential value of a firm. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), however, asserted that agency costs were not inefficient, as they 
are a necessary concomitant of the agency relationship, i.e. they would only be inefficient “in 
comparison to a world in which we would obtain compliance of the agent to the principal‟s wish 
at zero cost” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 : 328). Furthermore, agency costs would only be 
incurred if the benefits to the owner-manager exceeded these costs. 
 
They also argued that the existence and size of agency costs depended on the nature of the 
monitoring and bonding costs, the tastes of managers for non-pecuniary benefits, the costs of 
evaluating the manager‟s performance and aligning their interests with the owners, and the 
supply (and competition) for potential managers. 
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And finally, while not explicitly mentioning the potential ability of institutional shareholders to 
reduce agency costs, they noted that security analysis played an important role in monitoring 
firms, and by extension, deviant managerial behaviour. This conveniently leads us to the next 
section, which deals with mechanisms for reducing agency costs. 
 
 
2.2.1. Mechanisms for reducing agency costs 
 
The literature includes a number of mechanisms which mitigate agency costs, some of which 
are internal to the firm, and others, external. Organisational (internal) mechanisms will be dealt 
with first, and then external (market) mechanisms. 
 
 
2.2.1.1. Organisational mechanisms 
 
Expert/outsider boards 
Given that ordinary shareholders have a right to appoint board members, it is expected that the 
board would consist of individuals capable enough of monitoring management‟s actions. In 
many cases, outsiders (so called independent non-executive directors) are appointed in order to 
bring a balanced view and to keep managerial hegemony in check (David, Kochhar and Levitas, 
1998). 
 
Share-based remuneration and insider shareholders 
By aligning the interests of managers with shareholders, one can reduce agency costs. Share-
based remuneration is a means of achieving this, through the awarding of shares, share 
options, phantom shares and a wide variety of other share-based remuneration. In particular, 
because middle management‟s activities are less easier to monitor than the tasks of lower-level 
employees (who are measured usually against a fixed output per employee), “shirking by middle 
management may be reduced if they are allowed to share in profits….sharing in profit gives 
some incentive to curtail voluntarily the degree of shirking” (Demsetz, 1983 : 385). 
 
The use of debt 
First introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a means for reducing agency costs, the use 
of debt over equity reduces the amount of free cash flow available to managers to spend at their 
discretion. Jensen and Smith (1985) conducted a survey of numerous studies which showed 
that leverage-enhancing transactions resulted in significantly positively abnormal returns in 
share prices, with 2-day gains ranging from 2.2% to 21.9%. 
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2.2.1.2. External mechanisms 
 
The stock market 
First introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), external monitoring by the stock market is 
unique only to companies that are listed on stock exchanges. Share prices represent the 
“implications of internal decisions for current and future net cash flows” (Fama and Jensen, 
1983 : 313). Thus agency costs will be reflected in share prices, exerting pressure on 
management to maximising the value of the firm to its shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, Demsetz (1983 : 387) asserts that: 
 
“of course, management does worry about the prices of the firm‟s stocks and bonds 
because these give the terms on which capital will be supplied to the corporation…even 
shirking managers desire cheaper financing of amenities.”  
 
The market for corporate control (takeovers) 
The second external mechanism is also only limited to publicly-listed firms, being the external 
monitoring by the takeover market. Where the firm‟s value is not being maximised (being 
reflected by a weak share price), hostile managers from other firms can bypass existing 
managers to gain control of the firm through open market purchases of the target‟s shares (Dyl, 
1988). This further exerts pressure on the incumbent management to act in the interests of 
shareholders, and not themselves. 
 
Finally, the presence of large institutional shareholders has also shown to be a mechanism for 
reducing agency costs, but to this, an entire section is devoted. 
 
 
 
2.3. Institutional Investors 
 
 
“Social and institutional factors [have] lead to a changing zeitgeist with respect to 
corporate governance issues.”  
- Zajac and Westphal, 1995 : 288. 
 
For the purposes of this report, the definition of institutional investors as provided by Koh (2003) 
will be used. Institutional investors are defined as “large investors, other than natural persons, 
who exercise discretion over the investments of others...and include the following organisations: 
insurance companies (life and non-life), superannuation and pension funds, investment trusts 
(including unit trusts), financial institutions (including banks and finance companies, building 
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societies, and credit cooperatives), investment companies, and other nominee companies 
associated with the above categories of institutions” (Koh, 2003 : 112). 
 
While the literature on institutional investors in the United States (U.S.) is small but slowly 
expanding, the literature on them in South Africa is limited. Few studies have examined the 
effects that institutional shareholders have had on the companies that they invest in, with just 
anecdotal evidence being reported on by the media. However, the amount of influence that they 
potentially have at their disposal is undeniable.  
 
In the U.S., institutional ownership of corporations has increased from approximately 16% in 
1965 to just over 50% in 2003 (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Hamilton (2001) noted that only four 
companies in the 1000 largest American corporations had 90% or more of their shares owned 
by institutional investors in 1987, but by 1997 this had grown to 40 companies. In the U.K. and 
Australia in 1995, institutions held approximately 60% and 50% of listed domestic equities 
respectively (Ramsay et al., 1998).  
 
 
2.3.1. South African institutions 
 
In South Africa there is very little research as to how much exactly institutional investors own. 
Currently the biggest institutional investor is the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), with over 
R786.8 billion worth of assets under management and approximately 47% of those funds 
invested on the JSE, as at 31 March 2008 (Public Investment Corporation, 2008). The PIC 
controls about 9.1% of the market capitalisation of the JSE (Public Investment Corporation, 
2008).   
 
The PIC is wholly owned by the South African government, and though founded in 1911, it was 
only established as a corporate entity in terms of the Public Investment Corporation Act of 2004, 
on 1 April 2004 (www.pic.gov.za). The PIC invests funds on behalf of public sector entities, of 
which its biggest client is the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), which accounts 
for approximately 91.7% of assets, and is the seventh largest pension fund in the world (Public 
Investment Corporation, 2008). However, owing to its size (and the fact that any meaningful 
portfolio adjustments could have major implications for the capital markets) has led to the PIC 
outsourcing some 86% of its equity portfolio to external asset managers, which include RMB 
Asset Management, Stanlib, Futuregrowth, Sanlam Investment Managers and Old Mutual Asset 
Management (now called Old Mutual Investment Group South Africa) (Rose & Gunnion, 2005). 
In March 2005, the PIC relocated R22 billion of equity investments from these managers to their 
internal fund, largely due to the fact that its own fund had outperformed its outsourced funds, 
and that the PIC had started to bolster its own investment teams (Gunnion, 2005). 
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The following table shows South Africa‟s 15 largest asset managers, by assets under 
management (excluding the PIC), as of 31 December 2007: 
 
 
Table 1: South Africa‟s 15 largest asset managers at 31 December 2007 
 
Rank Company 
Total Assets under management as 
at 31 December 2007 (R’000) 
1 Old Mutual Investment Group SA 445 691,8 
2 Stanlib Asset Management  339 828,0 
3 Sanlam Investment Management 288 213,0 
4 Allan Gray 233 962,5 
5 Investec 222 552,9 
6 RMB Asset Management 190 510,0 
7 Investment Solutions 138 600,7 
8 Coronation Fund Managers 133 408,1 
9 Sanlam Multi Managers 101 419,4 
10 Absa Asset Management 77 552,0 
11 Prudential Portfolio Managers 71 629,5 
12 Metropolitan Asset Managers 60 423,1 
13 Advantage Asset Management 57 771,2 
14 Cadiz African Harvest 49 810,0 
15 Prescient Investment Management 40 742,3 
 
Financial Mail Top Companies 2008: 136 
 
 
2.3.2. Institutional shareholder activism 
 
Possibly the biggest area of research has concerned the role of institutional investors in 
maximising shareholder wealth and curtailing poor management decisions. Activism “includes a 
broad set of actions including public announcements, shareholder proposals and proxy 
contests, through which institutional investors attempt to gain power” (David and Kochhar, 1996 
: 463).  
 
The main aim of these actions is to bring public pressure on complacent managers, thus 
improving firm performance and enhancing shareholder value. The efficacy of these actions is 
ultimately dependent on, amongst other things, their legitimacy, managers' attitude to such 
actions, and any legislative barriers. For example, in Germany and Japan, where a strong 
culture of activism exists, numerous interventions by institutional investors have led to major 
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turnarounds (Akai Electric in Japan) and management shake-outs (Daimler-Benz in Germany) 
because the prevailing regime encourages, and is conducive to, such action (David and 
Kochhar, 1996).  
 
In contrast to this, in the United States, where regulatory barriers exist, institutional action is 
sometimes considered as an unwarranted intrusion into companies' affairs (Smith, 1996). 
California's public pension fund, California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), is 
infamous for its targeted interventions. Smith (1996) examined firms that were targeted by 
CalPERS over the period 1987-1993 and found that 72% adopted proposed changes or made 
changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. He further found that shareholder wealth 
increased for firms that adopted or settled, while decreased for those that resisted the action. 
For CalPERS, “the value increase of its holdings from activism is almost $19 million over the 
1987-1993 period…while its estimated costs of activism over the same period were 
approximately $3.5 million” (Smith, 1996 : 251). 
 
Nesbitt (1994) also investigated companies targeted by CalPERS, and in particular, their long-
term share price performance. Prior to the initiative led by CalPERS, the targeted companies 
had under-performed the S&P 500 index by 66% over the previous 5 years, but outperformed 
the index by 41% over the subsequent 5 years. “To the extent such long-term excess gains are 
attributable to an ongoing institutional catalyst for change and a fundamental response by 
directors and management, the results of this study provide support for the effectiveness of 
long-term relationship investing” (Nesbitt, 1994 : 80). 
 
Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) examined the activities of the Teachers Insurance 
Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), the single largest U.S. 
pension fund which holds approximately 1% of the total U.S. equity market. They found that out 
of the 45 firms that TIAA-CREF contacted between 1992 and 1996 about governance issues, 
agreements were reached with 42 firms (93%) and 39 (87%) subsequently took action to 
comply with these agreements. They also found statistically significant positive abnormal returns 
surrounding the targeting date for blank cheque preferred issues. 
 
Gillan and Starks (2000) examined the voting outcomes and short-term market reactions of 
shareholder proposals (known in South Africa as shareholder‟s resolutions), depending on the 
proposal type and the identity of the proposal‟s sponsor. The sample consisted of 2042 
shareholder proposals submitted at 452 companies over the period 1987-1994. Of the 
proposals, 463 were submitted by institutional investors, 213 proposals by co-ordinated groups 
of individual investors, and the remaining 1366 proposals were from individual investors.  
 
Proposals sponsored by the latter garnered fewer votes and were associated with a slightly 
positive affect on share prices. However, proposals sponsored by institutional investors and co-
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ordinated groups of investors received significantly more votes and had a small, negative impact 
on share prices. Gillan and Starks (2000 : 301) explained this by stating that “the negative 
reaction may result from a belief that the appearance of the proposal in the proxy statement is a 
signal of management‟s unwillingness to negotiate with such investors”. In a related study, 
Gordon and Pound (1993) found the same results. 
 
Many of the studies however, only focused on “visible” activism. Behind-the-scenes (or 
“invisible”) activism also occurs but is more difficult to research, and is likely to be more effective 
than visible activism (Coffee, 1991). A study by Opler and Sokobin (1997), investigated firms 
that were on the „focus list‟ of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an umbrella 
organisation for large institutional investors in the U.S. Compared to other such organisations 
(e.g. CalPERS), the CII used quiet diplomacy when engaging with investee companies, and not 
public shareholder proposals. The study covered 117 firms over the period 1991-1994. Prior to 
appearing on the list, the targeted firms exhibited poor share price performance. After being put 
on the list, the targeted firms outperformed control firms (matched by industry, book-to-market 
ratios, and prior returns) in both share price performance and accounting performance.  
 
Another study, by Strickland, Wiles and Zenner (1996), examined 216 proposals at 85 firms 
during 1990-1993, by the United Shareholders Association (USA), an organisation for small 
shareholders. The USA monitored publicly-traded firms and targeted those that had poor 
financial performance, executive compensation plans that were not sensitive to firm 
performance and policies that limited shareholder input on corporate governance. The 
organisation first attempted to negotiate agreements with targeted firms, using its 65 000 
members‟ ability to sponsor proxy proposals as leverage. The results indicated that the USA 
successfully negotiated changes involving 53 proposals before those were submitted for 
inclusion in proxy statements. The targeted firms‟ shareholders experienced an abnormal return 
of 0.9% at the announcement of the negotiated agreement, suggesting that the USA was 
successful in its actions. 
 
 
2.3.3. South African institutional shareholder activism 
 
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002 : 44) notes that: 
 
“Institutional shareowners in South Africa have been notable in their apathy towards 
participating actively in shareowner meetings and it is recommended that the bodies 
representing these institutions look to the steps taken by bodies such as the National 
Association of Pension Funds and the Association of Pension Funds and the 
Association of British Insurers in the United Kingdom in setting benchmark standards 
expected of companies in relation to conformance with good corporate governance.”  
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Furthermore, the report states that, “the absence of shareowner activism in South Africa 
seriously undermines good levels of managerial compliance. Institutional investors and pension 
funds for the most part remain passive despite some very obvious instances of poor or 
undesirable corporate governance practices by South African companies. A moderate level of 
activism has recently emerged however” (King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa (2002 : 143). 
 
The “moderate level of activism” mentioned above has emerged through a number of recent 
successes, most involving institutional investors placing pressure on management to change 
course. These include former co-operative OTK (now Afgri) being forced to adopt a new 
restructuring strategy, the Comparex (now called Business Connexion) and Kersaf boards being 
reconstituted and the delisting plans of Energy Africa and Mutual & Federal being rejected 
(Marrs, 2004).  
 
In the following section the Comparex case (owing to its precedent-setting nature), the emerging 
role of the PIC, as well as an examination of the status quo in South Africa, is reviewed. Please 
note that due to the scarcity of academic research on institutional shareholders in South Africa, 
the information that follows has been mainly obtained from newspapers, websites and other 
financial-related press articles. 
 
 
2.3.3.1. Comparex case study 
 
In June 2002, a group of institutional shareholders of Comparex decided to change the board of 
the Information Technology (IT) consulting company, arising from frustration with management, 
mainly for not productively using the windfall it had received from selling its networking business 
to Dimension Data at the height of the IT boom (Cohen, 2003).  
 
Their argument was that the company should either use the money productively or give it back 
to shareholders. Part of this windfall had already been spent in Europe for little return, and the 
company was losing money. The situation was complicated by the fact that the market value of 
IT assets was collapsing at the time and that any investment might be markedly cheaper by 
waiting a bit longer. But institutional shareholders became weary after two years of inaction. 
This was followed by a letter sent on behalf of Allan Gray, Investec Asset Management and 
Sanlam Investment Management stating that they supported a change in the board, if 
necessary by calling an extraordinary general meeting (Cohen, 2003).  
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The Comparex directors replied, complaining to the Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) that the 
acts of the asset managers constituted “action in concert” and arguing they were to be obliged 
to make an offer to minorities because collectively they owned more than 35% of the company‟s 
shares. If this argument was upheld, the asset managers‟ action would be regarded as an 
“affected transaction” in terms of Section 440 of the Companies Act and the panel‟s rules (See 
Section 2.3.5.2.) (Cohen, 2003). 
 
The SRP ruled that the fund managers had not contravened the section. The finding was largely 
based on the definition of “control” and a distinction between types of mandates that are granted 
to asset managers by pension funds and the like. The SRP also pointed out that an agreement 
on how the parties will vote at a general meeting was not in itself sufficient to give rise to an 
affected transaction, as it was not allied with a decision to acquire shares (Cohen, 2003). The 
significance of this ruling was considered a major victory for shareholder activism as it 
effectively allowed institutional shareholders to pool their voting power in cases where 
managers act contrary to shareholder value maximisation. In any event, many of the directors 
resigned instead of waiting for the SRP's ruling and the board was reconstituted with the 
company being renamed Business Connexion (Cohen, 2003). 
 
 
2.3.3.2. The PIC – champion for shareholder activism? 
 
Following its corporatisation in April 2005, the PIC has become a more active shareholder in its 
investee companies (Rose, 2004a). In recent years the PIC has challenged executive 
remuneration at a number of companies, including Dorbyl (who paid CEO Bill Cooper a R2.4 
million bonus in 2004, despite a 25% drop in earnings) and Aveng (who paid CEO Carl Grim a 
R166 000 bonus amid a 66% income drop) (Rose, 2004a).  
 
In May 2005, the PIC also questioned life assurer Sanlam as to why it wanted shareholders to 
approve a 60% pay increase for its chairman, Roy Andersen, at its June 1 annual general 
meeting (Rose, 2005a). Later in November of that year, the PIC voted against Shoprite CEO 
Whitey Basson's R58 million package, but failed to lobby others to reject it (Rose, 2005b).  
 
The PIC also investigated listed industrial Barloworld, in 2007. In January 2007, the PIC, which 
owned 17.2% worth of Barloworld‟s shares, challenged the conglomerate for not having a single 
black director on its Board. It was also unhappy that the Chairman of the Board, Warren 
Clewlow, was also the father-in-law of the recently appointed CEO, Clive Thomson (Rumney, 
2007). This subsequently led to four directors resigning from the Board, including Clewlow 
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himself, and the appointment of a black Chairman, advocate Dumisa Ntsebeza, and a black 
executive director, Isaac Shongwe (Mantshantsha, 2007). 
 
However, shortly afterwards, Barloworld announced the appointment of former SASOL deputy 
CEO, Trevor Munday, as deputy chairman of the group, a newly created position that had not 
existed at the company for more than a decade. The PIC described this as being “racist and 
patronising, because it would appear that the company believes the first black person to 
become chairman in its 105-year history needs a white deputy to look over his shoulder” (Rose, 
2007a). Munday subsequently also resigned.  
 
The PIC also recently indicated its intention to review the independence of some of Barloworld‟s 
independent non-executive directors, especially that of Mike Levett, a non-executive director 
who had been with the company for 22 years (Crotty, 2007a). It regarded such a tenure to 
severely affect the independence of a director who was supposed to be independent of that 
company. 
 
The amount of influence that the PIC has cannot be questioned, simply due to the amount of 
funds that it has under management. However, a more pertinent issue is how strong its links 
with government still are. This is important because, while the PIC will remain a state entity and 
some of its board members will be government appointees, its primary responsibility is to the 
state employees whose pension funds it manages. This was highlighted in the actions that the 
PIC took against Sasol over the appointment of a black director, Imogen Mkhize (Rose, 2004b), 
as well as with Barloworld (Rumney, 2007). In 2008, the PIC vetoed directors‟ pay at a number 
of companies, including AngloGold Ashanti, where is said that the fees were “extremely high” 
(Rose, 2008 : 140). 
 
The following table shows the top 10 holdings of the PIC as at 31 March 2008. The table is 
relevant, as it shows the significant voting power that the PIC has in many of the companies in 
which it invests, and thus, the ability to enable change at these companies. 
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Table 2: Top 10 holdings of the Public Investment Corporation at 31 March 2008 
 
 Company name Percent 
1 SA Corporate Real Estate Fund 31.29% 
2 Growthpoint Properties Ltd 29.14% 
3 Alexander Forbes Pref Share Inv Ltd 22.85% 
4 Lewis Group Ltd 19.93% 
5 Aveng Ltd 18.89% 
6 Imperial Holdings Ltd 17.93% 
7 Telkom SA Ltd 17.77% 
8 Sasol Ltd 17.10% 
9 Barloworld Ltd 15.16% 
10 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd 14.83% 
 
Source: Public Investment Corporation (2008 : 84).  
 
 
2.3.3.3. Other significant institutional shareholders 
 
2.3.3.3.1. Frater Asset Management 
Frater Asset Management (“Fraters”) is possibly the most vocal of all institutional shareholders 
on principles of corporate governance. They were not only the first asset manager to offer an 
“activist” investment (the Fraters Earth Equity Fund – launched in October 2001), but were also 
the first to publish a complete voting record and voting proxy policy (Frater Asset Management, 
2007a).  
 
From an international perspective, they were also the first South African asset manager to 
become a signatory to the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing, as well as the 
first to become a signatory to the Principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) – an initiative that supports the full publication and verification of company payments and 
government revenues from oil, gas and mining, in resource-rich countries (Frater Asset 
Management, 2007b).  
 
 29 
Certain asset managers such as Investec Asset Management and Cadiz African Harvest don‟t 
publish their voting records, as they believe that it would lead to unhelpful public debates on 
each vote – they preferred to work privately with companies, than publicly against them 
(Bonorchis, 2007a).  
 
Fraters, however, have been public with their intentions. To this end, they have set up an 
independent advisory board, selected from local company directors, professionals, and 
international asset managers that adopt a similar approach and leaders of a number of non-
governmental organisations (Frater Asset Management, 2007c). This board reviews 
engagement and voting policies, helps set priorities for engagement and suggests methods of 
engagement (Frater Asset Management, 2007c).  
 
One of the responsibilities of the board is to review Fraters‟ voting policies. According to the 
voting policy, “as far as possible, Fraters will contact the company, preferably in writing, prior to 
voting, to discuss our concerns, explain why Fraters is voting in a particular manner, explain the 
voting policies of the firm, and to request the company to implement a strategy to meet our 
recommendations, where appropriate” (Frater Asset Management, 2007d : 3).  
 
The policy document sets out very clear guidelines as to how Fraters will vote in certain 
scenarios, and their views on certain governance issues. These include extensive provisions on 
the re-election of directors, the size and composition of the Board, remuneration of directors, 
capital allocation decisions (share issues, repurchases, etc.) and others. Because an important 
topic of this study deals with executive remuneration, this will be discussed next. 
 
Fraters would consider a symbolic vote against the re-election of one or all of the Chairman, 
deputy chairman and the chairman and members of the remuneration committee should the 
company consistently fail to adopt best practice standards with regards to remuneration. 
(Section B, item 3.1.3.). Fraters is opposed to share options being awarded to non-executives 
as they believe that it may impair their independence, but if they are awarded, there are very 
strict conditions under which they should be awarded, e.g. share options should not be issued 
at a discount, and they should be aligned with board performance indicators, not performance 
indicators that are applied under general employee share option schemes (Section B, item 
3.2.4.). This was evident when they voted against share options being awarded to Mervyn King, 
a non-executive at furniture retailer JD Group (Rose, 2008). 
 
Fraters also stipulates significant disclosures by companies with regards to share option 
schemes (Section B, item 3.3.6.). And finally, where Fraters believes there to be excessive 
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remuneration, “where it is inadequately motivated and there is a clear misalignment of interests 
between management and shareholders, Fraters should consider voting against one or all 
members of the remuneration committee nominated for re-election, and/or the Chairman or 
deputy chairman” (Section B, item 3.4.).  
 
However, in terms of assets under management, they are a relatively small institution and would 
have less of an impact as a bigger institution, such as Allan Gray. 
 
 
2.3.3.3.2. Allan Gray 
Allan Gray is the largest privately-owned investment management firm in South Africa, with 
assets under management of R234 billion as of 31 December 2007 (Financial Mail, 2008). They 
have been involved in some of the more high-profile shareholder conflicts in South Africa. In 
2000, they were instrumental in forcing through management changes at listed agricultural co-
operative OTK (Marrs, 2004). They were also involved in the previously mentioned Comparex 
case.  
 
Allan Gray also often takes large positions in its investee companies. For example, the 
approximately 25% stake that it held in both mining companies JCI and Randgold & Exploration 
(R&E) enabled it to be the chief proponent behind the ousting of Brett Kebble (from both 
companies) in August 2005, for which the Chief Investment Officer, Stephen Mildenhall, was 
alleged shot at by supporters of Kebble (Sergeant, 2007). More recently, they were also 
involved in the ousting of 2 directors from the Board of R&E (Sergeant, 2007). 
  
 
2.3.3.3.3. Other companies 
One of the few companies (other than Fraters) to publish its policy on certain corporate 
governance issues is Regarding Capital Management (“RE:CM”). There are clear policies with 
regards to the composition of the Board of Directors, directors‟ remuneration policies, and the 
repurchasing and issuing of shares. Of particular relevance to this study, was their policy on 
executive share option schemes: 
“In principle, we are against share option schemes as a form of remuneration, unless they 
contain very challenging performance conditions. Options issuance should be linked to explicit 
financial performance criteria, preferably relative to an index of comparable companies. Such a 
 31 
share option scheme must only be available to top management” (Regarding Capital 
Management, 2007).  
RE:CM is also the only other asset manager to publish its voting records (Bonorchis, 2007b). In 
2008, RE:CM voted against Standard Bank chairman Derek Cooper‟s remuneration, as they 
believed “the amount proposed for his remuneration [was] excessive” (Rose, 2008 : 140). 
Unfortunately, RE:CM has significantly less funds under management than some of the more 
established asset managers.  
A number of other companies also have standard policies on certain company actions (see also 
sub-section 2.3.3.4. below). These often involve critical decisions such as giving directors 
approval for issuing shares for cash. Institutions such as Fraters, Coronation Asset 
Management (Coronation), Allan Gray, RMB Asset Management (RMB) and RE:CM all have 
written policies against such resolutions (Jones, 2007).  
 
 
2.3.3.4. The current state of institutional shareholder activism in South Africa 
 
Trevor Manuel, the Minister of Finance, has urged pension fund trustees and members to “pool 
their collective muscle” to influence companies in which pension funds are invested (Rose, 
2005c). The biggest pension fund in South Africa – the Government Employee Pension Fund 
(GEPF) – also falls under him as Minister of Finance, and it (the GEPF) recently signed the 
Principles of Responsible Investment (Bonorchis, 2007a). This will require the fund to disclose 
how it votes. “If that were to happen, it may follow that the Public Investment Corporation and 
the fund managers that it uses may follow suit. This would be the tipping point for shareholder 
activism in SA” (Bonorchis, 2007a : 1). 
 
Trade unions such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) said that it would 
also play a more active role in influencing corporate decisions using the leverage of workers' 
pension money (Rose, 2005c). These events have served to create an environment in which 
trustees are becoming more aware of their fiduciary duties. 
 
In a recent event involving MTN Group Ltd (“MTN”), the influence of institutional shareholders 
was again highlighted (Anderson, 2007). At MTN‟s Annual General Meeting, 46% of 
shareholders voted against the resolution giving directors the general authority to issue up to 
10% of the company‟s share capital. The resolution was therefore rejected, because it required 
the approval of 75% of shareholders.  
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Institutional shareholders, Allan Gray and RMB Asset Management, both voted against the 
resolution, citing standard policy not to allow directors the freedom to issue large amounts of 
shares without first consulting them with regards to the reasons for the share issue (Anderson, 
2007). RMB cited a further reason that “the company would be virtually ungeared by end-
December-2008 and, consequently, it didn‟t seem wise to issue shares for cash” (Anderson, 
2007 : 26).  
 
The Financial Services Board (FSB) recently published a circular entitled “Good Governance of 
Retirement Funds” (www.fsb.co.za/pension/circulars.html). However, the circular only mentions 
how pension funds should be run, and is silent on shareholder activism and disclosure of 
shareholder votes. This has been criticised by some, including Fraters, who described it as 
being of little substance (Bonorchis, 2007a). 
 
Finally, in August 2007, the PIC released its much-awaited corporate governance guidelines. 
Whilst similar to King II in many ways, it has a number of distinguishing features, most of all 
being that while King II was not required to be complied with by companies (although JSE-listed 
firms are required to report deviations from King II), the PIC‟s set of governance principles will 
be enforced by a large, powerful shareholder. The PIC will also start publishing its voting 
records from March 2008 (Crotty, 2007b). 
 
Its distinguishing features include opposing dual equity capitalization structures that give 
preferential voting rights to different classes of shares (e.g. Naspers, Remgro), pyramid 
structures (e.g. Standard Bank-Liberty Holdings-Liberty Life), companies that do not have 
independent, non-executive chairmen (e.g. JD Group, Steinhoff), and companies that do not 
have Boards that “reflect the demographics of the country in terms of gender and race” (Rose, 
2007b : 62). Finally, the most significant differentiator is its clear statement on executive 
remuneration. The PIC requires companies to provide detailed disclosure on how and why 
executives are remunerated the way that they are. It also prefers that non-executive directors 
are paid only in cash, as it believes that share-based remuneration may undesirably 
compromise the independence of such directors.  
 
The major criticism of this code, however, is that it essentially uses the same definition of 
“independence” that King II uses, which is notably deficient with regards to non-executive 
directors who have served long periods on company boards (Rose, 2007b). 
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2.3.4. Empirical evidence on institutional shareholders 
 
The four main areas in which the effect of institutional investors has been studied relate to 
corporate takeovers, innovation/research and development, corporate diversification and 
dividend policy. However, in some of these areas the conclusions have been equivocal. The 
literature examining the relationship with executive compensation is reviewed in a later section, 
owing to its stand-alone significance. 
 
 
2.3.4.1. Corporate anti-takeover amendments 
 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) examined whether institutional investors voted differently to 
other investors when it came to anti-take over charters, using data from 201 firms that proposed 
308 anti-takeover amendments during 1984 in the U.S.. Their hypothesis was that managers of 
poorly performing firms have incentives to protect their positions with anti-takeover defences, 
which may reduce shareholder value. They found that institutional investors not only voted more 
actively on these amendments (compared to other investors) but also voted against value-
destroying anti-takeover defences. They also found that different types of institutional investors 
voted differently. In order to avoid repetition, this is discussed in Section 2.3.5.1., because it is 
more relevant to that section.  
 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1992) also examined anti-takeover proposals, using data from 356 
firms in the U.S. over the period 1979-1985. They documented a statistically significant negative 
relationship between the ownership of institutional shareholders and the abnormal returns on 
the shares of firms around the announcement of anti-takeover amendments, indicating that their 
findings were consistent with the theory that firms with large institutional ownership are more 
likely to maximise shareholder wealth. 
 
 
2.3.4.2. Innovation/research and development 
 
Jarrell and Lehn (1985), as cited in Graves (1988), examined the relationship between 
institutional ownership and research and development (R&D) spending in 324 companies during 
the period 1980-1983. Using multiple regression analysis, they found a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the level of institutional ownership and the R&D-to-sales ratio, 
suggesting that institutional investors encourage such value-creating expenditure. 
 
Graves (1988) extended the study of Jarrell and Lehn (1985), but focused on a single industry – 
computer manufacturing – over the period 1976-1985. He used two measures of R&D intensity: 
constant-dollar R&D expenditures per employee and R&D as a proportion of sales. Graves 
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(1988), however, found a negative relationship between R&D intensity (spend) and institutional 
ownership, arguing that such spending tends to be large and left to managers' discretion, and 
hence subject to abuse. Given that the study was focused on the computer industry, Graves 
(1988) acknowledged that such behaviour might also be only endemic to that industry. He also 
attributed this to possible reason that some institutional investors may have a short -term focus, 
and thus would discourage R&D spending, as they negatively affect short-term earnings. 
 
In a later study, Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk (1991) examined the R&D programmes of 176 
Fortune 500 companies over the period 1980-1983, and across different industries. They found 
a positive relationship between corporate R&D programmes and the level of institutional share 
ownership, arguing that, “the prospect of high financial returns attracts institutional investors to 
companies that engage in long-term R&D strategies, and the investment risk does not deter 
these investors because they can diversify it away” (Baysinger et al., 1991: 212). 
 
 
2.3.4.3. Corporate diversification 
 
Palmer, Friedland, Jennings and Powers (1987) examined the relationship between institutional 
ownership and corporate diversification, using data on 147 firms over the period 1963-1964. 
The found a negative relationship between the two, arguing that institutional investors 
discourage such „empire building‟ by managers.    
 
In contrast to this, Hansen and Hill (1991) conducted a study of 129 firms over the period 1977-
1987 and found a positive association, noting that some institutions would rather use the 
activities of their investee companies through which to diversify their own risk. 
 
 
2.3.4.3. Dividend policy 
 
Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) as well as Eckbo and Verma (cited in Short et al., 2002) found 
a positive association between institutional shareholdings and a firm's dividend payouts in the 
United Kingdom and Canada, respectively. Short et al. (2002) examined 211 firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange over the period 1988-1992, and used 4 different types of dividend 
models to test their hypothesis. 
 
Short et al. (2002) argued that the payment of dividends reduces agency costs, as such 
payment forces a firm to go to external capital markets in order to secure additional finance, and 
thus the firm has to undergo monitoring by the capital market. Short et al. (2002), further cited 
the favourable tax treatment of dividends (over capital gains), as a reason that institutional 
shareholders may prefer companies with higher dividend payouts. 
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2.3.5. Barriers to effective governance 
 
While it may seem that institutional investors wield immense power, in some ways this power is 
constrained. The main threats to their ability to monitor firms effectively arise from additional 
business relationships they may have with investee companies, regulatory restrictions, high 
costs of monitoring and lack of organisational capability and other reasons that may affect 
institutional shareholders who are only short-term holders of the company‟s shares (i.e. active 
traders). These are discussed in detail below. 
 
 
2.3.5.1. Business relationships 
 
With some financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies, there is a possible 
conflict of interest as these institutions may also invest in the companies with which they have 
commercial dealings. Thus, institutions' ability to intervene is limited to the extent to which they 
depend on those companies for business.  
 
Brickley et al. (1988) developed a taxonomy of different types of institutional investors, with 
three classifications of institutional investors: “pressure-resistant” (those without any significant 
business relationship); “pressure-sensitive” (those for whom a conflict of interest is highly 
probable) and; “pressure-indeterminate” (those for which there is a business relationship, but 
uncertainty as to the influence of such relationship). Brickley et al. (1988)  found that mutual 
funds, endowments and foundations, and public pension funds are more likely to oppose anti-
takeover charter amendments than banks, insurance companies and trusts, the latter group 
more likely are which to have business relationships with their investee companies. 
 
Kochhar and David (1996) also found that only institutional investors without potential business 
relationships positively influence firms' investment in innovation, while other institutions have no 
effect, further confirming that business relationships provide a barrier to corporate governance. 
 
 
2.3.5.2. Barriers from the regulatory environment 
 
In a survey conducted by Ramsay et al. (1998) amongst Australian institutional investors, most 
indicated that insider trading provisions acted as a disincentive to effective monitoring by 
restricting the level of monitoring, due to the fear of acquiring inside information and thus being 
prohibited from trading the shares until such information was made public.  
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Black (1990) cited a complex web of legal rules that made it difficult, expensive and legally risky 
to own large percentage stakes or to undertake joint efforts, by institutional shareholders in the 
U.S. These include various barriers such as state corporate law, proxy rules, disclosure 
requirements, insider trading reporting and liability, poison pills, ownership limits, fiduciary 
liability, and antitrust concerns (Black, 1990). Black and Coffee (1994) examined shareholder 
passivity in the U.K., and came to similar conclusions as Black (1990). 
 
Following the Comparex case, the only potential regulatory barrier to institutional shareholders 
acting in concert was effectively removed by the SRP's decision. The ruling meant that 
institutional shareholders are allowed to act in concert, provided that there is no simultaneous 
arrangement in place to acquire shares with intention to take control. This would not constitute a 
breach of S440 of the Companies' Act. 
 
 
2.3.5.3. Barriers due to monitoring costs and organisational capability 
 
When shareholders are dispersed and ownership is less concentrated, monitoring costs are 
high due to the need for co-ordination and increased information asymmetry (Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia, 1989). As the number of owners increases, the benefits that an individual investor 
receives for greater monitoring decrease with the marginal costs required, creating a „free rider‟ 
problem. Hence, monitoring ultimately depends on the cost-benefit trade-off. 
 
Furthermore, some institutions (especially the smaller, boutique-types), may not have the 
sufficient resources, both time and staffing, to engage in interventions (Black and Coffee, 1994). 
Intervention may consume scarce managerial time, and then there is the added disincentive that 
larger rivals (who are also invested in the target company) may also gain from the action. 
 
 
2.3.5.4. Barriers as a result of being an active trader 
 
Some institutions may only hold a company‟s shares for the short-term and may be apathetic 
towards shareholder activism for a number of reasons. Firstly, these institutions may be cut off 
from the flow of information that management provides to securities analysts and institutions, if 
they challenge management on certain issues (Soobyah, 2002). The value of this information 
may not be as beneficial to long term holders such as pension funds or asset managers with 
long investment horizons. 
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Secondly, due to the long-term benefits of shareholder intervention, these short-term 
shareholders may have no incentive to act. For example, a disruption may even lead to an 
interim period of share price weaknesses, which is undesirable for these investors. 
 
Black (1990) makes mention of a number of „cultural factors‟ that may further inhibit shareholder 
action. The focus by many fund managers on outperforming their competitors may mean that 
they are not accustomed to taking legal risks. 
 
 
2.3.6. A survey of South African institutional shareholders 
 
Soobyah (2002) conducted a survey of a sample of institutional shareholders in South Africa. 
The sample consisted of 2 respondents from each of Abvest (ABSA‟s previous asset 
management division), Fraters, and FTNIB Asset Management (now Nedgroup Investments), 
who at the time managed R40 billion worth of funds collectively. While the sample size may 
have been small, its findings were interesting and relevant to this study. The survey was 
intended to ascertain what some of the factors were that inhibited shareholder activism in South 
Africa (amongst other things). 
 
A unique factor related to the convoluted control structures that were established in the past, 
such as low-voting “N” shares (e.g Naspers, Brimstone) and pyramid structures (e.g. the Liberty 
Holdings-Liberty Group pyramid structure), which made shareholder intervention difficult. 
However, since the JSE has now outlawed the creation of these (despite allowing existing 
structures to continue), this is less likely to be a factor in the future (Soobyah, 2002). 
 
Another factor was the close relationship between corporate managers and institutions, owing to 
the small community of institutional investors. This often led to a conflict of interest, as “there 
were only six or seven major institutions, which had close associations with brokers, investment 
banks and asset managers” (Soobyah, 2002 : 48).  
 
Trustees of pension funds were also cited as being uninformed on certain issues, as well as 
their significant workloads and short tenures precluding them from taking a more active stance. 
Other factors included the lack of time and resources, as well as expertise in dealing with 
corporate governance issues, on the part of asset managers. The respondents also cited the 
„free rider‟ problem, as well as the negative publicity that may arise from interventions, which 
may result in depressed prices due to panicked selling. Finally, scrip lending by pension funds 
was common because it contributed additional revenue separate from fund performance. When 
funds lend their scrip, they lose the ability to vote, which may be material in instances when 
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value is destroyed (Soobyah, 2002).  
 
The institutions were also asked that, if a company exhibited poor corporate governance, 
whether they (the institutions) would sell the shares or engage with management. The general 
response was that they would first engage with management, making management aware of 
their position and recommending possible courses of action. The next course of action would 
depend on the relative size of the holding – if it was small then the company would be sold, but 
if it was a large, then further engagement with management would be undertaken. One of the 
respondents mentioned the likelihood of meeting with other institutional investors should the 
matter be serious enough (Soobyah, 2002). 
 
 
 
2.4. CEO compensation 
 
 
“Fed by an exaggerated and unsubstantiated belief in their own importance, heightened 
by unspoken threats of imminent departure to even better paying jobs in Dubai, Sydney 
or Atlanta...these executives have heaped a whole load of money, share options and 
glory on themselves.”  
– Crotty, 2005b. 
 
Executive remuneration has come under increasing scrutiny following the detailed disclosure 
now required by companies in their annual reports. While researchers in South Africa have 
seemingly ignored this previously unavailable information, the financial press has not. Due to 
the limited research in South Africa, most of the research that is cited is based on studies 
conducted in the United States. As one of the objectives of this report is to provide original 
South African findings, the findings of this research report are presented in Chapter IV. 
 
 
2.4.1. Components of CEO compensation 
 
CEO remuneration has many components, the sum total of which is not always the most 
important. To lend some structure to this discussion, total compensation, consisting of salary, 
bonus and share options, is referred to as the level of pay; each component is called a type of 
pay; and the combination of types is called the mix of pay (David et al., 1998). While the amount 
of pay is an important factor, consideration of type and mix explicitly recognises the complexity 
of CEO remuneration. 
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2.4.2. Trends in the level and mix of compensation 
 
Hall and Liebman (1998) found that the mean salary and bonus of U.S. CEOs grew by 97% 
over the period 1980-1994 (median by 85%), from $655 000 to $1.3 million (median from $566 
541 to $1.05 million). The rise in the value of share options was even more dramatic, with the 
mean value of option grants having risen by 683% from $155 000 to $1.2 million (median from 
$0 to $325 000). Furthermore, Hall and Liebman (1998) found that the percentage of CEOs 
being awarded share options had grown from 30% in 1980 to 70% in 1994, while the number of 
executives holding share options increased from 57% to 87%, making them a very important 
component of equity incentives. The New York Times reports that share options were "the 
source of more than half of most top executives' compensation in 2001," (Maloney, 2002 : 1).  
 
In South Africa, there is minimal research dealing with the value (not amount) of share options 
awarded to company executives. A survey conducted by staff recruitment firm Renwick Reward 
found that the average compensation package of SA CEOs comprised approximately 40% of 
share options (van der Kooy, 2000). Betts, Billett, Rainier and Survé (2005) found that executive 
share options as a percentage of total shares outstanding rose from about 2% to 2.5% over the 
period 2000-2004 in South Africa, indicating their increased popularity. They didn't, however, 
examine trends in option grants. One of the aims of this study is to quantify the actual value of 
share options awarded to company CEOs in South Africa, something that no other previous 
South African study has yet done (to the best of the author‟s knowledge). 
 
The tilt towards incentive compensation is mainly in response to the agency problem – the often 
conflicting goals of managers and owners (shareholders), exacerbated by the separation of 
management and ownership. By aligning the incentives of executives with the interests of 
shareholders through the use of shares and share options, the agency problem is somewhat 
ameliorated.  
 
One method of assessing how well the compensation structure ties CEO pay to firm 
performance is to calculate the dollar (rand) change in CEO pay relative to each thousand dollar 
(rand) change in total shareholder wealth. This particular relationship was specified by Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) and is referred to as “pay-performance sensitivity”. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
found that this has more than doubled from $2.5 to $5.3 per $1000 change in firm value (from 
1980-1994).  
 
 
2.4.3. Share options 
 
 
2.4.3.1. The mechanics of share options 
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A typical call option used in an executive compensation scheme allows the grantee to purchase 
a specified number of shares at a fixed exercise price. Typically, share options granted have 
maturity dates of five to ten years after the grant date (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999). The option 
contracts are written to allow the executive the right (but not the obligation) to exercise the 
option any time before it matures (i.e. they are “American” call options). Usually there are some 
formal restrictions on early exercise during the first few years of the option's life (“vesting 
restrictions”).  
 
This method of remuneration effectively transfers equity value from existing shareholders to the 
party receiving the remuneration and dilutes the value held by the existing shareholders. The 
cost to shareholders of issuing share options is the decrease in value per share that results. 
Prior to the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standard 2: Share-based payments 
(effective for financial year-ends ending on or after 1 January 2005), this dilution was not 
reflected as a cost in the financial statements of companies, allowing entities to avoid reflecting 
a portion of remuneration paid in their reported financial performance. 
 
 
2.4.3.2. Accounting implications 
 
Prior to 1 January 2005, South African companies were only required to disclose the nature, 
terms, and dilution effects of these share based payments in their financial statements, with a 
charge rarely appearing in the profit and loss account. In the United States and United 
Kingdom, accounting practice has been to expense share options at their intrinsic value on 
grant date. Dreyer and Williams (2003) note though that the recognition of an expense based on 
the intrinsic value of an option can easily be avoided
1
 and so companies have been able to 
reduce the effect of this legislature.  
 
To address the effects of the cost of share-based payments, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) issued an exposure draft in November 2002 that drew upon comments 
submitted from interested parties in response to an earlier discussion document. In February 
2004, the Board approved International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 2: Share-Based 
Payments for issue.  
 
The objective of the standard is to specify the financial reporting required by an entity when it 
undertakes share-based payment transactions. No matter what form of share-based transaction 
                                                   
1
 The intrinsic value of a share option is defined as the difference between the exercise price of an option 
and the ruling or spot price of the underlying share. By increasing the exercise price of an option to 
match the ruling price of the share on grant date, an issuer can reduce the intrinsic value of an option 
to nil. 
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is entered into, IFRS 2 requires the entity to recognise the related expense. IFRS 2 is effective 
for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005.  
 
The reasoning behind the expensing of share options is the fact that an entity has sacrificed its 
equity in lieu of services rendered by the employee (Hassan and Wolpert, 2005). Had the entity 
provided a cash salary, it would have recognised an expense in its Income Statement. Hence, 
even though the nature of the compensation has changed, the nature of the item as an expense 
has not changed. As Warren Buffett, billionaire investor and philanthropist, put it: “If options 
aren‟t a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation  
isn‟t an expense, what is it? And if expenses shouldn‟t go into the calculation of earnings, where 
in the world should they go?” (Mann, 2001). 
 
The effect of this policy change is that issuing share options reduces a company‟s profit for the 
year. Consider the example of listed financial services group Investec Limited who voluntarily 
disclosed the potential cost of share-based payments in the announcement of their September 
2002 interim results. According to the announcement, expensing the cost of share-based 
payments would have reduced Investec‟s headline earnings for the six months ended 30 
September 2002 by 4.2% (Dreyer et. al, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, Matisonn (1999) investigated the effect that expensing share options had on a 
sample of South African company profits and presented the following results for the year ended 
1996: 
 
Table 3: The effect of expensing share options for a sample of South African companies for the 
year ended 1996. 
 
Company Decrease in Earnings (%) 
Polifin 0.48% 
Leisurenet 0.37% 
Bidvest Group 6.43% 
SAB 0.896% 
 
 
In 2003, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (PwC) conducted a study of the impact of IFRS 2‟s 
preceding exposure draft (ED2) on 22 listed companies in the United Kingdom (Financial 
Director, 2004). Although IFRS 2 is not exactly the same as ED2, the results are still 
informative. PwC found that the effects varied widely, depending on the share schemes in 
place. On average, implementing ED2 could reduce earnings from continuing operations by 
3.5% and by more than 10% for the most affected companies (Financial Director, 2004). 
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As far as South African companies are concerned, Sanlam seems to be leading the way when it 
comes to accounting for executive share options. In the 2005 financial year, Sanlam deducted  
R800 million from its embedded value
2
 because this is what it estimated was the fair value of its 
share incentive scheme (Business Report, 2005). 
 
The valuation of employee share options is a complicated process, and critical to this study, as 
this study requires that the share options awarded to CEOs be valued. Owing to its standalone 
significance, a discussion on the valuation of employee share options as well as the impact of 
IFRS 2 on such valuation will be dealt with in Chapter III. 
 
 
2.4.3.3. Tax implications 
 
From a company's perspective, share options are not deductible as an expense. The South 
African Revenue Services (“SARS“) is of the viewpoint that it is in fact the shareholders of the 
company who incur the expense, and not the company, as they suffer from the dilution of their 
own shareholding (Betts et al., 2005). This in contrast to the deduction that companies are 
allowed for shares that are awarded to employees in terms of a broad-based employee share 
ownership plan (S8B of the Income Tax Act).   
 
For directors themselves, there are 2 different treatments depending on when the share options 
were granted. According to S8A of the Income Tax Act, share options that are granted before 26 
October 2004 are only taxed when they are exercised (or ceded) by the director in question. 
This also applies to deferred shares awarded before 26 October 2004. Capital Gains Tax (CGT) 
only arises if the shares (that were acquired with the option) are sold.  
 
For share options that were granted after 26 October 2004, the share options are taxed when 
they vest in the hands of the director (S8C of the Income Tax Act). Furthermore, any 
subsequent gains on the disposal of the shares acquired in terms of the option scheme, over 
and above the market value at vesting date, will attract CGT on disposal of those shares.  
 
 
2.4.3.4. Adverse effects of awarding share options 
 
Given the increased incidence of awarding share options to executives over the past few years, 
it seems logical that companies would repurchase shares, so as to counter some of the dilution 
that would result upon the exercising of those share options or to fund future share option 
grants. However, executives who are heavily compensated with share options may also have a 
                                                   
2
 Embedded value is not an accounting term. Sanlam disclosed the full effect of a change in policy, 
however they did not show an expense in their financial statements. 
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vested interest in favouring share repurchases over dividends. The primary reason is that share 
repurchases and decreased dividends both enhance the value of share options held on the 
company‟s shares. Thus, managers who hold these share options have an incentive to favour 
repurchases over dividends.  
 
Jolls (1998), Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kahle (2002) all found evidence for both reasons of 
repurchases, but with emphasis on the latter. Within a South African context, Betts et al. (2005) 
conducted a study using data from 88 companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange, for the 
financial years 2000-2004. They only found evidence for the first hypothesis, i.e. that companies 
repurchase shares in order to undo the dilution created by awarding employee share options. 
They attribute this result to a number of reasons, including a limited sample size, potential errors 
in data collection and the unavailability of data relating to the number of unexercisable executive 
share options.  
 
 
2.4.3.5. Recent developments: phantom cash options 
 
Following the accounting and tax reforms that have taken place with regards to share options, a 
growing list of companies in South Africa (including for example, Tiger Brands) have scrapped 
their share option schemes in favour of phantom cash option schemes (Crotty, 2006). How the 
schemes work is that companies will make a cash payment equivalent to the profit that would 
have been made by the executive on the share options, as opposed to issuing shares. The 
advantage is that these payments are tax deductible (conventional share options are not), and 
they avoid diluting existing shares in issue. 
 
 
2.4.4. Legislation 
 
Before the introduction of new accounting standards, both the King Report on Corporate 
Governance (1994) (“King I”) and the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
(2002) (“King II”) recommended full disclosure of top executives' remuneration, meaning that a 
single line item displaying a directors salary would now be broken down into its constituent 
parts: cash based remuneration, share options and any other forms of compensation.  
 
In addition to King II, Section 297 of the Companies Act requires disclosure of all directors' 
emoluments. Yet the Companies' Act in no way empowers shareholders to regulate 
remuneration matters. Some guidance can only be found in Appendix V to King II. Entitled 
“Model Terms of Reference for Board Committees”, paragraph 3.5 provides as follows:  
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“3.5 Shareholder acceptance 
 Every effort should be made to promote acceptance of the necessity for, and benefits 
of, a realistic realignment of director remuneration; 
 Requirements to disclose remuneration in annual reports is seen as a constructive 
opportunity to communicate with shareholders on all aspects of remuneration; 
 The information disclosed could usefully include, in relation to each director, such 
matters as a breakdown of the remuneration into its individual components, the 
remuneration package as a total cost to company, the number of meetings attended 
and, if practicable, the number of hours worked; 
 The adoption by companies of formal remuneration policies, encompassing such 
matters as the philosophy behind remuneration assessments, the criteria for 
remuneration setting, the remuneration components, and the composition and role of 
the Committee, and the disclosure of such policies to shareholders, can also indicate to 
the public a responsible approach by companies to remuneration issues. 
 
In fact, the resolutions that are placed before shareholders at Annual General Meetings (AGMs) 
are only “to approve the remuneration of directors in their capacity as directors, not in their 
capacity as executives. Executive contracts, and thus executive remuneration, are established 
by the remuneration committee of a company, or what is termed usually in a company‟s articles 
of association as a “disinterested body of directors”” (Frater Asset Management 2007d : 9).  
 
Thus, shareholders cannot directly prevent executive remuneration abuse in South Africa. There 
are, of course, indirect means of reigning companies in for executive remuneration abuses, 
such as voting against re-election of the remuneration committee, or certain non-executive 
directors. Also, if the relevant company has a primary listing in the United Kingdom, e.g. Anglo 
American plc, then the remuneration report has to be presented to shareholders, in which case 
they will have input into executive remuneration (Frater Asset Management, 2007d).  
 
However, shareholders are able to vote on the introduction and amendment of share option 
schemes. They are also able to vote on the allocation of shares to option schemes (Frater Asset 
Management, 2007d). Since remuneration committees have been mentioned above, they are 
discussed next. 
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2.4.5. Remuneration committees 
 
Remuneration committees have been recommended by King II, “consisting entirely or mainly of 
independent non-executive directors, to make recommendations to the board within agreed 
terms if reference on the company's framework of executive remuneration and to determine 
specific remuneration packages for each of the executive directors” (King Report on Corporate 
Goverance for South Africa, 2002 : 2.5.2). It also recommends that the committee be chaired by 
a non-executive director. The aim of this is ultimately to ensure that executives are remunerated 
in a manner that would be considered fair and reasonable by an objective outsider, given that 
executive's performance. 
 
The efficacy of remuneration committees however, is in question. Conyon and Peck (1998) 
found that companies in the United Kingdom that adopted remuneration committees or with high 
proportions of outsiders on those committees generally had higher levels of top management 
pay. Mongalo (2003) noted that this could be due to a number of reasons, the first of which is 
“back-scratching”: “the classic situation in which this occurs is if executive directors of company 
X are non-executives with company Y and the executives of company Y are non-executives of 
company X. It would be obvious to each of these individuals that it would be in their own self-
interest to be generous with respect to their approach to executive pay” (Mongalo, 2003 : 763).  
 
Secondly, cross-directorships (like in the example above) also mean “that when such individuals 
are deciding on issues of executive pay in companies in which they sit as members of 
remuneration committees, they would be aware that they are setting, albeit indirectly, the going 
rate for executive pay in a more general sense” (Mongalo, 2003 : 672), thus raising the 
benchmark for their own pay. In South Africa, this is of greater concern given the small pool of 
directors that are available and the numerous cross-directorships held by some (Crotty, 2005c). 
 
Finally, it is problematic that members of remuneration committees themselves are remunerated 
by the company, the level of which is usually decided by the main board of directors. Daily, 
Johnston, Ellstrand and Dalton (1998) investigated this and found that the salaries of 
remuneration committee members and the composition of these committees are positively 
related to CEO compensation. Given all this, it would appear then that remuneration committees 
are from the panacea that they were made out to be. 
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2.4.6. Controversies surrounding executive remuneration 
 
While any discussion on executive remuneration seems to invite controversy, there are a few 
major issues that have attracted much attention in the recent past, and are dealt with below. 
 
 
2.4.6.1. Share option schemes 
 
The first problem relates to share option schemes, ironically. Share options allow management 
to benefit when a company is doing well but do not penalise them when performance is 
unsatisfactory.  In fact, in some cases when a company's share price has declined significantly, 
executive share options have been re-priced (e.g. Metro Cash and Carry, PSG) or even 
cancelled (e.g. Shoprite) (Henderson, 2001). Secondly, most executives tend to just sell their 
shares immediately upon exercising the share options granted to them (instead of holding onto 
the shares), thereby yielding an immediate profit (Mongalo, 2003). This practice completely 
contradicts the very reasoning behind awarding share options in the first place, i.e. as a long-
term incentive tool. 
 
 
2.4.6.2. Macroeconomic influences 
 
In the past three years the South African economy has been experiencing a significant boom. In 
Massmart's 2005 annual report, non-executive chairman Chris Seabrooke noted that “continued 
low inflation and low interest rates, together with growth in real GDP of over 4%, higher 
disposable incomes, improved social stability, increasingly affluent black consumers and a more 
stable exchange rate have stimulated an unprecedented expansion in consumer spending” 
(Crotty, 2005b). Such an environment is mainly the fruit of the government's sound fiscal and 
monetary policies, yet remuneration committees have failed to see that “in a hurricane even 
turkeys can fly” (Crotty, 2005b). Given the rise in company share prices and that these are often 
used in determining executive remuneration, executive packages have increased dramatically, 
in many cases only because the companies have been trading in a highly favourable 
environment. 
 
 
2.4.6.3. Excessive remuneration 
 
By far the most controversial issue is the amount by which executives are remunerated. The 
criticism is that the gulf between executive pay and the pay of rank and file workers is increasing 
dramatically from year to year. The following table gives a comparative view of the pay 
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packages in executives in ten countries and their respective wage gaps (in order of total 
package): 
 
Table 4: Total compensation for executives in different countries compared with the wage gap 
in that country 
 
Country Total value (US$) Wage gap* 
United States 1 403 000 54 
Canada 752 000 20 
Britain 720 000 24 
Australia 646 000 23 
The Netherlands 621 000 17 
Brazil 597 000 49 
Japan 545 000 11 
Germany 422 000 13 
South Africa 406 000 22 
New Zealand 258 000 14 
* multiple of lowest paid worker 
       
Source: Finance Week, 24 November 2000, p. 28 
 
Of the 25 countries, CEOs in 18 of the countries earned more than their South African 
counterparts, yet South Africa had the fifth highest wage gap. However, this could perhaps be 
due to the large skills and education differentials in South Africa, as well as different work ethic 
and productivity levels than other countries (Henderson, 2001).  
 
Option schemes have also been used to mask excessive remuneration. Business Report (21 
August 2005) indicates that Naspers CEO, Koos Bekker, whose remuneration consists solely of 
share options, was reportedly set to make a profit of over R300m on his share options if the 
current share price (at the time) held.  
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2.5. Previous research and their findings 
 
 
The subject of executive remuneration, whilst receiving much attention from the financial press, 
has been seemingly neglected by academic researchers, while research on institutional 
investors/shareholder activism is anecdotal at best. As a result, much of the previous work in 
this arena has been conducted overseas, notably in the United States. The following section 
provides a brief summary of some of the related studies in this area, and is not intended to be a 
literature review. 
 
While not specifically addressing the effect of institutional investors on executive compensation, 
Dyl (1988) examined whether in closely-held companies, major shareholders engage in 
monitoring activities that reduce agency costs through lower managerial compensation. Using a 
sample of the 271 major industrial corporations in the United States during 1982, he found a 
statistically significant negative relationship (at the 5% level) between the level of corporate 
control and management compensation. He estimated that, on average, “monitoring activities by 
major shareholders may have reduced the residual loss portion of agency costs due to 
excessive top management compensation by approximately 32%.” (Dyl, 1988 : 24) 
 
Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin (1987) were the first to examine whether ownership structure 
affects the level and mix of executive remuneration. In their sample of 71 manufacturing firms in 
the U.S. over the period 1979-1982, they found that owner-controlled firms remunerated 
executives differently to management-controlled firms. They found that in owner-controlled 
firms, executives were rewarded more for the firm's performance, and had a higher proportion of 
their remuneration in long-term incentives. However, in management-controlled firms, 
executives were rewarded more for the scale of operations than for performance. Their 
conclusion is that outside dominant shareholders view firms primarily as investments and have 
the power and incentive to align the compensation of hired CEOs with performance of their 
firms. 
 
In one of the more celebrated studies in this genre, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) examined 
how ownership configuration affects the determination of CEO pay raises. Based on a sample of 
188 firms (in the United States) over the period 1978-1982, they found that CEO pay rises were 
based on distinctly different factors, depending on the ownership profile of the firm. In firms 
where no single major owner existed (management-controlled firms), the overarching pay 
philosophy was to maximise CEO pay, subject to “demonstration of face legitimacy” (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1995 : 188); whereas in firms where a major (non-managerial) owner existed 
(externally-controlled firms), CEO pay was minimised, subject to the ability to attract/retain a 
satisfactory CEO. 
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David, Kochhar and Levitas (1998), took a different approach by investigating whether different 
types of institutional investors have different effects on the level and mix of CEO compensation. 
They classified institutional investors into 2 categories: pressure-resistant (those without any 
significant business relationship) and pressure-sensitive (those for whom a conflict of interest is 
highly probable). Using data on 125 U.S. firms over the period 1990-1994, they found that the 
presence of pressure-resistant institutional shareholders reduced the level of CEOs' pay and 
increased the proportion of long-term incentives (i.e. share options). Pressure-sensitive 
institutions, however, had no effect on the mix of CEO pay but appeared to be associated with 
higher CEO compensation, highlighting the highly political nature of executive remuneration as 
well as confirming their original hypothesis. 
 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) have to date conducted the most rigorous tests on the relationship 
between institutional ownership and executive compensation, using a sample of 1914 firms 
taken from the S&P 500, S&P Midcap and S&P Smallcap indices. They found that institutional 
ownership is positively related to the long-term incentive-based component of executive 
compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation. Their results indicate that a 
one standard deviation increase in the percentage of institutional shareholdings by the top five 
institutional investors is associated with “an estimated 20% increase in option-grant sensitivity to 
stock price changes” and “a drop in salary equal to 12% of the sample mean, and a drop in total 
compensation equal to 19% of the sample mean” (Hartzell and Starks, 2003 : 2352).  
 
They also found that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain 
compensation structures, “suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures 
through their preferences” (Hartzell and Starks, 2003 : 2351). Importantly, they found that 
subsequent changes in institutional shareholdings lead to changes in compensation in the 
manner hypothesised. 
 
 
2.6. Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the relevant literature regarding agency theory and how institutional 
shareholders are a potential means to mitigating agency costs. South African institutions were 
also discussed, and how important the PIC has become in terms of shareholder activism. 
Finally, executive remuneration was discussed, and some of the controversies that have 
surrounded this issue. The next chapter presents the research hypotheses and methodology 
used to test these hypotheses. 
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Chapter III: Research Hypotheses, 
Methodology and Data 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Various methodologies were used in prior studies to test the hypothesis that institutional 
shareholders mitigate agency costs through their activities. However, the most common 
methods used some form of multiple regression. This study augments those models and adds 
further testing through the use of tests for differences of means.  
 
The following section first describes and then crystallises the central hypotheses of this report, 
based on the literature review in Chapter III. Next the delimitations of the sample used in this 
study will be discussed, followed by the sources from which data will be collected. Then, the 
statistical methodologies employed in this study will be discussed – regression models, and 
tests for differences of means – which is different to the previous studies on this issue, which 
generally used only one methodology. Finally, a discussion on valuing employee share options 
ensues, and how the model adopted in this study is arrived at. 
 
 
3.2. The research hypotheses 
 
 
3.2.1. Hypothesis 1 
 
The first hypothesis is that the greater the concentration of institutional shareholders in a firm, 
the greater their ability to rein in salaries, options and total compensation. This leads us to the 
first hypothesis (related to the level of compensation): 
 
Hypothesis 1a: 
Institutional ownership concentration is negatively related to salary, share options and total 
compensation levels. 
 
In accordance with Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995), owner-controlled firms also remunerate 
executives differently to management-controlled firms. In these firms, owners and their 
representatives (e.g. institutional investors) will be more influential in pay determination, 
whereas in management-controlled firms, the CEO should be the dominant influence. In owner-
controlled firms, the owners will seek to minimise agency costs through reduced compensation, 
hence: 
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Hypothesis 1b: 
Owner-controlled firms award lower levels of salary, share options and total compensation to its 
CEO, compared to management-controlled firms. 
 
 
3.2.2. Hypothesis 2 
 
To mitigate agency costs, the interests of managers and owners need to be aligned. Share 
options have become the primary medium through which this has been carried out, by making 
the reward contingent on the company's share price, and hence, future firm performance. Of all 
the institutions surveyed by Ramsay et al. (1998), all but one favoured some sort of share 
option/incentive scheme. Thus, it appears that institutional owners tend to favour remuneration 
systems that award more share options as a percentage of total compensation than salary. 
Hence, the next hypothesis (related to the mix of compensation) is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: 
Institutional share ownership is positively related to the proportion of total compensation that 
comprises share options. 
 
By making compensation contingent on future firm performance, long-term incentives add 
uncertainty to a CEO's compensation. While owner-controlled firms are more likely to award a 
greater proportion of options than management-controlled firms, executives in management-
controlled firms would prefer just the opposite structure in order to minimise personal risks. 
Beatty and Zajac (1994 : 316) assert the following: 
 
“Managers are more likely to attach significantly more value to a given level of cash 
than to the same expected level in stock or options because they can use that cash to 
buy a diversified portfolio of common stocks, bonds or whatever. But, as you force 
managers to reduce their cash compensation while making a larger investment in their 
own firm, you're asking them to bear more risk – risk that cannot be diversified away by 
holding other stocks and bonds.” Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: 
Owner-controlled firms award a greater proportion of share options (of total compensation) 
compared to management-controlled firms. 
 
 
 52 
3.3. Research design and methodology 
 
 
3.3.1. Population, samples and delimitations 
 
The study uses data from the top fifty companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange, ranked 
by market capitalisation. This choice of selection is based on a number of factors. Firstly, larger 
companies are assumed to have better disclosure than smaller companies, because they have 
more resources to devote to their annual reports, and typically attract more investors than 
smaller companies. This is evidenced by the fact that, in the Ernst & Young Corporate Reporting 
Survey, 46 (out of 50) of the companies in the three highest categories (Top 10, Excellent, 
Good) were in the top fifty companies ranked by market capitalisation in 2006 (2005 had 47 out 
of 51, 2004 had 43 out of 52, 2003 had 49 out of 62, and 2002 had 47 out of 56) (Ernst & 
Young, 2002-2006). This is important for data collection purposes because data will have to be 
manually collected from company annual reports.  
 
Secondly, the top fifty companies by market capitalisation constituted approximately 84.92% of 
the total market capitalisation of the JSE Securities Exchange (as calculated using data from 
McGregor BFA on 23 October 2007). As a result, institutional shareholders will have most of 
their funds invested in these companies and have larger proportions of their portfolios allocated 
to these companies. This provides a greater incentive to correct deviant managerial behaviour 
(in these companies) compared to a company that constitutes a small portion of their portfolio.  
 
Data will be gathered on these companies over the five-year period 2002-2006, due to the fact 
that certain disclosures were only made possible (after 2001) as a result of the King II Report on 
Corporate Governance. This should result in a sample of approximately 250 observations (fifty 
companies over five years). It was decided to use this approach as opposed to just taking data 
from 250 companies over one year, as the former allows one to incorporate both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal (time-series) effects which will evidence the trends (in compensation, 
institutional holdings, etc.) over the chosen period. This sample size is still significant (despite 
the number of independent variables used in the model), as it exceeds the statistically 
significant requirement of 186 observations (Green, 1991). 
 
Companies with poor or insufficient disclosure will be omitted from the sample. Dual-listed 
companies will also be omitted owing to insufficient disclosure (due to different disclosure 
regulations) and possibly different labour market conditions (which could affect the level and/or 
mix of executive remuneration).  
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3.3.2. Data collection 
 
The necessary data will be obtained from the following sources: 
 McGregor BFA 
 Company annual reports 
 
The two main variables of interest – CEO compensation and institutional shareholdings - are not 
available on the electronic databases available. Following King II, however, all JSE-listed 
companies were required to disclose detailed remuneration schedules of their top executives in 
their annual reports. Companies are also required to disclose shareholders who own more than 
5% of their share capital, as per Section 140A (8) of the Companies' Act. For these reasons, 
data on these two variables are manually captured from each company‟s annual report.  
 
All other variables (control or otherwise) are obtained from the McGregor BFA database. For 
data collected from McGregor BFA, the published financials data, and not the standardised 
financial data will be used. This is for two reasons: firstly, and most importantly, companies that 
base their awards on financial data will most likely base it on their own data (e.g. if based on 
Return on Equity, then it will be based on the Return on Equity as calculated by them, not by 
McGregor), and secondly, it is not known what changes McGregor makes to the published data 
to make it standardised, and whether these provide more useful information. 
 
 
3.3.3. Techniques of analysis 
 
3.3.3.1. Regression models 
 
The first part of the study will involve the construction of five regression models, the first three of 
which represent the level of compensation as their dependent variables (salary, share options 
and total compensation) and the next two of which represent the mix of compensation (salary as 
a percentage of total compensation and share options as a percentage of total compensation, 
as the dependent variables). For the 3 models that do not involve share options (Models 1, 3 
and 4), ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions will be estimated. For the two other models, 
tobit regressions will be estimated, because not all companies award share options in every 
year
3
.  
 
Each of the models will employ the same independent variables, consisting of measures of 
institutional concentration, insider influence and a number of control variables (firm size, 
performance, industry, etc.), which have empirically been shown to be statistically significant 
(see the detailed discussion that follows). The independent variables are those which hold the 
                                                   
3
 Refer to Appendix A for a more detailed explanation as to why a tobit model was chosen. 
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most interest. The control variables are used to account for other factors that may affect CEO 
compensation policy. The aim of these models is to provide evidence as to whether there are 
any statistically significant relationships observed, with emphasis on the institutional 
concentration variables.  
 
3.3.3.1.1. Dependent variables 
 
Level 
 
Model 1: salary (OLS) 
The dependent variable is the base salary plus bonus of the CEO earned during the relevant 
year. This will be obtained from each company‟s annual report. 
 
Model 2: share options (tobit) 
The dependent variable represents the aggregate value of share options granted to the CEO 
during the relevant year. Share options will be used as a proxy for total incentive-based 
compensation. Since companies are only required to value (and expense) share options 
granted to employees from fiscal years beginning after 1 January 2005 (International 
Accounting Standards Board, 2007), share option grants will be valued using the Hull and White 
(2004) model (see Section 3.4. as to why this model was chosen and the assumptions made to 
value the share options). 
 
Model 3: total compensation (OLS) 
The dependent variable in this model represents the value of all the components of CEO 
compensation for a given year, including the estimated value of share options granted as 
calculated for Model 2.  
 
 
Mix 
 
Model 4: salary as a percentage of total compensation (OLS) 
The dependent variable here is the base salary of the CEO as a percentage of total 
compensation received for the year. 
 
Model 5: share options as a percentage of total compensation (tobit) 
The dependent variable in this model is the ratio of share options to total compensation of the 
relevant CEO for the given year.  
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3.3.3.1.2. Independent variables 
 
Institutional influence 
A number of measures of institutional influence will be employed. The first measure is the total 
number of institutional investors that possess 5% or more of shares, which is considered to be a 
significant holding in terms of the literature (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Khan et al., 2005). 
This measure is also convenient as companies have to disclose all shareholders who own 5% 
or more of total shares outstanding, per Section 140A (8) of the Companies' Act. The second 
measure is the percentage of shares owned by the largest institutional owner (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003). The third measure is the total percentage owned by all the institutional 
shareholders with more than 5% of shares, as consistent with Dyl (1988). The fourth and final 
measure is the total percentage of shares held by all institutions, which all of the 
abovementioned studies used.  The data for the all of the institutional variables are obtained 
from companies' annual reports.  
 
However, a data limitation arose with respect to the fourth measure. It was found that 52 out of 
the 250 firm-year observations did not disclose this measure (total percentage of shares held by 
all institutions). This was not considered to be a significant proportion of the sample 
(approximately 20.80%). The limitation was overcome by assuming that the total percentage 
owned by all the institutional shareholders with more than 5% of shares (the third measure) is 
the same as the total percentage of shares held by all institutions. 
 
Insider influence 
As a corollary to the hypotheses, some measures of insider influence are also included, to 
examine whether these have any effects on the dependent variables. The percentage of shares 
owned (directly and indirectly) by the CEO will be included, as it relates to “risk-taking, firm 
strategy, CEO compensation and agency issues” (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989 : 214). The 
total percentage of shares owned by the board of directors will also be included. Data for both 
measures are obtained from the annual reports, and are required as per paragraph 8.63 (d) of 
the listings requirements of the JSE. 
 
 
3.3.3.1.3. Control variables 
 
Size 
A number of studies have documented a systematic (positive) relation between managerial 
compensation and firm size (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; and 
Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1991). According to Dyl (1988), “executives of larger firms have 
more levels of management reporting to them, and a 'tall' organisational structure may create 
upward pressure on top-management salaries simply to maintain salary differentials between 
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each level of executives further down in the hierarchy” (Dyl, 1988 : 23). Size also “has the 
added advantage for the manager of being a generally defensible way to justify pay” (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1995 : 178) and connotes responsibility and complexity (Agrawal, 1981). To 
control for size, the natural logarithm of total assets (McGregor data item number 50) will be 
used, consistent with other studies (David et al., 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). The natural 
logarithm is used as a scaling factor because of the large variance in total assets held by the 
firms in the sample. 
 
Firm performance 
Firm performance has also been shown to drive both the level (Smith and Watts, 1992) and mix 
(Zajac and Westphal, 1994) of compensation. This makes sense given that it is widespread 
practice for management compensation to be tied to firm performance (Hall and Liebman, 
1998). Both an accounting measure (return on equity) and a market measure (ordinary share 
annual return) will be used, as there is some debate as to the preferred measure (Weiner and 
Mahoney, 1981). The share return above is simply the capital appreciation over the year in 
question (ordinary share prices are obtained from McGregor), as it is unlikely that executives 
would be evaluated on the income (dividend) portion of the gain – something which they have 
direct control over.  
 
Investment opportunities 
Smith and Watts (1992) and Harvey and Shrieves (2001) also documented a strong relation 
between a firm's growth opportunities and incentive compensation. They hypothesised that 
“because it is more difficult to observe managers' actions in firms with more growth options, 
those firms will be more likely to employ incentive plans” (Smith and Watts, 1992 : 269). This is 
corroborated by both Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Khan et al. (2005), who found a strong 
positive relation between investment opportunities and incentive compensation measures. As a 
proxy for growth opportunities, Tobin's q (market value divided by total assets) will be used, 
consistent with the above-mentioned studies. Market value at year-end is obtained by the 
product of year-end share price (obtained from McGregor) and number of shares outstanding at 
year-end (item number 201 in McGregor). Total assets is McGregor data item number 50. 
 
Industry-specific behaviour 
Dummy/indicator variables will also be used in order to control for any pay similarities within 
industries. Industries are based on the sector in which the company is listed on the JSE Main 
Board. A company will receive a number of one if in the specific sector or zero if otherwise. Data 
will be sorted into five sectors: Basic Materials (which includes Resources shares), Financials, 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Industrials (there were no Information Technology 
sector shares in the sample).  
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CEO and Board characteristics 
David et al. (1998) found a number of CEO and Board characteristics which have statistically 
significant effects on the level and/or mix of compensation. They found that older CEOs tended 
to command a higher pay, by virtue of their experience. CEOs' ages can be found in most 
annual reports. Also, CEOs “with greater tenure may accumulate power over their boards...and 
this may help them obtain higher levels of compensation” (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989 : 
127). Unfortunately, this study was not able to control for this owing to data constraints.  
 
Finally, David et al. (1998) also found that boards of directors with a greater proportion of 
outside (independent) directors award greater remuneration. This is consistent with the 
argument put forward by Mongalo (2003), that since many of these independent non-executive 
directors are executive directors on other companies' boards, they award higher remuneration 
so that 'the favour is returned', so to speak. Whether all of this is conjecture though is another 
matter, so this variable will be included without making any predictions as to its sign. Information 
on board characteristics is also found in the annual reports. 
 
The regression models will be as follows: 
 
(1) yi          = β0 + β1*NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS THAT HOLD > 5%i +  
β2*% OWNED BY LARGEST INSTITUTIONi +  
β3*TOTAL OF INSTITUTIONS THAT OWN > 5%i +  
β4*TOTAL % HELD BY INSTITUTIONSi + β5*CEO OWNERSHIPi  + 
β6*BOARD OWNERSHIPi + β7*LN(TOTAL ASSETS)i + β8*ROEi + 
β9*SHARE RETURNi + β10*TOBIN'S qi + + β11*CEO AGEi +  
β12*PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENTS ON BOARDi +  
β13-17*SECTORi + εi 
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Table 5: Summary of regression variables, their measures/proxies and sources of information 
for the regression models 
 
 Variable Measure/Proxy Source 
β1 
Number of institutional investors 
that own >5% of shares 
Institutional 
concentration 
Annual Reports 
β2 % owned by largest institution Institutional 
concentration 
Annual Reports 
β3 Total of institutions that own >5% Institutional 
concentration 
Annual Reports 
β4 Total % held by all institutions Institutional 
concentration 
Annual Reports 
β5 CEO ownership Insider influence Annual Reports 
β6 Board ownership Insider influence Annual Reports 
β7 Natural log of total assets Size of firm McGregor BFA (item 50) 
β8 Return on Equity Firm performance McGregor BFA 
β9 Share price return Firm performance McGregor BFA  
β10 Tobin's q Investment 
opportunities 
McGregor BFA (items 50, and 
201) 
β11 CEO age CEO experience Annual reports 
β12 Proportion of independent 
directors on board 
Board 
characteristics 
Annual reports 
 
β13 
β14 
β15 
β16 
β17 
Sector indicator variables: 
Basic Materials 
Consumer goods  
Consumer services 
Financials 
Industrials 
Industry specific 
behaviour 
Financial Press 
(Business Report) 
 
 
3.3.3.2. Tests for differences of means 
 
The second set of tests conducted, are an adaptation of those carried out by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1995). They involve separating the sample into two sub-samples: so-called “owner-
controlled” firms (i.e. where institutions hold a significant part of the company) and 
“management-controlled” firms (i.e. where institutions do not hold a significant stake in the 
company). These classifications are based on the criteria used by Hambrick and Finkelstein 
(1995) in their study. The ultimate aim is to demonstrate whether there are any significant 
differences between the two sub-samples with regards to the level and mix of compensation, i.e. 
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whether owner-controlled firms do, in fact, remunerate CEOs differently to management-
controlled firms, in the manners hypothesised. 
 
There are two choices of tests, each of which depends on whether the data is normal (t-tests for 
differences) or non-normal (Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests). The choice of which test will be used will 
be decided upon once the variables have been tested for normality (see Section 4.4.2.) The null 
and alternative hypothesis for each variable is detailed below. 
 
 
3.3.3.2.1. Owner-controlled firms versus management-controlled firms 
 
A firm is designated as being owner-controlled if at least 5% of its shares are controlled by one 
or more institutional shareholders. The consensus in the literature is that 5% is an appropriate 
cut-off for attributing a strong owner (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1995). Firms that are management-controlled have at least 5% of their shares owned by an 
insider (manager, CEO, etc.) or if no single individual or organisation owned at least 5% of its 
shares. Firms that have both managers and institutional shareholders owning at least 5% of 
shares are designated owner-controlled if the “Total of institutions that own more than 5%” 
institutional concentration measure (calculated previously) exceeded the “board ownership” 
concentration measure (also calculated previously) and vice versa for management-controlled 
firms. 
 
 
3.3.3.2.2. Key variables 
 
The principal variables of interest are those used in the five models developed in the regression 
tests, viz. cash component, share options, total compensation, cash component as a 
percentage of total compensation and, share options as a percentage of total remuneration. 
 
Salary and other cash benefits (level) 
It is expected that owner-controlled firms award lower salaries to their CEOs compared with 
management-controlled firms. This is consistent with the general agency theory that monitoring 
by institutional shareholders should reduce agency costs, one of which would be to serve as a 
check on executive compensation. These are supported by statistically significant results by 
Khan et al. (2005), amongst others.  
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Formally, the null and alternative hypothesis for this variable is as follows: 
 
H0: μ1= μ2 
H1: μ1< μ2 
 
Where μ1 is the mean cash component for owner-controlled firms and μ2 is the mean cash 
component for management-controlled firms. 
 
 
Share options (level) 
It is expected that owner-controlled firms award fewer share options to CEOs than 
management-controlled firms. The reasoning behind this is the same as with the “salary and 
other cash benefits” variable. Formally, the null and alternative hypothesis for this variable is as 
follows: 
 
H0: μ1= μ2 
H1: μ1< μ2 
 
Where μ1 is the mean share options component for owner-controlled firms and μ2 is the mean 
share options component for management-controlled firms. 
 
 
Total compensation (level) 
It is expected that total compensation is lower for owner-controlled firms than for management-
controlled firms. This is consistent with the other two “level” variables previously and with the 
theory that institutional shareholders should reduce managerial discretion in compensation 
decisions (Khan et al., 2005). Formally, the null and alternative hypothesis for this variable is as 
follows: 
 
H0: μ1= μ2 
H1: μ1< μ2 
 
Where μ1 is the mean total compensation for owner-controlled firms and μ2 is the mean total 
compensation for management-controlled firms. 
 
 
Cash benefits as a percentage of total compensation (mix) 
It is expected that salary constitutes a smaller proportion of total compensation for owner-
controlled firms.  This is because a salary is relatively risk-free and not as conducive to reducing 
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agency costs as share options are (see below). Formally, the null and alternative hypothesis for 
this variable is as follows: 
 
H0: μ1= μ2 
H1: μ1< μ2 
 
Where μ1 is the mean cash percentage for owner-controlled firms and μ2 is the mean cash 
percentage for management-controlled firms. 
 
 
Share options as a percentage of total remuneration (mix) 
Finally, it is expected that share options form a greater part of total compensation for owner-
controlled firms. This is also consistent with agency theory, as institutional shareholders should 
be more inclined to set compensation that aligns managers' interests with that of their own – 
compensation that is contingent on the well-being of the firm itself. In fact, Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) found in their study that “an increase of one standard deviation in the institutional 
shareholdings by the top five institutional investors is associated with a greater than 20% 
increase in the sensitivity of changes in total compensation to changes in shareholder wealth” 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003 : 2352). Formally, the null and alternative hypothesis for this variable 
is as follows: 
 
H0: μ1= μ2 
H1: μ1> μ2 
 
Where μ1 is the mean options percentage for owner-controlled firms and μ2 is the mean options 
percentage for management-controlled firms. 
 
 
 
3.4. Employee share option valuation 
 
 
A critical part of this study involves valuing the share options awarded to the CEOs of the 
companies in the selected sample. This is vital in determining not only the CEOs‟ total 
compensation, but also their mix of compensation. As a result, the following section is entirely 
devoted to the discussion of the valuation of employee share options, and the model that this 
study will use to value share options granted to CEOs. 
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3.4.1. The requirements of IFRS 2: Share-based payments 
 
IFRS 2 establishes a valuation pecking order for determining the fair values of share options to 
be expensed, requiring the use of market prices for similar share options where available 
(International Accounting Standards Board, 2007). Market prices provide the best indication of 
the fair value of share options, however the fact that share options with terms and conditions 
similar to the employee share options granted are rarely traded in active markets, presents a 
problem. In the absence of market prices, a generally accepted valuation methodology is used, 
provided that it "incorporates all factors and assumptions that knowledgeable, willing market 
participants would consider in setting the price" (Hassan and Wolpert, 2005 : 1).  
 
IFRS 2 makes reference to two pricing models, namely the Binomial Option pricing model, 
which is used to value American share options
4
, and the Black-Scholes-Merton model (“Black-
Scholes”) which is predominantly used to value European share options
5
 (International 
Accounting Standards Board, 2007). Share options in South Africa are predominantly American 
calls, although American puts, as well as European calls and puts are also traded. Identifying an 
appropriate valuation model is crucial, since valuations can differ significantly from conventional 
equity options. 
  
 
3.4.2. Differences between conventional options and employee share options 
 
Employee share options differ in many ways to ordinary “vanilla” options, and these have 
significant implications for how they are valued. These differences are discussed below. 
 
Maturity 
Employee share options typically have much longer maturities than ordinary options. This is 
because traded options are created by investment banks and are thus of shorter maturities, due 
to the estimation risk involved in creating options with longer maturities. Employee share options 
also have longer maturities, so as to align the interests of managers and shareholders over 
longer periods of time. This means that the volatility of the underlying share, dividend yields and 
interest rates may change significantly from when the option was granted. As a result this 
should increase the value of employee share options compared to ordinary options. 
                                                   
4
 An American option can be exercised at any time during the option’s life. 
5
 European share options can only be exercised at the end of the option’s life. American options are 
normally more valuable than European options because of the greater flexibility; however IFRS 2 
indicates that the difference in value is seldom significant.  
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Vesting 
Employee share options are often subject to vesting requirements, i.e. they are not exercisable 
after a certain period of time from the grant date (the vesting period). This will decrease the 
value of employee share options as compared to ordinary options. 
 
Forfeiture 
Employees that leave before all their share options have vested will often lose the right to any 
unvested share options, and may be forced to exercise their vested share options prematurely 
(Correia, 2006). This will decrease the value of employee share options as compared to 
ordinary share options, as not all share options may eventually vest. 
 
Non-tradability and non-transferability 
Employees are typically not allowed to sell or transfer their share options to other parties. As a 
result, this may cause the employee to exercise early, and thus reduce the value of employee 
share options as compared to ordinary share options. 
  
Performance conditions 
Some companies may impose performance hurdles before the share options are exercisable. 
This has the same effect as vesting conditions (Correia, 2006). Thus, it will reduce the value of 
employee share options as compared to ordinary share options. 
 
Lack of diversification 
With tradable options, investors are assumed to hold a diversified portfolio of assets, but 
employee share options may constitute a significant proportion of an employee‟s personal 
wealth. In order to achieve diversification, an employee may exercise the option earlier than is 
optimal (Correia, 2006). This will reduce the value of employee share options as compared to 
ordinary share options. 
 
The result of the above differences (excluding the long-term nature of employee share options) 
will typically reduce the value of employee share options as compared to standard share options 
and in most cases, result in early exercise by the employee. They also complicate the 
valuations. 
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3.4.3. Black-Scholes and adjusted Black-Scholes 
 
The ordinary Black-Scholes model is ill-suited in dealing with employee share options, due to a 
number of critical reasons. Firstly, Black-Scholes can only model European share options, and 
assumes no early exercise on the part of the option-holder. Furthermore, the non-transferability, 
lack of diversification and potential forfeiture of employee share options all may lead to early 
exercise, which the Black-Scholes model cannot incorporate in its valuation of share options 
(Rubenstein, 1995). 
 
To compensate for the effects of forfeiture, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 
the U.S. has suggested that the resulting option value be adjusted downwards by multiplying 
the value that would otherwise be obtained by one minus the probability of forfeiture through the 
vesting date (FASB 1995, as cited in Amman and Seiz, 2004). To generally handle all factors 
that result in early exercise, if the Black-Scholes formula is used, the time-to-maturity of the 
option should be replaced by the expected time-to-maturity of the option (FASB 1995, as cited 
in Amman and Seiz, 2004).  
 
Rubenstein (1995) empirically tested both adjustments, but found that the adjusted model 
suggested by the FASB systematically understated the value of the option. Furthermore, the 
model does not incorporate the feature that share options cannot be exercised during the 
vesting period. 
 
 
3.4.4. Binomial models 
 
The standard binomial model is also ill-suited to deal with employee share options, but because 
adjustments can be incorporated easily into such model and explicitly modelled, this has 
received much of the focus in the extant literature when trying to value employee share options. 
Three seminal papers on the topic are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
 
3.4.4.1. Rubenstein (1995)  
 
Rubenstein (1995) adapted the standard binomial model to take into account the effects of 
longer maturity, vesting, forfeiture, non-transferability, dilution of the company‟s earnings and 
the tax effects to the option holder. The final model required 16 input variables (10 more than 
the usual 6 variables required). The additional 10 input variables were: expected share return, 
number of years to vesting, expected employee forfeiture rate, minimum and maximum 
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forfeiture rate multipliers, employee‟s non-option wealth per owned option, employee‟s risk 
aversion, employee‟s tax rate, percentage dilution, and number of steps in the binomial tree. 
 
However, critically, Rubenstein (1995) did not empirically test the validity of his model, mainly 
due to the difficulty in obtaining many of its additional variables. While this study was the first to 
highlight the main differences between ordinary share options and employee share options (and 
the issues involved), from a practical point of view, it was of little value. 
 
 
3.4.4.2. Carpenter (1998) 
 
Carpenter (1998) tested the validity of two option-pricing models: a simple, extended binomial 
with a complicated one, to determine whether either was better in terms of valuing employee 
share options. The performance of the 2 models was examined by their ability to predict actual 
exercise patterns for a sample of 40 firms with data during the period 1979-1994. 
 
The first model was a simple extension of a binomial American option model that “introduces an 
exogenous „stopping state‟, in which the executive automatically exercises or forfeits the option. 
This state arrives with some fixed probability, given as the „stopping rate‟, each period” 
(Carpenter, 1998 : 128-129). The aim was to capture as simply as possible the fact that 
executives may exercise share options earlier than if they held ordinary share options. The 
stopping event was meant to serve as a proxy for anything that caused the executive to 
exercise the option early, such as the desire for liquidity, voluntary or involuntary employment 
termination, a need for diversification, or forced exercise or forfeiture. 
 
The second model explicitly accounted for the non-transferability of employee share options, by 
also including a stopping state, as well as “other unobservable factors, such as the executive‟s 
risk aversion, his outside wealth, and his potential gain from voluntary separation” (Carpenter, 
1998 : 129). 
 
Her results indicated that both models performed just as well, with the simpler model even 
outperforming the more complicated model in certain cases. The first model also predicted the 
actual exercise patterns of her dataset better than the second model, suggesting that “exercise 
patterns can be approximately replicated by merely imposing a suitable stopping rate, without 
the need to make assumptions about executive risk aversion, diversification, and the value of 
new employment” (Carpenter, 1998 : 129). 
 
She also tested the validity of the adjusted Black-Scholes suggested by the FASB (1995) and 
also found, like Rubenstein (1995), that that model systematically understated option values. 
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3.4.4.3. Hull and White (2004) 
 
Hull and White (2004) adjusted the model suggested by the FASB (1993) in two ways (Hull and 
White, 2004 : 116): 
 
 “it explicitly considers the possibility that the employee will leave the company after the 
vesting period. It requires the company to use employee turnover rates to estimate an 
employee exit rate that applies to both the prevesting period and the postvesting period. 
 it explicitly incorporates the employee‟s early exercise policy by assuming that early 
exercise happens when the stock price is a certain multiple of the exercise price.” 
The first change (incorporation of employee exit rate) can be directly estimated from the 
company‟s historical data on employee turnover, for the particular category of employees who 
receive the share options. The second variable (early exercise multiple) poses more difficulties, 
but should also be based on past decisions by employees who voluntarily exercised their share 
options voluntarily. Hull and White (2004) suggested an alternative for the latter, where such 
information is not available. 
They recommended using empirical evidence on such behaviour, such as that found by Huddart 
and Lang (1996), and Carpenter (1998). Huddart and Lang (1996) studied 8 companies who 
granted share options to 58 316 employees (including executives and ordinary employees) 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. They found that the average ratio of the share price to the 
exercise price, at the time of exercise, was 2.2. Carpenter‟s (1998) sample of 40 companies 
between 1979-1994 gave a multiple of 2.8.  
A possible reason for the difference between Carpenter‟s (1998) multiple and Huddart and 
Lang‟s (1996) multiple, is that executives are more affluent and can thus wait longer to exercise 
their share options, as they have less of a need for personal liquidity (Hull and White, 2004). 
Hull and White (2004) therefore recommended using Carpenter‟s (1998) multiple when trying to 
value executive share options.  
 
3.4.5. The valuation model used in this study 
 
From a practical point of view, Carpenter‟s (1998) simple model poses difficulties, in that in 
order to select an appropriate stopping rate, data on the annual cancellation rates of share 
options (for a specific grant) granted by firms needs to be obtained. Such data is not publicly 
available, as firms only publish (in their financial statements) total cancellations every year – not 
from a specific grant. In any event, the cancellation rates of share options (for specific grants) 
awarded to the CEOs of companies is required – this information is not available either.  
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Thus, this study uses the Hull and White (2004) model to value share options granted to CEOs
6
. 
Non-parametric models were considered, but none of the literature surveyed on the topic of 
valuing employee share options mentioned the use or application of non-parametric models. For 
this reason they were excluded. 
 
A number of assumptions have had to be made with regards to the other variables in the Hull 
and White (2004) model, such as the grant date, expected share volatility, expected dividend 
yield, risk-free rate, early exercise multiple, and expected employee exit rate. The inputs to the 
model are discussed next. 
 
 
3.4.6. Valuation model inputs and assumptions made 
 
Grant date and grant date share price 
None of the companies in the sample disclosed the exact grant dates of the share options 
granted. This date is important, so as to determine the spot share price on the grant date which 
is used in the valuation of the share options. However, all of the companies disclosed the 
exercise price of the shares, and given that all of the companies awarded share options with 
exercise prices either equal to the spot price on the day (or, in some cases, the weighted 
average of the share price in the few days before the grant date), the exact grant date is not 
important in determining the spot price of the individual share, because the grant date share 
price will be the same (or very close to) the exercise price of the option. Also, as per the JSE 
listing requirements, companies are not allowed to award share options that have an exercise 
price less than the grant date share price (i.e. companies are not allowed to award share 
options that are so called “in-the-money”). Based on the above, the grant date share price will 
be assumed to be the exercise price of the options granted. 
 
However, the grant date is still needed to determine the risk-free rate. Thus, given that it can be 
assumed that the exercise price of the options are the same as the grant date price (see 
above), the grant date was found by searching the closing share prices during that particular 
year until the share price matched the exercise price of the shares. This date would then be 
taken as the grant date price. Where the exercise price occurs more than once in the same 
year, then the date closest to the year-end will be taken. This is because it is reasonable to 
assume that the options would only be awarded once the performance of the firm over the past 
year can be assessed – usually towards the end of the year. Finally, where exercise prices 
could not be matched exactly to the closing share prices in that particularly year, then the 
                                                   
6
 An electronic version of this model is available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/~hull 
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closest share price (as close to the year end as possible) was taken - this date would then be 
substituted as the grant date. 
  
Expected share volatility 
Given the inherent difficulties associated with estimating the expected standard deviation of the 
share over the option's life, an alternative measure will be used. The average standard deviation 
of the share's return over the 5 years prior to the grant date will be calculated, and this will be 
normalised by the mean share return over that 5 year period. This is, in effect, the coefficient of 
variation, and will be used because the standard deviations of shares with large share prices will 
tend to be greater than those shares that have smaller share prices – the coefficient of variation 
removes this bias. This is consistent with Westphal and Zajac (1994) and Carpenter (1998). 
Share prices will be obtained from McGregor BFA. 
 
Expected dividend yield 
The 5-year average dividend yield prior to the grant date, will be used as a proxy for the 
expected dividend rate, which too, is consistent with Westphal and Zajac (1994) and Carpenter 
(1998). This will slightly underestimate the value of options in early years and slightly 
overestimate the value of options in later years (because dividends reduce the value of options), 
and so should even out over the period under examination (Westphal and Zajac, 1994). 
Dividend yields will be calculated using data from McGregor BFA. 
 
Time to maturity/expiration 
This data will be obtained from company annual reports.  
 
Vesting period 
This will be obtained directly from the company‟s annual report. 
 
Risk-free rate 
As a proxy for the risk-free rate, the interest rate prevailing on the grant date for the government 
bond that most closely matches the maturity of the option will be used. Details of government 
bonds (such as issue dates, redemption dates and durations/maturities), will be obtained from 
the National Treasury‟s website
7
. Government bond rates will be obtained from McGregor BFA.  
 
It was found, however, that bond data from McGregor BFA only went back to 1 August 2003 for 
most bonds (the only bond for which there was data before 1 August 2003 was the R153 – 
maturing in August 2011). This is a problem with McGregor BFA itself, because, as per the 
National Treasury‟s schedule of bonds (see above), there were many more bonds in issue 
before this. This only presented a problem for share options that were issued before this date. 
For share options that were issued before this date (1 August 2003), the yield on the R153 was 
                                                   
7
 Available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/divisions/alm/2006/default.aspx 
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used (because data was available on this bond before 1 August 2003). The difference in the 
maturity of the option and the R153 bond (which was never more than 5 years), can be 
accepted as not being material, given that the South African yield curve is relatively flat over a 5 
year period, and generally only changes shape over a longer period. 
 
A further problem was presented by the fact that the R153 matured in August 2011 and there 
were no bonds in issue (during 2002 and 2003) that matured in 2012 – a later bond which 
matured in 2012 (the R205) was only issued in July 2005, and McGregor BFA has no data on 
this bond. The bond that matured next was the R179 (in August 2013), but data on this was only 
available from 1 August 2003. Thus, there was no bond that matured between the period 1 
August 2011 and 1 August 2013. As a result, a midpoint of 1 August 2012 was determined, and 
for share options that matured before 1 August 2012, the R153 was used. For share options 
that matured between 1 August 2012 and 1 August 2013, the R179 was used, as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
But because data on the R179 was only available from 1 August 2003, the yield on the R179 on 
1 August 2003 (9.68%) was used for these share options (i.e. ones that matured between 1 
August 2012 and 1 August 2013), even if the option was granted before this date (1 August 
2003). In any event, the difference between this date (1 August 2003) and any given option‟s 
grant date (for share options that matured between 1 August 2012 and 1 August 2013) was 
never more than 6 months, which is not likely to materially affect the calculation or its use in this 
study, because it is unlikely for interest rates to change dramatically over a 6 month period.  
 
This can best be illustrated by an example: assume an option (maturing on 1 May 2012) was 
granted on 1 June 2003. For this option, the yield on the R153 at 1 June 2003 would be used 
(because the option matures before 1 August 2012, and because there is data for the R159 at 1 
June 2003). For an option (maturing on 1 October 2012) that was granted on 1 June 2003, the 
yield on the R179 on 1 August 2003 would be used (because the option matures after 1 August 
2012, and because there is no data on the R179 before 1 August 2003).  
 
Aug 2011 Aug 2012 Aug 2013 
R153 
expires 
 no bond expires 
R179 
expires 
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Early exercise multiple 
Following the Hull and White (2004) recommendation (from the Carpenter (1998) study), this is 
taken as being the first time the share price is 2.8 times the exercise price. 
 
Employee exit rate (pre-vesting and post-vesting) 
The CEO exit rate is not given in company annual reports and will be impracticable to calculate, 
as a detailed record of all CEOs and their tenures (for each company) will be required. 
Consequently, the CEO exit rate is estimated to be 0%, as it is reasonable to assume that 
CEOs will not leave within the five-year period (2002-2006). 
 
 
3.5. Assumptions underlying the study 
 
This study is based on agency theory, and hence the assumptions underlying agency theory 
underpin this study as well. Specifically, the primary assumption is that managers do pursue 
goals that are at odds with shareholder wealth maximisation, and that one of the primary means 
of doing this is through awarding themselves higher salaries. 
 
The second assumption is that data collected from the various sources, namely McGregor BFA 
and company annual reports, is accurate. 
 
 
3.6. Limitations 
 
3.6.1. Sample size 
 
The sample size used in this study is smaller than those used in U.S. studies. Most of the data 
must be captured manually (i.e. 250 annual reports must be examined) and then additional 
valuations of the share options is required, hence the relatively small sample size compared to 
the U.S. studies. In the U.S. studies all the data (excluding the actual valuing of share options) 
were readily available on electronic databases, hence the large sample sizes used in those 
studies. 
 
The JSE Securities Exchange also has substantially less companies than its U.S. counterparts, 
with a few companies making up the majority of the overall market capitalisation. The sample of 
companies used here covers a large proportion of the total market capitalisation of the JSE. The 
appropriateness of choosing the top fifty companies was discussed in detail in Section 3.3.1. 
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3.6.2. Differences in institutional investors 
 
As discussed previously, some institutional investors may have commercial relations with the 
companies that they invest in and hence are “indifferent” to irregular corporate governance acts 
in their investee companies. It may be that since the measures of institutional investors have not 
been separated into pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant, this may affect the results of this 
study (see the discussion of David, et al. (1998) in Section 2.5.). In any event, such a separation 
would be very difficult to achieve, and most likely not be practicable.  
 
 
3.7. Summary 
The first section of this chapter developed and formally stated the central hypotheses underlying 
this study, namely that (1) the greater the presence of the institutional shareholders in a 
company, the less the overall remuneration awarded to CEOs, and the more the percentage of 
remuneration that is in the form of share options, and (2) firms that are controlled by their 
owners will award less overall compensation and more compensation in the form of share 
options (and vice versa). The next section described the delimitations of the sample chosen, 
and the sources from which the data has been obtained.  
Then, the first statistical technique was described, and the five regression models explained, 
with justification for the various independent and dependent variables. Thereafter, the tests for 
differences of means were explained, and how firms are designated “management-controlled” 
or “owner-controlled”. The various employee share option valuation models were also 
discussed, a model was chosen (the Hull and White (2004) model), and the various 
assumptions used in valuing the options were described. Finally, the assumptions and 
limitations of the methodology employed were discussed. The next chapter will present the 
findings of this study, and interpret the results obtained from the regression models and tests for 
differences of means. 
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Chapter IV: Results and Discussion 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As noted in the previous chapters, there has been little or no research on institutional 
shareholders in South Africa. In particular, it is not known exactly how much institutions own of 
the companies listed on the JSE Securities Exchange. A similar conclusion can be reached 
about the value of share options awarded to South African CEOs. While there has been some 
media publicity about the number of options, no study has yet explicitly valued these options. 
The following sections will first describe the sample used, thereby presenting original findings on 
both the level of institutional shareholdings in these companies over the period 2002-2006, and 
findings on the level and mix of CEO compensation over this same period. Thereafter, the 
results of the regression models and tests for differences of means are presented, with a 
detailed interpretation and discussion of the results. All regression models were estimated using 
EViews 5.1 for Windows, whereas the tests for means (and other related statistical tests) were 
performed using the Data Analysis Plus 2.12 add-in for MS Excel 2003 (available with the Keller 
and Warrack (2000) text). 
 
 
4.2. Sample description 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe and analyse some of the more interesting findings, 
where applicable. The relevant data was obtained for these 50 companies over the five previous 
financial years, being 2002-2006, resulting in a sample of 250 firm-years
8
. Certain companies 
(sixteen in total) were excluded from the sample, due to a number of reasons
9
. Most of those 
excluded were dual listed companies (ten companies), due to the fact that their financial 
statements were presented in a foreign currency and often did not contain the required data. 
Other companies were generally excluded for not having the required data.   
 
In presenting the findings from the data, more reliance is placed on the median figures, as the 
mean figures are often distorted by significant outliers (e.g. Phutuma Nhleko's approximately 
R36 million package in 2006). The following tables summarise the key data from the sample, 
sorted by year: 
                                                   
8
 Refer to Appendix B for a list of the companies included in the sample. 
9
 For a list of the companies excluded from the sample, and the reasons for their exclusion, refer to  
Appendix C. 
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Table 6: Mean compensation data sorted by year (median figures in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Mean institutional data sorted by year (median figures in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cash 
component 
R 3 631 963 
(R 3 139 000) 
R 4 372 069 
(R 3 432 500) 
R 5 214 418 
(R 4 568 000) 
R 5 890 684 
(R 5 130 000) 
R 6 944 741 
(R 6 499 500) 
Options 
component 
R 1 989 688 
(R 890 725) 
R 2 394 746 
(R 1 134 339) 
R 1 951 599 
(R 1 078 932) 
R 2 257 134 
(R 1 211 500) 
R 2 680 389 
(R 0) 
Total 
compensation 
R 5 621 651 
(R 4 222 000) 
R 6 766 815 
(R 5 171 892) 
R 7 166 017 
(R 5 857 240) 
R 8 147 818 
(R 7 167 555) 
R 9 625 129 
(R 7 639 783) 
Cash % 75.46% 
(81.90%) 
72.79% 
(71.22%) 
78.76% 
(83.22%) 
79.16% 
(82.93%) 
84.12% 
(100%) 
Options % 24.54% 
(18.10%) 
27.21% 
(28.78%) 
21.24% 
(16.78%) 
20.84% 
(17.07%) 
15.88% 
(0%) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number of institutions that own more 
than 5% of total shares 
2.57 
(2.00) 
2.68 
(2.00) 
2.80 
(3.00) 
2.64 
(2.00) 
2.44 
(2.50) 
% owned by the largest institution 15.41% 
(13.56%) 
15.68% 
(13.90%) 
15.05% 
(13.21%) 
14.65% 
(13.43%) 
13.73% 
(12.50%) 
Total of institutions that own more 
than 5% of total shares 
31.85% 
(30.04%) 
32.61% 
(27.34%) 
31.48% 
(25.45%) 
29.75% 
(24.87%) 
25.94% 
(24.87%) 
Total % owned by all institutions 51.44% 
(55.98%) 
54.44% 
(59.36%) 
51.88% 
(53.61%) 
52.36% 
(52.04%) 
49.11% 
(48.09%) 
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Table 8:  Mean control variables sorted by year 
(median figures in parentheses) 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total assets Rm 42 264 
(Rm 8 883) 
Rm 46 677 
(Rm 9 645) 
Rm 53 351 
(Rm 11 498) 
Rm 68 138 
(Rm 10 569) 
Rm 79 690 
(Rm 14 003) 
Return on equity (ROE) 26.20% 
(19.00%) 
18.60% 
(20.25%) 
21.42% 
(20.28%) 
28.81% 
(25.60%) 
31.76% 
(26.13%) 
Share return 16.03% 
(8.44%) 
16.33% 
(0.11%) 
44.28% 
(37.79%) 
44.10% 
(40.05%) 
37.99% 
(33.58%) 
Tobin‟s Q 0.89 
(0.60) 
0.81 
(0.71) 
0.98 
(0.94) 
1.26 
(1.14) 
1.49 
(1.29) 
CEO age 51.94 
(53.00) 
51.86 
(53.00) 
52.38 
(53.50) 
52.80 
(54.00) 
52.84 
(53.50) 
Proportion of independent  
non-executive directors on Board 
46.36% 
(45.00%) 
47.55% 
(46.87%) 
50.76% 
(50.00%) 
49.75% 
(51.32%) 
49.36% 
(50.00%) 
CEO ownership 0.98% 
(0.06%) 
1.01% 
(0.08%) 
0.94% 
(0.07%) 
1.67% 
(0.10%) 
1.64% 
(0.12%) 
Board ownership 6.08% 
(0.40%) 
6.64% 
(0.61%) 
7.36% 
(0.49%) 
7.53% 
(0.60%) 
8.07% 
(0.85%) 
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4.2.1. Analysis by years 
 
4.2.1.1. Compensation 
 
The cash component of compensation has risen from a mean of R3 631 963 (median of  
R3 139 000) in 2002 to a mean of R6 944 741 (median of R6 499 500), a compound annual growth 
rate of 17.59% (median of 19.96%) - increases which are significantly above inflation. This is shown 
in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 1: Cash component of compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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The options component of compensation has risen from a mean of R1 989 688 (median of  
R890 725) in 2002 to a mean of R2 680 389 (median of R0) in 2006, a compound annual increase 
of 7.73% (median is a decrease of 100.00%). This is shown in the figure below:  
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Figure 2: Options component of compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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The mean figures are often distorted by large amounts of share options awarded to executives. To 
partially remove this effect from the mean figures, option awards of R10 million or greater were 
removed from the sample – R10 million worth of share options seems an acceptable limit for 
reasonability. This resulted in the following adjusted amounts:  
 
 
Table 9: Mean options component sorted by year (with abnormal awards removed) 
 
 
 
These numbers show that the value of share options awarded increased until 2005, whereafter they 
decreased by approximately 40% in 2006. Both un-adjusted (median) and adjusted (mean) figures 
show a decrease in the 2006 year. This is perhaps as a result of the increasing negative publicity 
surrounding share options (refer to Section 2.4.6.), and also due to the adoption of cash option 
awards – e.g. phantom share options (see Section 2.4.3.5). Perhaps another reason is the adoption 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Options 
component 
R 1 486 861 R 1 889 142 R 1 735 567 R 2 058 463 R 1 242 339 
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of International Accounting Standards by firms in 2005/2006, and in particular, IFRS 2: Share-based 
payments, which requires the expensing of share options. The negative effect on the income 
statement of expensing these options may have discouraged remuneration committees from 
awarding them, as well as the effect of a bull market, which made shares less attractive than cash.  
 
 
Figure 3: Total compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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As shown in Figure 3 (above), mean total compensation has grown from R5 621 651 (median of 
R4 222 000) in 2002, to mean of R9 625 129 (median of R7 639 783) in 2006, an annual 
compounded rate of 14.96% (median by 15.98%). Thus, it appears that CEO compensation has 
nearly doubled over the period 2002-2006. 
 
With regards to the various components of CEO compensation (see Figure 4 and 5 on the next 
page), the cash component of executive remuneration increased over the sample from a mean of 
75.46% to 84.12% (median from 81.90% to 100.00%), indicating a greater propensity to award cash 
over options. This may be attributed to the factors mentioned above (with regards to the decrease 
in options), namely the fact that options have had to be expensed, their unfavourable tax status, 
and negative publicity. This is in complete contrast to the results found by Hall and Liebman (1998) 
in the U.S. 
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Figure 4: Cash percentage of total compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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Figure 5: Options percentage of total compensation over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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4.2.1.2. Institutional holdings (see Table 7) 
 
The number of companies that have institutional shareholders holding more than 5% of shares 
seems to be constant at about 2 to 3. It also appears that institutions on average, don't take more 
than about a 15% holding in a company, though this differs when different sectors are taken into 
account (discussed in a further section). From the statistics on the total percentage of shares (of a 
company) owned by institutions, it can be seen that the total percentage of shares owned by 
institutions went from 51.44% (median of 55.98%) in 2002 to 49.11% (median of 48.09%) in 2006. 
However, even though this level has decreased, there appears to be no discernible trend, as the 
percentage owned seems to be around the 50% level from year to year. Thus, it can tentatively be 
concluded that approximately 50% of listed companies in South Africa are held by institutions, 
which is consistent with the level of institutional shareholdings in the U.S. (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003) and in the U.K. and Australia (Ramsay et al., 1998).  
 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of companies owned by institutions over the sample period (2002-2006) 
 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
55.00%
60.00%
65.00%
70.00%
75.00%
80.00%
85.00%
90.00%
95.00%
100.00%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
%
 o
w
n
e
d
 b
y
 i
n
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
s
Mean
Median
 
 
 
 80 
4.2.1.3. Board membership, Board ownership and CEO ownership (see Table 8) 
 
Of further interest is that the percentage of independent non-executives on companies' Boards has 
increased over the period, from a mean of 46.36% to 49.36% (median from 45.00% to 50.00%), 
indicating companies' increased focus on corporate governance.  With regards to CEO ownership, 
this has increased from 0.98% to 1.64% (median from 0.06% to 0.12%). The median figures should 
be relied upon here because the mean figures have been distorted by some significant outliers such 
as Patrice Motsepe‟s approximately 40% holding in African Rainbow Minerals and Steven Saad‟s 
approximately 14% holding in Aspen Pharmacare. Thus, given that the median percentage has 
doubled over the period, a plausible explanation for this increase could be that, following the equity 
market crash in 2001/2002, CEOs increased their own personal holdings in their companies in the 
subsequent period, because they knew that the market price of their shares was lower than their 
company‟s intrinsic value.  
 
Finally, Board ownership has increased over the period from a mean of 6.08% (median of 0.40%) in 
2002 to a mean of 8.07% (median of 0.85%) in 2006. This could also be attributed to the same 
reason for the increase in the CEO holdings. 
 
 
4.2.2. Analysis by sector 
 
The final sample can be analysed into sectors as follows: 
 
Table 10: Distribution of sample by sector 
 
 Basic 
Materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services 
Financials Industrials Total 
Number of 
companies 
12 7 11 12 8 50 
Number of 
firm-years 
60 35 55 60 40 250 
 
There appears to be a good representation of all the sectors in the sample. 
 
4.2.2.1. Compensation 
 
The following tables analyses the variables from the data by sector. A commentary follows. 
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Table 11:  Mean compensation data analysed by sector over the period 2002-2006 
(median figures in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12:  Mean institutional data analysed by sector over the period 2002-2006 
 (median figures in parentheses) 
 Basic Materials Consumer Goods Consumer Services Financials Industrials 
Cash component 
R 4 144 118 
(R 3 626 027) 
R 4 077 257 
(R 2 850 000) 
R 6 041 792 
(R 5 950 000) 
R 6 726 564 
(R 5 603 500) 
R 4 339 610 
(R 3 718 500) 
Options component 
R 2 515 534 
(R 1 258 270) 
R 1 509 587 
(R 0) 
R 2 672 012 
(R 1 152 010) 
R 2 464 311 
(R 970 335) 
R 1 136 326 
(R 862 475) 
Total compensation 
R 6 659 652 
(R 5 384 907) 
R 5 586 844 
(R 3 471 000) 
R 8 713 805 
(R 7 357 668) 
R 9 190 876 
(R 9 159 500) 
R 5 475 936 
(R 4 919 867) 
Cash % 
72.92% 
(74.23%) 
84.76% 
(100.00%) 
76.18% 
(83.94%) 
80.07% 
(86.28%) 
81.43% 
(84.07%) 
Options % 
27.08% 
(25.77%) 
15.24% 
(0.00%) 
23.82% 
(16.06%) 
19.93% 
(13.72%) 
18.57% 
(15.93%) 
 Basic Materials Consumer Goods Consumer Services Financials Industrials 
Number of institutions that own more than 5% 
1.83 
(1.00) 
2.34 
(2.00) 
3.07 
(3.00) 
2.28 
(2.00) 
3.98 
(4.00) 
% owned by the largest institution 
8.19% 
(8.50%) 
24.21% 
(16.31%) 
16.97% 
(14.66%) 
12.75% 
(12.33%) 
17.58% 
(17.60%) 
Total of institutions that own more than 5% 
17.00% 
(10.00%) 
38.77% 
(33.34%) 
36.17% 
(31.60%) 
24.16% 
(22.04%) 
44.59% 
(45.60%) 
Total % owned by all institutions 
36.61% 
(34.70%) 
50.08% 
(43.36%) 
60.45% 
(66.00%) 
52.28% 
(51.79%) 
64.27% 
(70.23%) 
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Table 13:  Mean control variables analysed by sector over the period 2002-2006 
(median figures in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Basic Materials Consumer Goods Consumer Services Financials Industrials 
Total assets 
Rm 23 257 
(Rm 17 562) 
Rm 7 703 
(Rm 5 639) 
Rm 7 454 
(Rm 5 883) 
Rm 194 497 
(Rm 92 909) 
Rm 12 756 
(Rm 9 661) 
Return on equity (ROE) 
25.24% 
(21.38%) 
24.93% 
(20.17%) 
32.13% 
(25.56%) 
19.92% 
(20.56%) 
24.44% 
(19.59%) 
Share return 
36.72% 
(20.30%) 
34.18% 
(34.97%) 
38.96% 
(37.25%) 
17.58% 
(16.00%) 
31.38% 
(21.13%) 
Tobin‟s Q 
1.54 
(1.31) 
1.44 
(1.10) 
1.25 
(1.15) 
0.42 
(0.14) 
0.86 
(0.77) 
CEO age 
52.92 
(52.50) 
51.97 
(53.00) 
52.95 
(55.00) 
48.65 
(49.00) 
57.00 
(57.00) 
Proportion of independent  
non-executive directors on Board 
42.93% 
(40.00%) 
46.76% 
(53.85%) 
48.73% 
(43.06%) 
56.06% 
(56.70%) 
45.76% 
(45.80%) 
CEO ownership 
1.44% 
(0.00%) 
2.68% 
(0.16%) 
0.72% 
(0.14%) 
0.46% 
(0.11%) 
1.46% 
(0.13%) 
Board ownership 
6.27% 
(0.06%) 
8.11% 
(1.52%) 
11.00% 
(4.90%) 
7.20% 
(0.43%) 
4.70% 
(0.66%) 
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It would appear that companies in the Financials sector reward their CEOs the most generously, 
with a mean total compensation of R9 190 876 (median of R9 159 500) over the sample period. 
Second is the Consumer Services sector (which includes retailers like JD Group), followed by Basic 
Materials (which includes Resources companies). It is interesting to note that the profits of 
companies in all three of these sectors, is significantly affected by macroeconomic factors such as 
commodity prices (Resources) and interest rates (Consumer Services and Financials).  
 
Consumer Services companies seem to award more share options than any other companies, 
followed by Resources companies. This is consistent with research by Betts et al. (2005), who 
found that Consumer Services companies (in South Africa) had the biggest employee share option 
programmes. The share prices (and hence share options) of these companies are also significantly 
influenced by macroeconomic factors. Figure 7 and 8 (below) graphically presents these findings: 
 
 
Figure 7: Mean compensation data analysed by sector over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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Figure 8: Median compensation data analysed by sector over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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In terms of the mix of compensation (see Figure 9 below), Consumer Goods companies award the 
greatest portion of CEO compensation in the form of cash (and hence the least in the form of share 
options) at a mean of 84.76% (median of 100.00%) in the form of cash. Basic Materials companies 
award the greatest proportion of CEO compensation in the form of share options (and hence the 
least in the form of cash), at a mean of 27.08% (median of 25.77%) in the form of share options. 
 
The last result (regarding Basic Materials companies) is particularly concerning, given that the 
CEOs of these companies hold the least number of shares in their companies compared to CEOs of 
other companies. If Patrice Motsepe's 43% stake in African Rainbow Minerals is removed from the 
sample the mean drops to 0.02% (from 1.44%), while the median stays the same at 0%, the lowest 
(mean and median figures) of all the sectors. This unwillingness to hold shares in their own 
companies is perhaps a disguised admission that the fortunes of their companies are largely out of 
their own hands. This raises the validity of using equity-based compensation in the first place, 
especially given that companies in this sector awards the greatest proportion of compensation in 
the form of share options (see above). 
 
The mix of compensation across all sectors is surprisingly within roughly the same region, i.e. 
approximately 80% cash and 20% share options. The sector that differs markedly is the Consumer 
Goods sector. Of the 7 companies in this sector, 3 of them were still being run by their founders 
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(Aspen Pharmacare, Netcare, Steinhoff), which perhaps explains the low incidence of share 
options, as these CEOs already owned significant stakes in their companies, and thus their 
interests can be said to be already significantly aligned with other shareholders. 
 
 
Figure 9: Cash percentage of total compensation analysed by sector 
over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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4.2.2.2. Institutional holdings (see Table 12 and Figure 10) 
 
All the statistics on institutional holdings are consistent in that Consumer Services (mean ownership 
of 60.45%, median of 66.00%) and Industrial companies (mean ownership of 64.27%, median of 
70.23%) appear to be the most popular with institutions, and Basic Materials companies the least 
popular (mean ownership of 36.61%, median of 34.70%). A possible explanation why Resources 
are so scarcely held once again relates to their dependence on commodity prices, and the difficulty 
of having to predict these prices. This difficulty and inherent uncertainty, may well discourage 
institutions from investing in these companies, or at least from taking long-term positions in them. 
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Figure 10: Percentage of shares owned by institutions analysed by sector 
over the sample period (2002-2006) 
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4.2.2.3. Board membership, Board ownership and CEO ownership (see Table 11) 
 
The percentage of independent non-executives on the various Boards is approximately the same 
across the sectors, except for Financials (with a mean of 56.06% and median of 56.70% of the 
Board being independent non-executive directors). The small CEO and Board ownership of Basic 
Materials companies was discussed earlier, but of interest here is the relatively larger ownership 
(both CEO and Board) in Consumer Services companies, especially since there aren't major 
outliers. This is perhaps explained by the large number of share options that these companies 
award (Consumer Services companies award the most share options as mentioned previously). 
 
 
4.3. Regression results  
 
The results from the regression models are shown in the table below (where ** = coefficient is 
significant at the 99% level, * = coefficient is significant at the 95% level): 
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Table 14: Summary of regression coefficients (p-values in parentheses) for original models 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 Cash  
Component 
(OLS) 
Options  
Component 
(tobit) 
Total 
Compensation 
(OLS) 
Cash % 
(OLS) 
Options % 
(tobit) 
Number of institutions 
that own>5% 
280 569 
(0.1655) 
89 134 
(0.8643) 
631 135 
(0.1314) 
0.0097 
(0.6504) 
-0.0303 
(0.3548) 
% owned by largest 
institution 
-2 021 835 
(0.5308) 
696 924 
(0.9331) 
3 649 293 
(0.5841) 
0.1661 
(0.6286) 
-0.5457 
(0.2956) 
Total of institutions that 
own >5% 
392 304 
(0.8694) 
-1 853 361 
(0.7623) 
-4 166 978 
(0.3985) 
-0.0409 
(0.8722) 
0.2616 
(0.4962) 
Total % owned by all 
institutions 
-2 052 617 
(0.0069)** 
246 472 
(0.8972) 
-2 176 993 
(0.1636) 
-0.0952 
(0.2367) 
0.1305 
(0.2772) 
Natural log of  
Total assets 
1 747 341 
(0.0000)** 
1 649 182 
(0.0000)** 
3 016 775 
(0.0000)** 
-0.0343 
(0.0176)* 
0.0480 
(0.0269)* 
Return on equity 890 279 
(0.0570) 
-2 095 735 
(0.2168) 
677 894 
(0.4818) 
0.0737 
(0.1387) 
-0.2382 
(0.0680) 
Share return -45 657 
(0.8560) 
287 667 
(0.6469) 
105 064 
(0.8399) 
-0.0101 
(0.7071) 
0.0195 
(0.6230) 
Tobin‟s Q 1 057 536 
(0.0000)** 
234 331 
(0.6655) 
1 392 695 
(0.0009)** 
0.0162 
(0.4470) 
-0.0207 
(0.5583) 
CEO ownership -182 849 
(0.9565) 
2 339 284 
(0.7747) 
3 048 750 
(0.6599) 
-0.2625 
(0.4623) 
0.1990 
(0.7000) 
Board ownership 752 124 
(0.4839) 
-1 375 518 
(0.6089) 
-1 078 386 
(0.6272) 
0.1075 
(0.3478) 
-0.0642 
(0.7064) 
CEO age 5 317 
(0.8357) 
-29 493 
(0.6615) 
-27 299 
(0.6064) 
0.0034 
(0.2088) 
-0.0028 
(0.5169) 
Proportion of 
independents on Board 
617 508 
(0.4878) 
3 020 214 
(0.1850) 
2 379 076 
(0.1965) 
-0.0957 
(0.3130) 
0.1733 
(0.2252) 
Basic Materials -38 983 628 
(0.0000)** 
-36 955 523 
(0.0000)** 
-66 047 873 
(0.0000)** 
1.3616 
(0.0002)** 
-0.7508 
(0.1631) 
Consumer goods -36 834 466 
(0.0000)** 
-37 477 123 
(0.0000)** 
-63 768 183 
(0.0000)** 
1.4454 
(0.0000)** 
-0.8816 
(0.0942) 
Consumer services -34 840 563 
(0.0000)** 
-35 012 302 
(0.0000)** 
-60 402 575 
(0.0000)** 
1.3653 
(0.0001)** 
-0.7465 
(0.1499) 
Financials -37 882 076 
(0.0000)** 
-40 467 667 
(0.0000)** 
-67 100 853 
(0.0000)** 
1.5397 
(0.0000)** 
-0.9969 
(0.0751) 
Industrials -37 160 083 
(0.0000)** 
-37 248 424 
(0.0000)** 
-64 667 261 
(0.0000)** 
1.4322 
(0.0001)** 
-0.8229 
(0.1214) 
 88 
 
 
4.3.1. Level of compensation
10
 
 
4.3.1.1. Cash component (OLS regression) 
 
Only one of the institutional variables (total percentage owned by all institutions) is significant for the 
cash component model, and in the hypothesised direction, i.e. that there is a decreased level of 
compensation because of a higher level of shares owned by institutions. However, none of the 
other institutional variables are significant, which suggests (on an overall level) that the presence of 
institutional shareholders does not appear to affect the cash component of CEO compensation. 
 
The (natural log of) Total Assets variable is highly significant (at the 99% confidence level) 
indicating that CEOs of bigger companies are likely to be awarded a greater cash salary than their 
counterparts in smaller companies. This is consistent with the predictions and with the previous 
studies mentioned earlier.  
 
The Tobin‟s q variable (a proxy for investment opportunities) is significant at the 99% level for this 
model, which is opposite to the predicted direction (refer to Section 3.3.3.1.3.). The results suggest 
that firms with greater investment opportunities pay larger amounts of cash than firms with fewer 
investment opportunities. A possible explanation for this is that the “size” effect (natural log of total 
assets variable) has somehow distorted this, due to the fact that total assets forms part of the 
calculation of Tobin‟s q. Therefore, this variable is in the same direction as the “size” variable. 
Another explanation is that this may also indicate overvaluation of the company‟s shares, and that 
cash is a better alternative as the company realises its growth opportunities. 
 
Although not significant at the 99% or 95% level, the return on equity (ROE) variable is significant at 
the 90% level for this model, and in the direction hypothesised. This suggests that ROE is a 
determinant in the level of cash compensation paid to CEOs. This makes intuitive sense given that 
the options component of CEO's pay should theoretically reward them for increases in the share 
price. 
 
Finally, the only remaining variables that are significant are the sector variables. Even more 
interesting is that all the sector variables are significant (at the 99% confidence level), indicating that 
remuneration practices (with regards to the cash element) clearly differ amongst sectors.  
 
                                                   
10
 See Appendix D for the detailed output of each model. 
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The R-squared and adjusted R-squared statistics for this model were 0.5639 and 0.5340 
respectively, indicating that approximately 53.40% of the cash component is explained by this 
model. 
 
 
4.3.1.2. Options component (tobit regression) 
 
None of the institutional variables are significant in this model. But more importantly, the presence 
of institutional shareholders would also not appear to affect the value of share options awarded to 
CEOs.  
 
Again, the size variable (natural log of total assets) is highly significant (at the 99% level), which is 
consistent with the theory. The sector variables are also highly significant, again suggesting that 
companies in different industry sectors remunerate their CEOs differently. Unfortunately, EViews 
does not report an R-squared or adjusted R-squared for tobit regressions, so this information is 
unavailable. 
 
 
4.3.1.3. Total Compensation (OLS regression) 
 
As with the “cash component” model, the size proxy (natural log of Total Assets) and investment 
opportunities proxy (Tobin‟s q) independent variables are significant, at the 99% confidence level. 
The sector variables are also all significant (at the 99% confidence level), confirming a clear 
difference between industry compensation practices. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared 
statistics for this model were 0.4277 and 0.3883 respectively, indicating that approximately 38.83% 
of total compensation is explained by the independent variables. 
 
 
4.3.1.4. Overall comments 
 
A consistent pattern across all models is that none of the institutional proxies have any significance, 
except for the “total percentage owned by all institutions variable in the “cash component” model. 
From this it can be preliminary concluded that the presence of institutional shareholders appear to 
have no effect on the level of compensation that CEOs receive. The validity of the last statement 
will be evaluated once the remaining tests are conducted. 
 
Also, there is a clear sector effect across all three “level” models which provides evidence of sector-
specific remuneration policies. 
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Finally, share return, CEO age, CEO ownership, Board ownership or the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on a Board do not appear to influence the level of CEO pay. The R-squared 
and adjusted R-squared statistics for the various models (where applicable) were satisfactory, 
ranging from 38.82% to 53.40%, thus providing some support for the conclusions reached from 
these models. 
 
 
4.3.2. Mix of compensation
11
 
 
4.3.2.1. Cash percentage (OLS regression) 
 
None of the institutional variables are significant in this model, suggesting that institutional 
shareholders do not have an effect on the cash percentage of CEOs‟ remuneration. 
 
The “size effect” is not prevalent in this model as it is with the other models, but instead, this model 
shows an inverse relationship between the size of the company and the percentage of cash salary 
(statistically significant at the 95% level). A possible explanation for this is that with larger 
companies, the agency problem is worsened (because managers take stewardship of larger 
assets), and thus are paid with a greater percentage of share options in order to align their interests 
with those of shareholders, thus reducing the agency problem. 
 
Again, the sector variables are all highly significant at the 99% confidence level. The R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared statistics for this model were 0.1014 and 0.0397 respectively, indicating that the 
overall model is not a good predictor of the cash percentage of CEOs compensation.  
 
 
4.3.2.2. Options percentage (tobit regression) 
 
None of the institutional variables are significant, implying that institutional shareholders would not 
appear to influence the proportion of share options awarded. The Tobin‟s q variable is also 
statistically significant at the 95% level as in the “cash percentage” model, and probably for the 
same reasons as mentioned above. Finally, there appears to be no sector-specific behaviour, given 
that none of the sector variables are significant at either the 99% or 95% level. 
 
                                                   
11
 See Appendix D for the detailed output of each model. 
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Although not significant at the 99% or 95% level, the return on equity (ROE) variable is significant at 
the 90% level for this model (p-value of 0.0680). This is an interesting result as the results suggest 
that the proportion of a CEO‟s remuneration in the form of share options is negatively related to a 
company‟s ROE. This also suggests that companies with lower ROEs award more share options as 
a percentage of total compensation. It also indicates that, when ROEs decrease, the proportion of 
options awarded increase.  
 
Given that share options did not affect the income statement in previous years, this would imply a 
degree of subterfuge on behalf of companies, because any decrease in cash compensation 
resulting from poor performance appears to have been offset by increased remuneration from share 
options. This became evident during the data capturing process, when it was observed that certain 
companies, particularly Resources companies, awarded large amounts of share options when their 
ROE was very poor, even negative. For example, in 2004 when Harmony‟s ROE was a dismal  
-2.52%, CEO Bernard Swanepoel‟s salary only increased by R108 000 (the amount which is 
actually visible from the financial statements). However, his share options award was approximately 
R5.4million in that year (versus no share options in the prior year), an amount which was not 
quantified in the financial statements. 
 
Finally, because this is a tobit model, EViews does not report its R-squared or adjusted R-squared 
statistic. 
 
 
4.3.2.3. Overall comments 
 
Consistent with the results of the regressions on the level of compensation, it appears that 
institutional shareholders have no effect on the mix of compensation. Once again it can only be 
preliminary concluded that the presence of institutional shareholders does not seem to have any 
effect on the mix of CEO compensation.  
 
The negative relationship between the firm's performance (as measured by the ROE) poses some 
interesting questions, such as whether this result will be observed in the post-IFRS period. 
 
 
4.3.3. Alternative specification – lagged compensation variables 
 
An alternative specification of the regression models is to make the assumption that compensation 
is based on the previous year‟s situation, e.g. compensation paid to a CEO in 2003 was based on 
the company‟s 2002 financial performance, or based on the actions of the institutional shareholders 
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in 2002 (the previous year), etc. Both David et al. (1998) and Khan et al. (2005) employed such a 
model to a degree of success.  
 
The alternative specification can be represented mathematically as follows: 
 
 
(2) Compensation variableYear n = ∑Independent variablesYear n-1 + ε 
 
 
Application of a lagged effect reduces the sample size from 250 firm-year observations to 200 firm-
year observations, due to the fact that the compensation data for 2002 (salary, share options, etc.) 
would have to be removed, as the independent variables for 2001 were not part of the original 
sample. The sample size is still sufficient, as it is larger than the statistical requirement of 186 
observations (Green, 1991). All five regression models were re-estimated using the lagged 
compensation variables, and the results are presented in the table below (where ** = coefficient is 
significant at the 99% level, * = coefficient is significant at the 95% level)
 12
: 
                                                   
12
 For the detailed output for each model, refer to Appendix E. 
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Table 15: Summary of regression coefficients (p-values in parentheses) for lagged models 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 Cash  
Component 
(OLS) 
Options  
Component 
(tobit) 
Total 
Compensation 
(OLS) 
Cash % 
(OLS) 
Options % 
(tobit) 
Number of institutions that 
own>5% 
266 571 
(0.2705) 
481 675 
(0.4586) 
747 285 
(0.1617) 
-0.0101 
(0.6951) 
0.0063 
(0.8679) 
% owned by largest 
institution 
-3 588 560 
(0.3373) 
4 168 609 
(0.6780) 
977 402 
(0.9055) 
-0.1722 
(0.6641) 
0.1241 
(0.8315) 
Total of institutions that own 
>5% 
899 840 
(0.7487) 
-3 314 203 
(0.6599) 
-2 615 232 
(0.6729) 
0.1323 
(0.6573) 
-0.0910 
(0.8352) 
Total % owned by all 
institutions 
-1 853 219 
(0.0270)* 
-727 300 
(0.7445) 
-2 426 223 
(0.1873) 
-0.0382 
(0.6659) 
0.0426 
(0.7433) 
Natural log of Total assets 1 783 286 
(0.0000)** 
1 414 150 
(0.0007)** 
2 922 878 
(0.0000)** 
-0.0183 
(0.2685) 
0.0269 
(0.2679) 
Return on equity -71 817 
(0.8884) 
-503 290 
(0.7018) 
-243 944 
(0.8289) 
0.0230 
(0.6716) 
-0.0384 
(0.6181) 
Share return 293 929 
(0.2560) 
-315 698 
(0.6387) 
258 388 
(0.6502) 
0.0186 
(0.4969) 
-0.0343 
(0.3823) 
Tobin‟s Q 1 257 660 
(0.0000)** 
283 977 
(0.6799) 
1 745 923 
(0.0024)** 
0.0094 
(0.7300) 
-0.0237 
(0.5555) 
CEO ownership -1 553 813 
(0.7196) 
-8 500 398 
(0.4509) 
-3 880 308 
(0.6843) 
0.2569 
(0.5762) 
-0.5996 
(0.3638) 
Board ownership 615 714 
(0.6110) 
203 552 
(0.9483) 
258 826 
(0.9227) 
0.0135 
(0.9164) 
0.0152 
(0.9337) 
CEO age 23 854 
(0.4096) 
15 023 
(0.8497) 
42 917 
(0.5009) 
0.0019 
(0.5273) 
-0.0025 
(0.5890) 
Proportion  of independents 
on Board 
736 570 
(0.4582) 
175 763 
(0.9472) 
1 077 755 
(0.6224) 
-0.0100 
(0.9245) 
0.0020 
(0.9896) 
Basic Materials -40 450 800 
(0.0000)** 
-33 240 918 
(0.0011)** 
-67 011 828 
(0.0000)** 
1.0838 
(0.0078)** 
-0.2703 
(0.6474) 
Consumer goods -37 978 607 
(0.0000)** 
-34 050 346 
(0.0006)** 
-64 134 809 
(0.0000)** 
1.1712 
(0.0033)** 
-0.4346 
(0.4522) 
Consumer services -35 858 713 
(0.0000)** 
-31 066 925 
(0.0014)** 
-60 551 948 
(0.0000)** 
1.0711 
(0.0064)** 
-0.2580 
(0.6493) 
Financials -39 057 553 
(0.0000)** 
-35 595 698 
(0.0008)** 
-66 797 309 
(0.0000)** 
1.1851 
(0.0051)** 
-0.4338 
(0.4802) 
Industrials -38 484 003 
(0.0000)** 
-34 154 310 
(0.0006)** 
-65 734 643 
(0.0000)** 
1.1544 
(0.0041)** 
-0.3611 
(0.5342) 
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As can be seen from the above figures, the results are very much similar to those in the original 
regression models. The “total percentage owned by institutions” variable is again significant in the 
“cash component” model, though this time only at the 95% confidence level. The “size” effect is only 
visible in the three “level” models, and Tobin‟s q is significant in the same models as before (the 
“cash component” and “total compensation” models).  
 
The R-squared and adjusted R-squared for the cash component model was 0.5807 and 0.5441 
respectively, indicating a slightly stronger fit than the original model. For the “total compensation” 
model, the R-squared and adjusted R-squared was 0.4055 and 0.3535 respectively – a slightly 
weaker fit than the original model. In general, the same conclusions can be reached – i.e. that 
institutional shareholders do not appear to have any effect on either the level or mix of CEO 
compensation. 
 
 
4.4. Tests of differences of means 
 
4.4.1. Sample description 
 
There were 17 management-controlled firms (49 firm-year observations, or 19.60% of the sample) 
and 45 owner-controlled firms (201 firm-year observations, or 80.40% of the sample
13
. The table 
below summarises the key data for each sub-sample:  
 
                                                   
13
 Note that the number of firms do not add up to 50 because some firms were management-controlled in 
some years and owner-controlled in other years. 
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Table 16:  Mean data for management-controlled and owner-controlled firms  
    over the sample period 2002-2006 (median figures in parentheses) 
 
 Management-controlled firms Owner-controlled firms 
Cash component R 5 010 375 
(R 4 358 000) 
R 5 250 346 
(R 4 640 000) 
Options component R 1 390 587 
(R 603 300) 
R 2 367 668 
(R 954 000) 
Total compensation R 6 400 962 
(R 5 269 000) 
R 7 618 014 
(R 5 950 000) 
Cash % 81.99% 
 (87.23%) 
77.49% 
 (81.43%) 
Options % 18.01% 
 (12.77%) 
22.51% 
 (18.57%) 
 
 
Whether the differences or similarities observed above are of any significance will be determined by 
the outcome of the remaining statistical tests. 
 
 
4.4.2. Choice of test 
 
4.4.2.1. Tests for normality 
 
In deciding on the requisite test (t-test for normal data or Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for non-normal 
data), the data first needs to be tested for normality (Keller and Warrack, 2000). There are three 
available tests: the chi-squared test for normality, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Lilliefors 
test. The chi-squared test requires that each observation be at least equal to 5, which would not be 
possible because of the cash percentage and options percentage variables. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test assumes that the mean and standard deviation of the population is known, which is 
not the case with these variables. Finally, the Lilliefors test has no requirement for each observation 
and does not require the mean or standard deviation of the population to be known (Keller and 
Warrack, 2000). Therefore, the Lilliefors test will be carried out.  
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The hypotheses for the Lilliefors test are as follows: 
 
H0: The data are normally distributed 
H1: The data are not normally distributed 
 
and the critical value (for a sample size of more than 30, and where “n” is the sample size), is as 
follows (Keller and Warrack, 2000): 
at the 95% confidence level: 0.886 / √n 
at the 99% confidence level: 1.031 / √n 
Thus, for the owner-controlled firm variables, the 95% critical value is 0.0625 and 99% critical value 
is 0.0727. For management-controlled firms, the 95% critical value is 0.1237 and 99% critical value 
is 0.1473. The calculated “D” values (as calculated by MS Excel) need to be greater than the critical 
values for the null hypothesis to be rejected.   
There were 10 sets of data to test (salary, options, total compensation, cash percentage and 
options percentage for each of the management- and owner-controlled firm-years). A summary of 
the results are displayed below
14
. 
 
Table 17: Summary of results of Lilliefors tests 
 
 D statistic Critical value  
(95%) 
Critical value  
(99%) 
Management-controlled firms    
Cash component 0.1557 0.1237 0.1473 
Options component 0.1867 0.1237 0.1473 
Total compensation 0.1477 0.1237 0.1473 
Cash % 0.2003 0.1237 0.1473 
Options % 0.2078 0.1237 0.1473 
Owner-controlled firms    
Cash component 0.0945 0.0625 0.0727 
Options component 0.2288 0.0625 0.0727 
Total compensation 0.1279 0.0625 0.0727 
Cash % 0.1956 0.0625 0.0727 
Options % 0.2061 0.0625 0.0727 
                                                   
14
 Refer to Appendix F (management-controlled firms) and Appendix G (owner-controlled firms) for the full 
results. 
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Since all the calculated D statistics are greater than the critical values (even at the 99% confidence 
level), the null hypothesis can be rejected for all variables, and it can be concluded that all 10 
variables are not normally distributed.  Thus, Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests will be performed on all the 
data. The hypotheses (per variable) for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests are detailed in Section 
3.3.3.2.2. 
 
 
4.4.3. Level of compensation 
 
The following table displays the results of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for each of the “cash 
component”, “options component” and “total compensation” variables
15
: 
 
Table 18: Summary of results of Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests (level of compensation) 
 
 Z statistic P-value 
Variable   
Cash component 0.4594 0.6770 
Options component 1.0675 0.8571 
Total compensation 0.8978 0.8154 
 
 
Given that the p-values are insignificant (at both the 95% and 99% levels) for all three variables, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and thus it can be concluded that owner-controlled firms do not 
remunerate their CEOs less than management-controlled firms, with regards to the level of pay. 
These results corroborate the results of the regression models. 
 
 
4.4.4. Mix of compensation 
 
The following two table displays the results of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for each of the “cash 
percentage” and “options percentage” variables
16
: 
 
 
                                                   
15
 Refer to Appendix H for the full results. 
16
 Refer to Appendix H for the full results. 
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Table 19: Summary of results of Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests (mix of compensation) 
 
 Z statistic P-value 
Variable   
Cash % -1.2922 0.0981 
Options % 1.2922 0.0981 
 
The p-values for both tests are insignificant (at both the 95% and 99% levels). However, they are 
significant at the 90% level, which is too weak to make any strong conclusions. The results, 
therefore, are much the same as the previous Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests, which indicate that, with 
regards to the mix of CEO compensation, owner-controlled firms do not remunerate their CEOs 
differently to management-controlled firms. 
 
 
4.5. Summary and overall conclusion of statistical tests 
 
The results of the original regression models indicated that the influence of institutional 
shareholders is not a determinant of either the level or mix of CEO compensation. The alternative 
regression models, using lagged compensation variables, provided a similar result. These results 
are not consistent with previous empirical studies in other markets.  
 
However, it must be noted from the relatively low R-squared and adjusted R-squared statistics that 
there are other variables (not included in the various models) that probably affect the various 
measures of compensation, which need to be included in the model in the future. Despite this, the 
purpose of this study was not to provide comprehensive models that predict remuneration, but to 
test whether the institutional variables were related (or not) to the various measures of 
compensation, in the manners hypothesised. This has been achieved.   
 
Thereafter, the sample was separated into firms that were designated as being owner-controlled or 
management-controlled. To test whether firms in these two sub-samples remunerated their CEOs 
differently to each other, Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests were performed (because the data was found to 
be non-normal). The Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests confirmed that companies that are owner-controlled 
do not remunerate their CEOs differently to management-controlled companies, or more specifically 
in the manners hypothesised by agency theory.  
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Both sets of statistical tests allowed us to tentatively conclude that the presence of large external 
shareholders do not affect CEO compensation, despite what agency theory may predict. 
 
Why this is the case would be a difficult question to answer. Magda Wierzycka, (previous CEO of 
African Harvest Fund Managers, which manages investments for over 205 funds), is of the opinion 
that pension-fund trustees in SA are largely apathetic (Rose, 2005c). Even the head of the largest 
asset manager in South Africa, Thabo Dloti (CEO of Old Mutual Investment Group SA), had this to 
say in a newspaper report: 
 
“As a house we don't believe in shareholder activism”, quoted in Barron (2006).  
 
Yet specific cases such as that of Comparex would indicate that institutional shareholders do get 
involved in their investments when it really matters. Perhaps then, executive compensation is not 
perceived to be an area of sufficient significance to warrant their attention. 
 
A final reason could be that institutional shareholders actually perceive the level and mix of CEO 
remuneration in South Africa to be justified, and to correctly reflect the value that CEOs contribute 
to their companies. Thus, intervention on their part is not necessary. 
 
The next chapter concludes the research report, discusses the limitations of the study, and provides 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter V: Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
5.1. Summary 
 
Agency theory would predict that, given the presence of large or powerful shareholders in a 
company, agency costs would be reduced. Since excessive executive compensation is regarded as 
being a problem that stems from the agency problem (Dyl, 1988), agency theory would also predict 
that executives in companies with large shareholders would receive less compensation and a larger 
proportion of long-term incentive-based compensation. 
 
From a South African perspective, there has been no research that has dealt with institutional 
shareholders, let alone their effect on firm value. The aim of this study was to test the hypotheses 
mentioned above, as well as present original findings on the level of institutional share ownership, 
and CEO remuneration, in South Africa over the sample period. A review of the literature was 
performed in Chapter II, which included the agency theory underpinnings of these hypotheses as 
well as mechanisms to reduce agency costs, a discussion of South African institutions (including the 
role of the PIC and other major activist institutional shareholders), empirical evidence on the effect 
of institutional shareholders on firm value, and the barriers faced by institutional shareholders. The 
trends and controversies surrounding CEO compensation were also discussed, and then finally, 
previous studies that examined and tested the same hypotheses posed by this study, were 
discussed.    
 
The research methodology was discussed in Chapter III. The central hypotheses were introduced 
and then the sample, limitations and delimitations were described. The hypotheses were tested 
using data from 50 companies over the period 2002-2006, resulting in 250 firm-year observations. 
There were two principal techniques of analysis used – regression models and tests for differences 
of means. The regression models were separated into those that represented the level of 
compensation (3 models) and those that represented the mix of compensation (2 models). The 
independent variables for each model were then presented, including justification for their use, with 
the key variables being the institutional ones.  
 
The tests for differences of means required that the entire sample be separated into two sub-
samples – a sample that contained owner-controlled firms and a sample that contained 
management-controlled firms. Owner-controlled firms were those firms that were deemed to have a 
sufficiently large institutional shareholder presence to reduce agency costs. The aim was to 
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determine whether owner-controlled firms remunerated their CEOs differently to management-
controlled firms. This was an alternative way of testing what the regression models aimed to do. 
 
Finally, a discussion on how the share options awarded to CEOs would be valued, ensued. The 
literature on the various valuation models was discussed, before reaching a conclusion on which 
model would be adopted for this study (the Hull and White (2004) model). Then, the assumptions 
and inputs to the model were discussed. The results and findings from the tests were presented in 
Chapter IV. 
 
 
5.2. Results and findings 
 
First, the sample used was described, and the trends in CEO compensation were presented. It was 
shown how the use of share options decreased over the sample period, most likely relate to the 
introduction of IFRS 2: Share-based payments, their adverse tax effects, and the negative publicity 
associated with them. Furthermore, companies in the financial services sector seemed to 
remunerate their CEOs the best, whereas resources companies awarded the greatest proportion of 
remuneration in the form of share options, despite the fact that CEOs in these firms held the lowest 
percentage of shares in their companies, compared to companies in other sectors. It was also 
shown how institutions own approximately 50% of the shares of the firms in the sample, and this 
has remained relatively stable over the sample period. 
 
Next, the results of the regression models were presented. On an overall level, the institutional 
variables were shown not to be significant in any of the models. The only consistent findings were 
that bigger companies (in terms of total assets) were found to reward their CEOs more than 
companies with fewer assets, and that remuneration practices differed amongst sectors. There was 
also weak evidence for suggesting that when companies‟ ROEs declined, CEOs received more 
share options in those years, suggesting a degree of dishonesty on the part of those firms. An 
alternative set of models, using lagged compensation variables were used, and the results from 
these models mirrored those of the original models. The poor fit for both sets of models suggest that 
they should not be used for predictive purposes. 
 
Then the tests for differences of means were performed. First, the sample was separated into 
management- and owner-controlled firms. Then, the sub-samples were tested for normality and 
found to be non-normal, hence Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests would be used to test the means of the 
two sub-samples. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests found that, for all the variables, owner-controlled 
firms did not remunerate their CEOs differently to management-controlled firms. 
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5.3. Conclusion 
 
The overall results do not support the hypotheses posed by agency theory. The results of the tests 
conducted have allowed us to tentatively conclude that the presence of institutional shareholders do 
not have an effect on either the level or mix of CEO compensation in these companies. Suggested 
reasons for this range from apathy, to not considering executive remuneration to be a significant 
enough issue for institutional shareholders, and finally to the suggestion that institutional 
shareholders perceive the level and mix of compensation paid to South African CEOs to be a fair 
reflection of their value to their companies.  
 
 
5.4. Limitations 
 
The sample size used in this study was smaller than those used in U.S. studies. Most of the data 
was captured manually, hence the relatively small sample size compared to the U.S. studies. In the 
U.S. studies all the data (excluding the actual valuing of share options) were readily available on 
electronic databases, hence the large sample sizes used in those studies.  However, given the 
composition of the JSE Securities Exchange (where a few companies account for a large proportion 
of the total market capitalisation), a large proportion of the market capitalisation was covered by the 
sample used in this study. 
 
Also, some institutional investors may have commercial relations with the companies that they 
invest in and hence are “indifferent” to irregular corporate governance acts in their investee 
companies. It may be that since the measures of institutional investors have not been separated 
into pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant, this may have affected the results of this study (see 
the discussion of David et al. (1998) in Section 2.5.). In any event, such a separation would have 
been very difficult to achieve, and most likely not have been practicable.  
 
 
5.5. Directions for future research 
 
While the primary means of testing the hypotheses posed in this study were statistical tests, it would 
be interesting to conduct a study similar to Ramsay et al. (1998), who surveyed institutional 
shareholders on their views with regards to specific corporate governance issues, one of which was 
executive compensation policies. A survey would provide a qualitative comparison to the 
quantitative nature of this study. Soobyah‟s (2002) survey only garnered responses from two South 
African asset managers, and thus a more extensive survey could be conducted in the future. 
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Further studies examining the effect of institutional shareholders on issues identified in the literature 
as being significant (see Section 2.3.4.), such as corporate diversification, dividend policy and 
corporate takeovers, may further shed light on the actions of institutional shareholders, and their 
affect on firm value. 
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APPENDIX A 
A note on tobit regression models 
 
 
 
The typical linear regression model (estimated using the ordinary least squares method) requires no 
assumptions regarding measurement of the independent variables (xi), but does require that the 
dependent variable (yi) be continuous. Among other assumptions, the key assumption is that the 
dependent variable has been measured for all cases in the sample (Frone, 1997). 
 
When the dependent variable is only partially observed, it is said to be a „limited outcome‟ 
dependent variable. “Limited outcomes are variables characterized by the fact that their observed 
values do not cover their entire range” (Frone, 1997: 2). A type of limited outcome variable is a 
censored outcome. Censored outcomes are those where the observations are clustered at a lower 
threshold (left-censored), an upper threshold (right censored) or both. Censored dependent 
variables can be analysed using tobit regression. 
 
In the sample of firms used in this study, not all of the 50 companies granted options to their CEO 
during the period under investigation. In fact, out of the total 250 firm-years used, 93 did not have 
option grants. Given that share option grants and options granted as a percentage of total 
compensation are the dependent variables in two of the models (Models 2 and 5 respectively), 
option grants therefore qualify as a „censored dependent variable‟. For this reason tobit regression 
models have been used. 
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 APPENDIX B  
List of companies included in the sample 
 
 
 
No. Company 
 
No. Company No. Company 
1. ABSA 18. Grindrod 35. Netcare 
2. AECI 19. Harmony 36. Pick n Pay 
3. African Bank 20. Highveld Steel 37. Remgro 
4. African Oxygen 21. Impala Platinum 38. Reunert 
5. African Rainbow 
Minerals 
22. Imperial 39. RMB Holdings 
6. Alexander Forbes 23. JD Group 40. Sanlam 
7. AngloGold Ashanti 24. Johnnic Communications 
(Avusa) 
41. Santam 
8. Anglo Platinum 25. Kumba (Exxaro) 42. Sasol 
9. Aspen Pharmacare 26. Liberty Life 43. Shoprite 
10. Aveng 27. Massmart 44. Standard Bank 
11. Barloworld 28. Medi-Clinic 45. Steinhoff International 
12. Bidvest Group 29. Metropolitan Holdings 46. Sun International 
13. Distell 30. Mittal Steel 47. Tiger Brands 
14. Ellerines 31. MTN 48. Tongaat-Hulett 
15. FirstRand 32. Murray & Roberts 49. Truworths 
16. Foschini 33. Nampak 50. Woolworths 
17. Goldfields 34. Nedbank   
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APPENDIX C 
List of companies excluded from the sample 
 
 
 
 Company Reason for exclusion 
1. Anglo American PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
2. BHP Billiton PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
3. SABMiller PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
4. Richemont Securities AG Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
5. Old Mutual PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
6. Telkom Ltd Not listed for full period of 2002-2006. Only listed in 2004 
7. Naspers Ltd Insufficient disclosure 
8. Liberty International PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
9. Lonmin PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
10. Investec PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
11. Sappi Ltd Foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
12. Pretoria Portland Cement Insufficient disclosure 
13. Assmang Ltd Managed by African Rainbow, hence insufficient disclosure 
14. Discovery Ltd Insufficient disclosure 
15. Growthpoint Properties Managed by Investec, hence insufficient disclosure 
16. Didata PLC Foreign incorporation; foreign currency; insufficient disclosure 
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APPENDIX D 
 
       Regression model output - Cash Component model 
 
       
       
       
       
 
Dependent Variable: CASH COMPONENT 
    
 
Method: Least Squares 
     
 
Included observations: 250 after 
adjustments 
    
       
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
NUMBER_5_ 280569 201684.5 1.391127 0.1655 
 
 
LARGEST -2021835 3220649 -0.627772 0.5308 
 
 
TOTAL_5_ 392304 2383329 0.164603 0.8694 
 
 
ALL -2053617 753701.1 -2.72471 0.00690 
 
 
LOGASSETS 1747341 134786.1 12.96381 0.00000 
 
 
ROE 890279 465512.6 1.91247 0.05700 
 
 
SHARE -45658 251396.3 -0.181617 0.85600 
 
 
TOBINSQ 1057537 199835.3 5.292045 0.00000 
 
 
BASIC -38983628 3352650 -11.6277 0.00000 
 
 
CGOODS -36834466 3277493 -11.23861 0.00000 
 
 
CSERVICES -34840563 3236398 -10.76523 0.00000 
 
 
FINS -37882076 3481423 -10.8812 0.00000 
 
 
INDUST -37160083 3319298 -11.19516 0.00000 
 
 
CAGE 5317 25602.32 0.207675 0.83570 
 
 
INDEP 617508 888619.3 0.694907 0.48780 
 
 
CSHIP -182849 3347643 -0.05462 0.95650 
 
 
BSHIP 752124 1072765 0.701107 0.48390 
 
       
 
R-squared 0.563899     Mean dependent var   5203312 
 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.533952     S.D. dependent var 
 
2994316 
 
 
S.E. of regression 2044151     Akaike info criterion 
 
31.96444 
 
 
Sum squared resid 9.74E+14     Schwarz criterion 
 
32.2039 
 
 
Log likelihood -3978.555     Durbin-Watson stat   1.221112 
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APPENDIX D 
 
       Regression model output - Options Component model 
 
       
       
       
       
 
Dependent Variable: OPTIONS COMPONENT 
   
 
Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill 
climbing) 
   
 
Included observations: 250 after adjustments 
    
 
Left censoring (value) at zero 
    
 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
    
 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
   
       
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
NUMBER_5_ 89134 521396.7 0.170953 0.8643 
 
 
LARGEST 696924 8299076 0.083976 0.9331 
 
 
TOTAL_5_ -1853361 6128487 -0.302417 0.7623 
 
 
ALL 246472 1908132 0.129169 0.8972 
 
 
LOGASSETS 1649182 347918.1 4.740146 0.0000 
 
 
ROE -2095735 1697006 -1.23496 0.2168 
 
 
SHARE 287667 628052.8 0.458031 0.6469 
 
 
TOBINSQ 234331 541934.4 0.432397 0.6655 
 
 
BASIC -36955523 8626974 -4.283718 0.0000 
 
 
CGOODS -37477123 8442005 -4.439363 0.0000 
 
 
CSERVICES -35012302 8299631 -4.218537 0.0000 
 
 
FINS -40467667 8994380 -4.499217 0.0000 
 
 
INDUST -37248424 8503309 -4.380462 0.0000 
 
 
CAGE -29493 67356.73 -0.437855 0.6615 
 
 
INDEP 3020214 2278733 1.325392 0.1850 
 
 
CSHIP 2339284 8173767 0.286194 0.7747 
 
 
BSHIP -1375518 2688334 -0.511662 0.6089 
 
       
 
  Error Distribution       
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
SCALE:C(18) 4829403 288608.7 16.7334 0 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
Mean dependent var 2176160     S.D. dependent var 3804146 
 
 
S.E. of regression 3639941     Akaike info criterion 21.7829 
 
 
Sum squared resid 3.07E+15     Schwarz criterion 22.03645 
 
 
Log likelihood -2704.863     Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.88494 
 
 
Avg. log likelihood -10.81945 
  
  
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
Left censored obs 93      Right censored obs 0 
 
 
Uncensored obs 157      Total obs   250 
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APPENDIX D 
      Regression model output - Total Compensation model 
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: TOTAL 
COMPENSATION 
   
 
Method: Least Squares 
    
 
Included observations: 250 after adjustments 
   
      
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ 631135 416870.9 1.513982 0.1314 
 
LARGEST 3649293 6656907 0.548196 0.5841 
 
TOTAL_5_ -4166978 4926213 -0.845879 0.3985 
 
ALL -2176993 1557860 -1.397426 0.1636 
 
LOGASSETS 3016775 278595.5 10.82851 0.0000 
 
ROE 677894 962189.5 0.704532 0.4818 
 
SHARE 105064 519622.6 0.202194 0.8399 
 
TOBINSQ 1392695 413048.8 3.371746 0.0009 
 
BASIC -66047873 6929747 -9.531065 0.0000 
 
CGOODS -63768183 6774400 -9.413111 0.0000 
 
CSERVICES -60402575 6689461 -9.029514 0.0000 
 
FINS -67100853 7195914 -9.324855 0.0000 
 
INDUST -64667261 6860811 -9.4256 0.0000 
 
CAGE -27299 52918.62 -0.515858 0.6064 
 
INDEP 2379076 1836728 1.29528 0.1965 
 
CSHIP 3048750 6919398 0.440609 0.6599 
 
BSHIP -1078386 2217348 -0.48634 0.6272 
      
 
R-squared 0.427729     Mean dependent var   7379472 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.388431     S.D. dependent var 
 
5402807 
 
S.E. of regression 4225150     Akaike info criterion 
 
33.41659 
 
Sum squared resid 4.16E+15     Schwarz criterion 
 
33.65604 
 
Log likelihood -4160.073     Durbin-Watson stat   1.878745 
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APPENDIX D 
      Regression model output - Cash % model 
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: CASH % 
    
 
Method: Least Squares 
    
 
Included observations: 250 after 
adjustments 
   
      
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ 0.0097 0.021477 0.453794 0.6504 
 
LARGEST 0.1661 0.342961 0.484401 0.6286 
 
TOTAL_5_ -0.0409 0.253796 -0.161031 0.8722 
 
ALL -0.0952 0.08026 -1.186351 0.2367 
 
LOGASSETS -0.0343 0.014353 -2.390074 0.0176 
 
ROE 0.0737 0.049572 1.485823 0.1387 
 
SHARE -0.0101 0.026771 -0.376273 0.7071 
 
TOBINSQ 0.0162 0.02128 0.761689 0.4470 
 
BASIC 1.3616 0.357018 3.813687 0.0002 
 
CGOODS 1.4454 0.349014 4.141254 0.0000 
 
CSERVICES 1.3653 0.344638 3.96162 0.0001 
 
FINS 1.5397 0.37073 4.153052 0.0000 
 
INDUST 1.4322 0.353466 4.051847 0.0001 
 
CAGE 0.0034 0.002726 1.260479 0.2088 
 
INDEP -0.0957 0.094627 -1.011065 0.3130 
 
CSHIP -0.2625 0.356484 -0.73626 0.4623 
 
BSHIP 0.1075 0.114237 0.940755 0.3478 
      
 
R-squared 0.101379     Mean dependent var   0.783722 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.039672     S.D. dependent var 
 
0.222129 
 
S.E. of regression 0.217678     Akaike info criterion 
 
-
0.146022 
 
Sum squared resid 11.0404     Schwarz criterion 
 
0.093437 
 
Log likelihood 35.2528     Durbin-Watson stat   1.828603 
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      Regression model output - Options % model 
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: OPTIONS % 
   
 
Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing) 
  
 
Included observations: 250 after adjustments 
   
 
Left censoring (value) at zero 
    
 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
   
 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
  
      
 
  Coefficient Std. Error 
z-
Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ -0.0303 0.032721 -0.92537 0.3548 
 
LARGEST -0.5457 0.521744 -1.04594 0.2956 
 
TOTAL_5_ 0.2616 0.384486 0.68051 0.4962 
 
ALL 0.1305 0.120096 1.08670 0.2772 
 
LOGASSETS 0.0480 0.021696 2.21343 0.0269 
 
ROE -0.2382 0.130513 -1.82518 0.0680 
 
SHARE 0.0195 0.039699 0.4916 0.6230 
 
TOBINSQ -0.0207 0.035364 -0.58535 0.5583 
 
BASIC -0.7508 0.538253 -1.39483 0.1631 
 
CGOODS -0.8816 0.526802 -1.67358 0.0942 
 
CSERVICES -0.7465 0.518452 -1.43991 0.1499 
 
FINS -0.9969 0.560176 -1.77960 0.0751 
 
INDUST -0.8229 0.531287 -1.54895 0.1214 
 
CAGE -0.0028 0.004254 -0.64808 0.5169 
 
INDEP 0.1733 0.142916 1.212703 0.2252 
 
CSHIP 0.1990 0.516264 0.385377 0.7000 
 
BSHIP -0.0642 0.170354 -0.37671 0.7064 
      
 
  
Error 
Distribution       
 
  
   
  
 
SCALE:C(18) 0.306292 0.018926 16.18392 0 
 
  
   
  
 
Mean dependent var 0.216278     S.D. dependent var 
 
0.222129 
 
S.E. of regression 0.219039     Akaike info criterion 
 
1.043624 
 
Sum squared resid 11.13093     Schwarz criterion 
 
1.297169 
 
Log likelihood -112.453     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
 
1.145668 
 
Avg. log likelihood -0.449812 
  
  
 
  
   
  
 
Left censored obs 93      Right censored obs 
 
0 
 
Uncensored obs 157      Total obs   250 
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APPENDIX E 
      Lagged regression model output - Cash Component model 
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: CASH COMPONENT 
   
 
Method: Least Squares 
    
 
Included observations: 200 after 
adjustments 
   
      
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ 266571 241185.4 1.105255 0.2705 
 
LARGEST -3588560 3730174 -0.962036 0.3373 
 
TOTAL_5_ 899840 2804651 0.320838 0.7487 
 
ALL -1853219 831332.7 -2.229215 0.0270 
 
LOGASSETS 1783286 155654.4 11.4567 0.0000 
 
ROE -71817 511188.5 -0.140491 0.8884 
 
SHARE 293929 257972.6 1.139381 0.2560 
 
TOBINSQ 1257660 256672.1 4.899869 0.0000 
 
BASIC -40450800 3793456 -10.66331 0.0000 
 
CGOODS -37978607 3709454 -10.23833 0.0000 
 
CSERVICES -35858713 3654454 -9.812331 0.0000 
 
FINS -39057553 3941319 -9.909768 0.0000 
 
INDUST -38484003 3739841 -10.29028 0.0000 
 
CAGE 23854 28863.06 0.826455 0.4096 
 
INDEP 736570 990861.8 0.743363 0.4582 
 
CSHIP -1553813 4321889 -0.359522 0.7196 
 
BSHIP 615714 1208580 0.509453 0.6110 
      
 
R-squared 0.580774     Mean dependent var   5600633 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544121     S.D. dependent var 
 
3004994 
 
S.E. of regression 2028937     Akaike info criterion 
 
31.96509 
 
Sum squared resid 7.53E+14     Schwarz criterion 
 
32.24545 
 
Log likelihood -3179.509     Durbin-Watson stat   1.387429 
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APPENDIX E 
      Lagged regression model output - Options Component model
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: OPTIONS COMPONENT 
   
 
Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing) 
  
 
Included observations: 200 after adjustments 
   
 
Left censoring (value) at zero 
    
 
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations 
   
 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
  
      
 
  Coefficient Std. Error 
z-
Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ 481675 649846.6 0.741213 0.4586 
 
LARGEST 4168609 10041789 0.415126 0.6780 
 
TOTAL_5_ -3314203 7531150 -0.44006 0.6599 
 
ALL -727300 2231544 -0.32591 0.7445 
 
LOGASSETS 1414150 417630 3.386131 0.0007 
 
ROE -503290 1314482 -0.38288 0.7018 
 
SHARE -315698 672379.2 -0.46952 0.6387 
 
TOBINSQ 283977 688168.1 0.412657 0.6799 
 
BASIC -33240918 10160308 -3.27164 0.0011 
 
CGOODS -34050346 9949321 -3.42237 0.0006 
 
CSERVICES -31066925 9751478 -3.18586 0.0014 
 
FINS -35595698 10582915 -3.36350 0.0008 
 
INDUST -34154310 9982499 -3.42141 0.0006 
 
CAGE 15023 79284.06 0.189489 0.8497 
 
INDEP 175763 2656489 0.066163 0.9472 
 
CSHIP -8500398 11274242 -0.75396 0.4509 
 
BSHIP 203552 3136769 0.064892 0.9483 
      
 
  
Error 
Distribution       
 
  
   
  
 
SCALE:C(18) 5070593 336412.9 15.07253 0 
 
  
   
  
 
Mean dependent var 2232726     S.D. dependent var 
 
3946772 
 
S.E. of regression 3878414     Akaike info criterion 
 
22.11861 
 
Sum squared resid 2.74E+15     Schwarz criterion 
 
22.41546 
 
Log likelihood -2193.861     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
 
22.23874 
 
Avg. log likelihood -10.96931 
  
  
 
  
   
  
 
Left censored obs 73      Right censored obs 
 
0 
 
Uncensored obs 127      Total obs   200 
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APPENDIX E 
      Lagged regression model output - Total Compensation model 
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: TOTAL 
COMPENSATION 
   
 
Method: Least Squares 
    
 
Included observations: 200 after adjustments 
   
      
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ 747285 531793.2 1.405216 0.1617 
 
LARGEST 977402 8224717 0.118837 0.9055 
 
TOTAL_5_ -2615232 6184017 -0.422902 0.6729 
 
ALL -2426223 1833018 -1.323622 0.1873 
 
LOGASSETS 2922878 343204.8 8.516426 0.0000 
 
ROE -243944 1127127 -0.21643 0.8289 
 
SHARE 258388 568807.6 0.454262 0.6502 
 
TOBINSQ 1745923 565940.1 3.084997 0.0024 
 
BASIC -67011828 8364248 -8.011698 0.0000 
 
CGOODS -64134809 8179030 -7.841371 0.0000 
 
CSERVICES -60551948 8057760 -7.514737 0.0000 
 
FINS -66797309 8690273 -7.686446 0.0000 
 
INDUST -65734643 8246032 -7.97167 0.0000 
 
CAGE 42917 63640.59 0.67437 0.5009 
 
INDEP 1077755 2184766 0.493305 0.6224 
 
CSHIP -3880308 9529398 -0.407193 0.6843 
 
BSHIP 258826 2664816 0.097127 0.9227 
      
 
R-squared 0.405466     Mean dependent var   7833359 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.353484     S.D. dependent var 
 
5563792 
 
S.E. of regression 4473634     Akaike info criterion 
 
33.54647 
 
Sum squared resid 3.66E+15     Schwarz criterion 
 
33.82683 
 
Log likelihood -3337.647     Durbin-Watson stat   1.680186 
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APPENDIX E 
      Lagged regression model output - Cash % model 
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: CASH % 
    
 
Method: Least Squares 
    
 
Included observations: 200 after adjustments 
   
      
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ -0.0101 0.025605 -0.392559 0.6951 
 
LARGEST -0.1722 0.396008 -0.434914 0.6641 
 
TOTAL_5_ 0.1323 0.297751 0.444372 0.6573 
 
ALL -0.0382 0.088257 -0.432522 0.6659 
 
LOGASSETS -0.0183 0.016525 -1.109809 0.2685 
 
ROE 0.0230 0.05427 0.424631 0.6716 
 
SHARE 0.0186 0.027387 0.680778 0.4969 
 
TOBINSQ 0.0094 0.027249 0.345718 0.7300 
 
BASIC 1.0838 0.402726 2.691075 0.0078 
 
CGOODS 1.1712 0.393808 2.97391 0.0033 
 
CSERVICES 1.0711 0.387969 2.760819 0.0064 
 
FINS 1.1851 0.418424 2.832321 0.0051 
 
INDUST 1.1544 0.397034 2.907465 0.0041 
 
CAGE 0.0019 0.003064 0.633298 0.5273 
 
INDEP -0.0100 0.105193 -0.094847 0.9245 
 
CSHIP 0.2569 0.458827 0.560008 0.5762 
 
BSHIP 0.0135 0.128307 0.105091 0.9164 
      
 
R-squared 0.054519     Mean dependent var   0.789773 
 
Adjusted R-squared -0.028146     S.D. dependent var 
 
0.21243 
 
S.E. of regression 0.215399     Akaike info criterion 
 
-0.151481 
 
Sum squared resid 8.490599     Schwarz criterion 
 
0.128876 
 
Log likelihood 32.14807     Durbin-Watson stat   1.797934 
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APPENDIX E 
      Lagged regression model output - Options % model 
      
      
      
      
 
Dependent Variable: OPTIONS % 
   
 
Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing) 
  
 
Included observations: 200 after 
adjustments 
   
 
Left censoring (value) at zero 
   
 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
   
 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
  
      
 
  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
 
  
   
  
 
NUMBER_5_ 0.0063 0.037774 0.166355 0.8679 
 
LARGEST 0.1241 0.583178 0.212796 0.8315 
 
TOTAL_5_ -0.0910 0.437546 -0.20807 0.8352 
 
ALL 0.0426 0.130126 0.327527 0.7433 
 
LOGASSETS 0.0269 0.024257 1.107949 0.2679 
 
ROE -0.0384 0.076955 -0.49853 0.6181 
 
SHARE -0.0343 0.03927 -0.87358 0.3823 
 
TOBINSQ -0.0237 0.040176 -0.58953 0.5555 
 
BASIC -0.2703 0.590799 -0.45743 0.6474 
 
CGOODS -0.4346 0.578153 -0.75171 0.4522 
 
CSERVICES -0.2580 0.567403 -0.45471 0.6493 
 
FINS -0.4338 0.614505 -0.70600 0.4802 
 
INDUST -0.3611 0.580889 -0.62162 0.5342 
 
CAGE -0.0025 0.004601 -0.54027 0.5890 
 
INDEP 0.0020 0.154741 0.013041 0.9896 
 
CSHIP -0.5996 0.660215 -0.90818 0.3638 
 
BSHIP 0.0152 0.183295 0.083162 0.9337 
      
 
  Error Distribution       
 
  
   
  
 
SCALE:C(18) 0.298775 0.02053 14.55301 0 
 
  
   
  
 
Mean dependent var 0.210227     S.D. dependent var 
 
0.21243 
 
S.E. of regression 0.216412     Akaike info criterion 
 
1.059712 
 
Sum squared resid 8.523846     Schwarz criterion 
 
1.35656 
 
Log likelihood -87.97117     Hannan-Quinn criter. 
 
1.179842 
 
Avg. log likelihood -0.439856 
  
  
 
  
   
  
 
Left censored obs 73      Right censored obs 
 
0 
 
Uncensored obs 127      Total obs   200 
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APPENDIX F 
Lilliefors test results - Cash Component variable 
(Management-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
3473000 1546223 0.020408 -1.2341 0.108583 0.088175 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
3461000 1559367 0.040816 -1.22942 0.109458 0.068642 D = 0.1557 
 
4443000 1666000 0.061224 -1.19143 0.116743 0.055518 
  
 
3279000 1689904 0.081633 -1.18291 0.118422 0.036789 
  
 
5512000 2033000 0.102041 -1.06068 0.144417 0.042376 
  
 
7027000 2102500 0.122449 -1.03593 0.150118 0.027669 
  
 
7643000 2164000 0.142857 -1.01402 0.155287 0.01243 
  
 
7842000 2173000 0.163265 -1.01081 0.156054 0.007212 
  
 
8734000 2200000 0.183673 -1.00119 0.158367 0.025306 
  
 
2559009 2405000 0.204082 -0.92816 0.176662 0.027419 
  
 
4962903 2449000 0.22449 -0.91249 0.180757 0.043733 
  
 
4650075 2559009 0.244898 -0.8733 0.191251 0.053647 
  
 
6091220 2597000 0.265306 -0.85976 0.19496 0.070346 
  
 
2164000 2640832 0.285714 -0.84415 0.199294 0.08642 
  
 
3471000 3069000 0.306122 -0.69161 0.244591 0.061532 
  
 
5269000 3147000 0.326531 -0.66382 0.253401 0.073129 
  
 
5975000 3279000 0.346939 -0.6168 0.268683 0.078255 
  
 
3147000 3282000 0.367347 -0.61573 0.269036 0.098311 
  
 
2102500 3461000 0.387755 -0.55196 0.290487 0.097268 
  
 
1666000 3471000 0.408163 -0.5484 0.291709 0.116455 
  
 
3069000 3473000 0.428571 -0.54769 0.291953 0.136618 
  
 
2173000 3578358 0.44898 -0.51015 0.304972 0.144008 
  
 
2597000 3648000 0.469388 -0.48534 0.313716 0.155672 
  
 
2033000 4015000 0.489796 -0.3546 0.361444 0.128352 
  
 
3282000 4358000 0.510204 -0.23241 0.408111 0.102093 
  
 
3648000 4443000 0.530612 -0.20213 0.419909 0.110703 
  
 
2449000 4650075 0.55102 -0.12836 0.448933 0.102087 
  
 
11516597 4906000 0.571429 -0.03718 0.485169 0.086259 
  
 
7865000 4962903 0.591837 -0.01691 0.493253 0.098583 
  
 
4906000 5191000 0.612245 0.064347 0.525653 0.086592 
  
 
8087000 5269000 0.632653 0.092135 0.536704 0.095949 
  
 
9041000 5512000 0.653061 0.178703 0.570915 0.082147 
  
 
4358000 5975000 0.673469 0.343646 0.634444 0.039026 
  
 
1546223 6091220 0.693878 0.385049 0.649899 0.043978 
  
 
3578358 7027000 0.714286 0.718419 0.763751 0.049465 
  
 
1559367 7045700 0.734694 0.725081 0.765799 0.031105 
  
 
2640832 7171000 0.755102 0.769719 0.779267 0.024165 
  
 
1689904 7643000 0.77551 0.937868 0.825844 0.050334 
  
 
7045700 7842000 0.795918 1.008761 0.843455 0.047537 
  
 
8923800 7865000 0.816327 1.016955 0.845413 0.029086 
  
 
8219700 8087000 0.836735 1.096042 0.86347 0.026735 
  
 
9680100 8219700 0.857143 1.143316 0.873546 0.016404 
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9135100 8734000 0.877551 1.326535 0.907669 0.030118 
  
 
2405000 8923800 0.897959 1.394151 0.918364 0.020405 
  
 
4015000 9041000 0.918367 1.435903 0.924485 0.006118 
  
 
5191000 9135100 0.938776 1.469426 0.929141 0.009634 
  
 
12011000 9680100 0.959184 1.663581 0.951902 0.007282 
  
 
7171000 11516597 0.979592 2.31783 0.989771 0.010179 
  
 
2200000 12011000 1 2.493961 0.993684 0.006316 
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Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) 
|S(x)-
F(x)| 
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
584018 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 D = 0.1867 
5857500 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 1934963 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 1876640 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 1310720 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 1205820 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 2776242 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 2579893 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 4800000 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 3109910 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 0 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 4304575 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 49200 0 0.408163 -0.68154 0.247764 0.160399 
 1258200 49200 0.428571 -0.65743 0.255453 0.173119 
 0 231630 0.44898 -0.56802 0.285012 0.163968 
 0 426320 0.469388 -0.4726 0.31825 0.151138 
 603300 584018 0.489796 -0.39531 0.346308 0.143488 
 0 603300 0.510204 -0.38586 0.349801 0.160403 
 0 797140 0.530612 -0.29085 0.385581 0.145031 
 10629765 1016250 0.55102 -0.18347 0.427216 0.123804 
 0 1110415 0.571429 -0.13732 0.445391 0.126038 
 1738072 1138254 0.591837 -0.12367 0.450788 0.141049 
 2444350 1205820 0.612245 -0.09056 0.463923 0.148322 
 2902000 1258200 0.632653 -0.06488 0.474133 0.15852 
 1323000 1310720 0.653061 -0.03914 0.484388 0.168673 
 1016250 1323000 0.673469 -0.03312 0.486787 0.186682 
 2289871 1738072 0.693878 0.170306 0.567615 0.126262 
 0 1852206 0.714286 0.226245 0.589494 0.124791 
 0 1876640 0.734694 0.23822 0.594145 0.140549 
 797140 1934963 0.755102 0.266805 0.60519 0.149912 
 1138254 2289871 0.77551 0.440749 0.670303 0.105207 
 0 2444350 0.795918 0.516461 0.697234 0.098685 
 0 2451215 0.816327 0.519826 0.698407 0.117919 
 1110415 2579893 0.836735 0.582892 0.720017 0.116718 
 1852206 2776242 0.857143 0.679125 0.751471 0.105672 
 5537279 2902000 0.877551 0.740761 0.770581 0.10697 
 2451215 3109910 0.897959 0.84266 0.800291 0.097669 
 426320 4304575 0.918367 1.428178 0.92338 0.005012 
 0 4800000 0.938776 1.670991 0.952638 0.013863 
 
 131 
0 5537279 0.959184 2.03234 0.97894 0.019757 
 0 5857500 0.979592 2.189284 0.985712 0.00612 
 231630 10629765 1 4.528224 0.999997 2.97E-06 
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APPENDIX F 
Lilliefors test results - Total Compensation variable 
(Management-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
3473000 1559367 0.020408 -1.40398 0.080163 0.059755 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
4045018 1715200 0.040816 -1.35879 0.087107 0.046291 D = 0.1477 
 
10300500 2164000 0.061224 -1.22864 0.109603 0.048378 
  
 
5213963 2173000 0.081633 -1.22603 0.110093 0.02846 
  
 
7388640 2431630 0.102041 -1.15104 0.124859 0.022818 
  
 
8337720 2597000 0.122449 -1.10308 0.134996 0.012547 
  
 
8848820 2636300 0.142857 -1.09169 0.137486 0.005371 
  
 
10618242 2828158 0.163265 -1.03605 0.150089 0.013176 
  
 
11313893 3147000 0.183673 -0.94359 0.172689 0.010984 
  
 
7359009 3282000 0.204082 -0.90444 0.18288 0.021201 
  
 
4962903 3437972 0.22449 -0.85921 0.195111 0.029379 
  
 
4650075 3471000 0.244898 -0.84964 0.197764 0.047134 
  
 
9201130 3473000 0.265306 -0.84906 0.197925 0.067381 
  
 
2164000 3578358 0.285714 -0.8185 0.206534 0.07918 
  
 
3471000 3648000 0.306122 -0.79831 0.212345 0.093777 
  
 
5269000 3836094 0.326531 -0.74377 0.228509 0.098022 
  
 
5975000 4045018 0.346939 -0.68318 0.247246 0.099693 
  
 
3147000 4327200 0.367347 -0.60135 0.273802 0.093545 
  
 
6407075 4441320 0.387755 -0.56826 0.284929 0.102826 
  
 
1715200 4650075 0.408163 -0.50773 0.305823 0.102341 
  
 
4327200 4856215 0.428571 -0.44795 0.327095 0.101476 
  
 
2173000 4962903 0.44898 -0.41701 0.338335 0.110645 
  
 
2597000 5191000 0.469388 -0.35087 0.362844 0.106544 
  
 
2636300 5213963 0.489796 -0.34421 0.365345 0.124451 
  
 
3282000 5269000 0.510204 -0.32825 0.371362 0.138842 
  
 
3648000 5374250 0.530612 -0.29773 0.382955 0.147657 
  
 
13078765 5975000 0.55102 -0.12352 0.450847 0.100173 
  
 
11516597 6407075 0.571429 0.001773 0.500707 0.070721 
  
 
9603072 7045700 0.591837 0.186963 0.574155 0.017682 
  
 
7350350 7171000 0.612245 0.223297 0.588348 0.023897 
  
 
10989000 7350350 0.632653 0.275306 0.608459 0.024194 
  
 
10364000 7359009 0.653061 0.277817 0.609423 0.043638 
  
 
5374250 7388640 0.673469 0.286409 0.612718 0.060752 
  
 
3836094 8337720 0.693878 0.561625 0.712814 0.018937 
  
 
3578358 8848820 0.714286 0.709835 0.761097 0.046811 
  
 
1559367 8923800 0.734694 0.731578 0.767787 0.033093 
  
 
3437972 9201130 0.755102 0.811999 0.791604 0.036502 
  
 
2828158 9330115 0.77551 0.849402 0.802171 0.026661 
  
 
7045700 9603072 0.795918 0.928555 0.82344 0.027522 
  
 
8923800 10300500 0.816327 1.130797 0.87093 0.054603 
  
 
9330115 10364000 0.836735 1.149211 0.874765 0.038031 
  
 
11532306 10618242 0.857143 1.222936 0.889323 0.03218 
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14672379 10989000 0.877551 1.330449 0.908315 0.030764 
  
 
4856215 11313893 0.897959 1.424663 0.922873 0.024913 
  
 
4441320 11516597 0.918367 1.483443 0.931022 0.012654 
  
 
5191000 11532306 0.938776 1.487999 0.931624 0.007151 
  
 
12011000 12011000 0.959184 1.626811 0.948111 0.011072 
  
 
7171000 13078765 0.979592 1.936444 0.973593 0.005998 
  
 
2431630 14672379 1 2.398564 0.99177 0.00823 
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APPENDIX F 
Lilliefors test results - Cash % variable 
(Management-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
1 0.18725 0.020408 -2.95296 0.001574 0.018834 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
0.85562 0.328153 0.040816 -2.29533 0.010857 0.029959 D = 0.2003 
 
0.431338 0.347738 0.061224 -2.20392 0.013765 0.047459 
  
 
0.628888 0.403072 0.081633 -1.94565 0.025848 0.055785 
  
 
0.74601 0.431338 0.102041 -1.81373 0.03486 0.067181 
  
 
0.842796 0.495242 0.122449 -1.51547 0.064827 0.057622 
  
 
0.863731 0.597528 0.142857 -1.03807 0.149619 0.006762 
  
 
0.73854 0.622605 0.163265 -0.92103 0.178518 0.015253 
  
 
0.771971 0.628888 0.183673 -0.8917 0.186277 0.002603 
  
 
0.347738 0.662008 0.204082 -0.73712 0.230524 0.026443 
  
 
1 0.667451 0.22449 -0.71172 0.23832 0.013831 
  
 
1 0.709235 0.244898 -0.5167 0.302683 0.057785 
  
 
0.662008 0.735918 0.265306 -0.39216 0.34747 0.082163 
  
 
1 0.73854 0.285714 -0.37992 0.352002 0.066288 
  
 
1 0.74601 0.306122 -0.34506 0.365026 0.058903 
  
 
1 0.768137 0.326531 -0.24179 0.404473 0.077942 
  
 
1 0.771157 0.346939 -0.22769 0.409943 0.063005 
  
 
1 0.771971 0.367347 -0.22389 0.411422 0.044075 
  
 
0.328153 0.810904 0.387755 -0.04218 0.483179 0.095423 
  
 
0.971315 0.819009 0.408163 -0.00435 0.498265 0.090102 
  
 
0.709235 0.83939 0.428571 0.090775 0.536164 0.107593 
  
 
1 0.842796 0.44898 0.106675 0.542476 0.093497 
  
 
1 0.85562 0.469388 0.166529 0.566129 0.096742 
  
 
0.771157 0.863731 0.489796 0.204383 0.580973 0.091177 
  
 
1 0.872347 0.510204 0.244595 0.596615 0.086411 
  
 
1 0.880986 0.530612 0.284917 0.612146 0.081534 
  
 
0.18725 0.904011 0.55102 0.39238 0.652611 0.101591 
  
 
1 0.904743 0.571429 0.395798 0.653873 0.082445 
  
 
0.819009 0.971315 0.591837 0.706512 0.760065 0.168229 
  
 
0.667451 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.735918 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.872347 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.810904 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.403072 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
1 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
1 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.768137 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.597528 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
1 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
1 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.880986 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.83939 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
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0.622605 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.495242 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.904011 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
1 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
1 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
1 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
  
 
0.904743 1 1 0.840393 0.799656 0.200344 
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APPENDIX F 
Lilliefors test results - Options % variable 
(Management-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
0.14438 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 D = 0.2078 
 
0.568662 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.371112 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.25399 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.157204 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.136269 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.26146 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.228029 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.652262 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.337992 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.671847 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.028685 0 0.408163 -0.84039 0.200344 0.207819 
  
 
0.290765 0.028685 0.428571 -0.70651 0.239935 0.188637 
  
 
0 0.095257 0.44898 -0.3958 0.346127 0.102853 
  
 
0 0.095989 0.469388 -0.39238 0.347389 0.121999 
  
 
0.228843 0.119014 0.489796 -0.28492 0.387854 0.101942 
  
 
0 0.127653 0.510204 -0.24459 0.403385 0.106819 
  
 
0 0.136269 0.530612 -0.20438 0.419027 0.111585 
  
 
0.81275 0.14438 0.55102 -0.16653 0.433871 0.11715 
  
 
0 0.157204 0.571429 -0.10667 0.457524 0.113905 
  
 
0.180991 0.16061 0.591837 -0.09078 0.463836 0.128001 
  
 
0.332549 0.180991 0.612245 0.00435 0.501735 0.11051 
  
 
0.264082 0.189096 0.632653 0.042178 0.516821 0.115832 
  
 
0.127653 0.228029 0.653061 0.223888 0.588578 0.064483 
  
 
0.189096 0.228843 0.673469 0.227691 0.590057 0.083413 
  
 
0.596928 0.231863 0.693878 0.241786 0.595527 0.098351 
  
 
0 0.25399 0.714286 0.345057 0.634974 0.079311 
  
 
0 0.26146 0.734694 0.379921 0.647998 0.086696 
  
 
0.231863 0.264082 0.755102 0.392161 0.65253 0.102572 
  
 
0.402472 0.290765 0.77551 0.5167 0.697317 0.078193 
  
 
0 0.332549 0.795918 0.711716 0.76168 0.034239 
  
 
0 0.337992 0.816327 0.737122 0.769476 0.046851 
  
 
0.119014 0.371112 0.836735 0.891701 0.813723 0.023011 
  
 
0.16061 0.377395 0.857143 0.921026 0.821482 0.035661 
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0.377395 0.402472 0.877551 1.038068 0.850381 0.02717 
  
 
0.504758 0.504758 0.897959 1.515471 0.935173 0.037214 
  
 
0.095989 0.568662 0.918367 1.813728 0.96514 0.046773 
  
 
0 0.596928 0.938776 1.945655 0.974152 0.035376 
  
 
0 0.652262 0.959184 2.203915 0.986235 0.027051 
  
 
0 0.671847 0.979592 2.295327 0.989143 0.009551 
  
 
0.095257 0.81275 1 2.952964 0.998426 0.001574 
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APPENDIX G 
Lilliefors test results - Cash Component variable 
(Owner-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
3356882 717000 0.004975 -1.48974 0.068147 0.063172 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
8478729 1169000 0.00995 -1.3412 0.089928 0.079977 D = 0.0945 
 
10492382 1233000 0.014925 -1.32017 0.093389 0.078464 
  
 
8576667 1264000 0.0199 -1.30998 0.095101 0.0752 
  
 
16608081 1276000 0.024876 -1.30604 0.09577 0.070894 
  
 
2204000 1360000 0.029851 -1.27844 0.100548 0.070697 
  
 
2403000 1458000 0.034826 -1.24623 0.10634 0.071514 
  
 
3431000 1476000 0.039801 -1.24032 0.107429 0.067628 
  
 
3502000 1478000 0.044776 -1.23966 0.107551 0.062775 
  
 
5122000 1498000 0.049751 -1.23309 0.108772 0.059021 
  
 
3200000 1505000 0.054726 -1.23079 0.109202 0.054475 
  
 
3300000 1513819 0.059701 -1.22789 0.109745 0.050043 
  
 
4500000 1649000 0.064677 -1.18346 0.118313 0.053636 
  
 
4528000 1677000 0.069652 -1.17426 0.120145 0.050493 
  
 
5098000 1703000 0.074627 -1.16572 0.121864 0.047237 
  
 
1649000 1717655 0.079602 -1.1609 0.122841 0.043239 
  
 
1703000 1752000 0.084577 -1.14962 0.125151 0.040574 
  
 
1875000 1788000 0.089552 -1.13779 0.127605 0.038052 
  
 
3990000 1800000 0.094527 -1.13384 0.12843 0.033903 
  
 
3343000 1827000 0.099502 -1.12497 0.130301 0.030798 
  
 
2725000 1875000 0.104478 -1.1092 0.133673 0.029195 
  
 
12841316 1930000 0.109453 -1.09112 0.137609 0.028157 
  
 
11832192 1951000 0.114428 -1.08422 0.139133 0.024705 
  
 
8470000 1987956 0.119403 -1.07208 0.141843 0.02244 
  
 
9425500 1995711 0.124378 -1.06953 0.142416 0.018037 
  
 
8464420 2020000 0.129353 -1.06155 0.144221 0.014867 
  
 
4464926 2066000 0.134328 -1.04643 0.147681 0.013353 
  
 
2702000 2111000 0.139303 -1.03164 0.15112 0.011816 
  
 
2309000 2204000 0.144279 -1.00108 0.158394 0.014115 
  
 
2305000 2295000 0.149254 -0.97118 0.16573 0.016476 
  
 
1930000 2305000 0.154229 -0.96789 0.166549 0.01232 
  
 
2695000 2309000 0.159204 -0.96658 0.166878 0.007674 
  
 
4219000 2403000 0.164179 -0.93569 0.174717 0.010538 
  
 
3350000 2500000 0.169154 -0.90381 0.183048 0.013893 
  
 
4459000 2526000 0.174129 -0.89527 0.185322 0.011193 
  
 
5688000 2533000 0.179104 -0.89297 0.185937 0.006833 
  
 
5839000 2577700 0.18408 -0.87828 0.189896 0.005817 
  
 
7027000 2630000 0.189055 -0.86109 0.194594 0.005539 
  
 
3547000 2679000 0.19403 -0.84499 0.199059 0.005029 
  
 
3693000 2695000 0.199005 -0.83973 0.20053 0.001525 
  
 
5023000 2702000 0.20398 -0.83743 0.201175 0.002805 
  
 
9781000 2725000 0.208955 -0.82987 0.203305 0.00565 
  
 139 
 
11134000 2735157 0.21393 -0.82653 0.20425 0.00968 
  
 
1233000 2767000 0.218905 -0.81607 0.20723 0.011676 
  
 
1264000 2795000 0.223881 -0.80687 0.209871 0.01401 
  
 
1498000 2800000 0.228856 -0.80523 0.210345 0.018511 
  
 
1677000 2830000 0.233831 -0.79537 0.2132 0.020631 
  
 
2295000 2850000 0.238806 -0.7888 0.215116 0.02369 
  
 
1478000 2925300 0.243781 -0.76405 0.222419 0.021362 
  
 
1752000 2974000 0.248756 -0.74805 0.227216 0.02154 
  
 
2974000 2997402 0.253731 -0.74036 0.229542 0.024189 
  
 
5962000 3018431 0.258706 -0.73345 0.231643 0.027063 
  
 
6436000 3053000 0.263682 -0.72209 0.235121 0.028561 
  
 
7796000 3139000 0.268657 -0.69382 0.243896 0.024761 
  
 
8415000 3200000 0.273632 -0.67378 0.250226 0.023406 
  
 
9165000 3205600 0.278607 -0.67194 0.250811 0.027796 
  
 
10848000 3215000 0.283582 -0.66885 0.251796 0.031786 
  
 
4232600 3218296 0.288557 -0.66777 0.252141 0.036416 
  
 
5265600 3300000 0.293532 -0.64092 0.260788 0.032744 
  
 
6326200 3333291 0.298507 -0.62998 0.264355 0.034153 
  
 
6949300 3343000 0.303483 -0.62679 0.265399 0.038083 
  
 
3333291 3350000 0.308458 -0.62449 0.266154 0.042304 
  
 
5314779 3356882 0.313433 -0.62223 0.266897 0.046536 
  
 
5581237 3381331 0.318408 -0.61419 0.269545 0.048863 
  
 
5577577 3399356 0.323383 -0.60827 0.271505 0.051878 
  
 
6730031 3400000 0.328358 -0.60806 0.271575 0.056783 
  
 
2630000 3404000 0.333333 -0.60674 0.272011 0.061322 
  
 
5910000 3431000 0.338308 -0.59787 0.274964 0.063345 
  
 
7394000 3461000 0.343284 -0.58801 0.278263 0.065021 
  
 
4597000 3502000 0.348259 -0.57454 0.282802 0.065456 
  
 
4640000 3547000 0.353234 -0.55975 0.287825 0.065409 
  
 
4748000 3573333 0.358209 -0.5511 0.290784 0.067425 
  
 
1827000 3604053 0.363184 -0.541 0.294254 0.06893 
  
 
2066000 3638658 0.368159 -0.52963 0.298185 0.069974 
  
 
3781000 3652000 0.373134 -0.52524 0.299707 0.073428 
  
 
4636000 3693000 0.378109 -0.51177 0.304406 0.073704 
  
 
5877000 3702000 0.383085 -0.50881 0.305442 0.077643 
  
 
5545000 3724000 0.38806 -0.50158 0.30798 0.08008 
  
 
1788000 3744000 0.393035 -0.49501 0.310296 0.082739 
  
 
2500000 3781000 0.39801 -0.48285 0.3146 0.08341 
  
 
3215000 3786000 0.402985 -0.48121 0.315184 0.087801 
  
 
3652000 3926000 0.40796 -0.4352 0.331708 0.076253 
  
 
4139000 3933000 0.412935 -0.4329 0.332543 0.080393 
  
 
2735157 3990000 0.41791 -0.41417 0.339374 0.078536 
  
 
3218296 4115000 0.422886 -0.37309 0.354539 0.068346 
  
 
4495388 4128000 0.427861 -0.36882 0.35613 0.071731 
  
 
6031442 4139000 0.432836 -0.36521 0.357478 0.075358 
  
 
7148851 4168300 0.437811 -0.35558 0.361078 0.076733 
  
 
2925300 4181000 0.442786 -0.35141 0.362642 0.080144 
  
 
1987956 4219000 0.447761 -0.33892 0.367336 0.080426 
  
 
1513819 4222000 0.452736 -0.33793 0.367707 0.085029 
  
 
3018431 4232600 0.457711 -0.33445 0.36902 0.088691 
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3638658 4242000 0.462687 -0.33136 0.370186 0.0925 
  
 
1717655 4459000 0.467662 -0.26005 0.397413 0.070249 
  
 
1995711 4464926 0.472637 -0.2581 0.398164 0.074473 
  
 
3604053 4495388 0.477612 -0.24809 0.402032 0.07558 
  
 
3381331 4500000 0.482587 -0.24658 0.402618 0.079969 
  
 
5678000 4528000 0.487562 -0.23738 0.406183 0.081379 
  
 
5250000 4597000 0.492537 -0.2147 0.415 0.077537 
  
 
5950000 4636000 0.497512 -0.20188 0.420003 0.077509 
  
 
5100000 4640000 0.502488 -0.20057 0.420517 0.08197 
  
 
9112000 4649000 0.507463 -0.19761 0.421674 0.085789 
  
 
1169000 4728000 0.512438 -0.17165 0.431856 0.080582 
  
 
1276000 4729000 0.517413 -0.17132 0.431985 0.085428 
  
 
1476000 4748000 0.522388 -0.16508 0.434441 0.087947 
  
 
1800000 4767471 0.527363 -0.15868 0.43696 0.090403 
  
 
3702000 4870100 0.532338 -0.12496 0.450279 0.082059 
  
 
1505000 4907000 0.537313 -0.11283 0.455083 0.082231 
  
 
1951000 4986000 0.542289 -0.08687 0.465388 0.076901 
  
 
3053000 5015283 0.547264 -0.07725 0.469214 0.07805 
  
 
4907000 5023000 0.552239 -0.07471 0.470223 0.082016 
  
 
4242000 5084000 0.557214 -0.05466 0.478203 0.079011 
  
 
6927000 5098000 0.562189 -0.05006 0.480036 0.082153 
  
 
8098000 5100000 0.567164 -0.04941 0.480298 0.086866 
  
 
12855000 5122000 0.572139 -0.04218 0.483179 0.08896 
  
 
13519000 5160000 0.577114 -0.02969 0.488157 0.088957 
  
 
13393000 5213944 0.58209 -0.01196 0.495228 0.086862 
  
 
3139000 5250000 0.587065 -0.00011 0.499955 0.08711 
  
 
3404000 5265600 0.59204 0.005013 0.502 0.09004 
  
 
3744000 5314779 0.597015 0.021174 0.508446 0.088568 
  
 
4649000 5376000 0.60199 0.041292 0.516468 0.085522 
  
 
6578000 5421000 0.606965 0.05608 0.522361 0.084604 
  
 
3573333 5451000 0.61194 0.065938 0.526287 0.085654 
  
 
5015283 5465000 0.616915 0.070539 0.528118 0.088798 
  
 
2997402 5503000 0.621891 0.083026 0.533085 0.088806 
  
 
4767471 5545000 0.626866 0.096828 0.538569 0.088297 
  
 
7658922 5577577 0.631841 0.107534 0.542817 0.089024 
  
 
3724000 5581237 0.636816 0.108737 0.543294 0.093522 
  
 
2020000 5678000 0.641791 0.140535 0.555881 0.08591 
  
 
7412000 5688000 0.646766 0.143821 0.557179 0.089587 
  
 
8447000 5688145 0.651741 0.143868 0.557198 0.094544 
  
 
9691000 5742000 0.656716 0.161566 0.564176 0.09254 
  
 
2800000 5788000 0.661692 0.176682 0.570121 0.09157 
  
 
3461000 5839000 0.666667 0.193442 0.576694 0.089973 
  
 
2111000 5877000 0.671642 0.205929 0.581577 0.090065 
  
 
2795000 5910000 0.676617 0.216774 0.585808 0.090809 
  
 
6850000 5950000 0.681592 0.229918 0.590922 0.09067 
  
 
2577700 5962000 0.686567 0.233862 0.592454 0.094113 
  
 
3205600 6031442 0.691542 0.256682 0.601288 0.090255 
  
 
4168300 6116000 0.696517 0.284469 0.611974 0.084543 
  
 
4870100 6326200 0.701493 0.353544 0.63816 0.063333 
  
 
5084000 6369000 0.706468 0.367609 0.643418 0.06305 
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2679000 6421000 0.711443 0.384697 0.649769 0.061674 
  
 
2526000 6436000 0.716418 0.389626 0.651594 0.064824 
  
 
3786000 6539000 0.721393 0.423474 0.664025 0.057368 
  
 
4729000 6578000 0.726368 0.43629 0.668687 0.057681 
  
 
5376000 6600000 0.731343 0.44352 0.671305 0.060038 
  
 
3926000 6668756 0.736318 0.466114 0.679433 0.056885 
  
 
3400000 6730031 0.741294 0.48625 0.686605 0.054688 
  
 
4728000 6850000 0.746269 0.525674 0.700443 0.045826 
  
 
4986000 6927000 0.751244 0.550978 0.709175 0.042068 
  
 
5742000 6949300 0.756219 0.558306 0.711682 0.044537 
  
 
1360000 7027000 0.761194 0.583839 0.720336 0.040858 
  
 
7700000 7127000 0.766169 0.616701 0.731284 0.034885 
  
 
8608000 7148851 0.771144 0.623882 0.733647 0.037497 
  
 
9154000 7394000 0.776119 0.704442 0.759421 0.016698 
  
 
10026000 7412000 0.781095 0.710357 0.761259 0.019836 
  
 
1458000 7512000 0.78607 0.743219 0.771325 0.014744 
  
 
5465000 7658922 0.791045 0.7915 0.785674 0.005371 
  
 
5451000 7700000 0.79602 0.804999 0.78959 0.00643 
  
 
6369000 7740000 0.800995 0.818143 0.793362 0.007633 
  
 
3933000 7796000 0.80597 0.836546 0.798576 0.007394 
  
 
6539000 7811000 0.810945 0.841475 0.799959 0.010986 
  
 
6600000 7891478 0.81592 0.867922 0.807281 0.008639 
  
 
4222000 7935000 0.820896 0.882224 0.811172 0.009723 
  
 
7740000 8059000 0.825871 0.922972 0.821989 0.003881 
  
 
9948000 8089000 0.830846 0.932831 0.824546 0.006299 
  
 
10208000 8098000 0.835821 0.935788 0.825309 0.010512 
  
 
10563000 8415000 0.840796 1.03996 0.850821 0.010025 
  
 
12605000 8447000 0.845771 1.050476 0.85325 0.007479 
  
 
14069000 8464420 0.850746 1.0562 0.854562 0.003815 
  
 
15038000 8470000 0.855721 1.058034 0.85498 0.000741 
  
 
717000 8478729 0.860697 1.060903 0.855633 0.005064 
  
 
2850000 8576667 0.865672 1.093087 0.862822 0.00285 
  
 
5421000 8608000 0.870647 1.103383 0.86507 0.005577 
  
 
7935000 8724000 0.875622 1.141503 0.87317 0.002452 
  
 
9469000 9112000 0.880597 1.269006 0.897781 0.017184 
  
 
3399356 9154000 0.885572 1.282808 0.90022 0.014648 
  
 
5688145 9165000 0.890547 1.286423 0.900852 0.010305 
  
 
6668756 9386000 0.895522 1.359048 0.912934 0.017412 
  
 
7891478 9425500 0.900498 1.372028 0.914973 0.014475 
  
 
5213944 9430000 0.905473 1.373507 0.915203 0.00973 
  
 
7127000 9469000 0.910448 1.386323 0.917176 0.006728 
  
 
7811000 9691000 0.915423 1.459276 0.927755 0.012333 
  
 
8059000 9781000 0.920398 1.488851 0.931737 0.011339 
  
 
9430000 9948000 0.925373 1.543731 0.938673 0.0133 
  
 
9386000 10026000 0.930348 1.569363 0.941718 0.01137 
  
 
2533000 10208000 0.935323 1.629171 0.948362 0.013038 
  
 
4115000 10492382 0.940299 1.722624 0.957522 0.017223 
  
 
5160000 10563000 0.945274 1.74583 0.95958 0.014306 
  
 
5503000 10848000 0.950249 1.839486 0.967078 0.016829 
  
 
4128000 11134000 0.955224 1.933471 0.973411 0.018187 
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6116000 11832192 0.960199 2.162909 0.984726 0.024527 
  
 
7512000 12605000 0.965174 2.416867 0.992173 0.026998 
  
 
8089000 12841316 0.970149 2.494524 0.993694 0.023544 
  
 
8724000 12855000 0.975124 2.499021 0.993773 0.018649 
  
 
2830000 13393000 0.9801 2.675817 0.996273 0.016173 
  
 
5788000 13519000 0.985075 2.717223 0.996708 0.011634 
  
 
4181000 14069000 0.99005 2.897963 0.998122 0.008072 
  
 
2767000 15038000 0.995025 3.216393 0.999351 0.004326 
  
 
6421000 16608081 1 3.732349 0.999905 9.49E-05 
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APPENDIX G 
Lilliefors test results - Options Component variable 
(Owner-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
2394000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
2634750 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 D = 0.2288 
 
3882800 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
6592000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
11274337 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
569733 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
971166 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
682425 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
6169600 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
16510 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
1077413 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
1565850 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
2475676 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
2265476 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
948750 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
960438 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
838750 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
5925000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
869500 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
909833 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
963200 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
2201250 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
2122200 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
2737750 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
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0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
1903122 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
701434 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
1468000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
1054500 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
524500 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
16982500 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
4980000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
1335000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
6360826 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
5058000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
11992000 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
8086497 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
2082248 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
3564321 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
4832500 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
1155535 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
190400 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
6157500 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
6150329 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
5384579 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
3987050 0 0.363184 -0.57714 0.281923 0.081261 
  
 
0 16510 0.368159 -0.57311 0.283284 0.084876 
  
 
2193746 124502 0.373134 -0.54679 0.292261 0.080873 
  
 
1057060 174765 0.378109 -0.53454 0.296484 0.081625 
  
 
2371594 190400 0.383085 -0.53073 0.297804 0.085281 
  
 
3703165 312891 0.38806 -0.50087 0.308232 0.079828 
  
 
4940000 319872 0.393035 -0.49917 0.308831 0.084204 
  
 
1683750 320688 0.39801 -0.49897 0.308901 0.089109 
  
 
0 524500 0.402985 -0.44929 0.326612 0.076373 
  
 
0 532650 0.40796 -0.4473 0.327329 0.080631 
  
 
532650 569733 0.412935 -0.43826 0.330598 0.082337 
  
 
0 575700 0.41791 -0.43681 0.331126 0.086785 
  
 
2214000 620840 0.422886 -0.4258 0.335125 0.08776 
  
 
6973750 653200 0.427861 -0.41792 0.338004 0.089856 
  
 
1480500 682425 0.432836 -0.41079 0.340612 0.092223 
  
 
0 701434 0.437811 -0.40616 0.342313 0.095498 
  
 
0 728000 0.442786 -0.39968 0.344695 0.098091 
  
 
853600 736000 0.447761 -0.39773 0.345414 0.102348 
  
 
1523014 838750 0.452736 -0.37269 0.354691 0.098045 
  
 
2290800 853600 0.457711 -0.36907 0.356039 0.101672 
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1982651 855450 0.462687 -0.36862 0.356207 0.10648 
  
 
3136408 869500 0.467662 -0.36519 0.357484 0.110177 
  
 
934876 890725 0.472637 -0.36002 0.359417 0.11322 
  
 
1549145 909833 0.477612 -0.35536 0.36116 0.116452 
  
 
0 924420 0.482587 -0.3518 0.362493 0.120094 
  
 
3241500 934876 0.487562 -0.34926 0.363449 0.124113 
  
 
7262500 936668 0.492537 -0.34882 0.363613 0.128924 
  
 
0 948750 0.497512 -0.34587 0.364719 0.132793 
  
 
0 954000 0.502488 -0.34459 0.3652 0.137288 
  
 
0 960438 0.507463 -0.34302 0.36579 0.141673 
  
 
0 963200 0.512438 -0.34235 0.366043 0.146394 
  
 
0 971166 0.517413 -0.34041 0.366774 0.150639 
  
 
0 1054500 0.522388 -0.3201 0.374448 0.14794 
  
 
0 1056965 0.527363 -0.31949 0.374676 0.152688 
  
 
0 1057060 0.532338 -0.31947 0.374684 0.157654 
  
 
0 1077413 0.537313 -0.31451 0.376567 0.160747 
  
 
0 1080450 0.542289 -0.31377 0.376848 0.165441 
  
 
0 1100000 0.547264 -0.309 0.378659 0.168605 
  
 
0 1116667 0.552239 -0.30494 0.380205 0.172034 
  
 
0 1152010 0.557214 -0.29633 0.38349 0.173724 
  
 
4713000 1155535 0.562189 -0.29547 0.383818 0.178371 
  
 
14358476 1177500 0.567164 -0.29011 0.385865 0.181299 
  
 
0 1190400 0.572139 -0.28697 0.387068 0.185071 
  
 
0 1237950 0.577114 -0.27538 0.391513 0.185602 
  
 
22895627 1335000 0.58209 -0.25172 0.400628 0.181461 
  
 
890725 1371850 0.587065 -0.24274 0.404104 0.182961 
  
 
728000 1439600 0.59204 -0.22622 0.410513 0.181526 
  
 
1080450 1468000 0.597015 -0.2193 0.413208 0.183807 
  
 
855450 1480500 0.60199 -0.21625 0.414395 0.187595 
  
 
0 1500576 0.606965 -0.21136 0.416303 0.190662 
  
 
2761333 1523014 0.61194 -0.20589 0.418438 0.193502 
  
 
0 1549145 0.616915 -0.19952 0.420927 0.195988 
  
 
954000 1565850 0.621891 -0.19545 0.42252 0.19937 
  
 
575700 1583479 0.626866 -0.19115 0.424203 0.202663 
  
 
1237950 1627100 0.631841 -0.18052 0.428372 0.203468 
  
 
1500576 1683750 0.636816 -0.16671 0.433799 0.203017 
  
 
653200 1831360 0.641791 -0.13073 0.447995 0.193796 
  
 
6395279 1903122 0.646766 -0.11324 0.454921 0.191845 
  
 
2316000 1964400 0.651741 -0.0983 0.460847 0.190894 
  
 
3598800 1982651 0.656716 -0.09385 0.462614 0.194103 
  
 
2334000 2004110 0.661692 -0.08862 0.464692 0.197 
  
 
0 2074193 0.666667 -0.07154 0.471485 0.195181 
  
 
0 2082248 0.671642 -0.06957 0.472267 0.199375 
  
 
0 2122200 0.676617 -0.05983 0.476144 0.200473 
  
 
10068000 2193746 0.681592 -0.04239 0.483092 0.1985 
  
 
0 2201250 0.686567 -0.04057 0.483821 0.202746 
  
 
6690846 2214000 0.691542 -0.03746 0.48506 0.206482 
  
 
6009208 2223840 0.696517 -0.03506 0.486016 0.210501 
  
 
8783676 2265476 0.701493 -0.02491 0.490063 0.211429 
  
 
0 2290800 0.706468 -0.01874 0.492525 0.213942 
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0 2316000 0.711443 -0.01259 0.494976 0.216467 
  
 
1116667 2334000 0.716418 -0.00821 0.496726 0.219692 
  
 
0 2371594 0.721393 0.000957 0.500382 0.221011 
  
 
1964400 2378667 0.726368 0.002681 0.50107 0.225299 
  
 
0 2394000 0.731343 0.006419 0.502561 0.228783 
  
 
0 2475676 0.736318 0.026328 0.510502 0.225816 
  
 
1177500 2634750 0.741294 0.065104 0.525954 0.215339 
  
 
736000 2737750 0.746269 0.090211 0.53594 0.210329 
  
 
1100000 2761333 0.751244 0.095959 0.538224 0.21302 
  
 
2378667 2805751 0.756219 0.106787 0.542521 0.213698 
  
 
924420 2840112 0.761194 0.115162 0.545842 0.215352 
  
 
7800960 2986800 0.766169 0.150919 0.55998 0.206189 
  
 
1371850 3103017 0.771144 0.179248 0.571128 0.200016 
  
 
0 3136408 0.776119 0.187387 0.574321 0.201798 
  
 
0 3241500 0.781095 0.213004 0.584338 0.196756 
  
 
174765 3469040 0.78607 0.268469 0.605831 0.180239 
  
 
1831360 3511200 0.791045 0.278746 0.60978 0.181265 
  
 
5387899 3564321 0.79602 0.291694 0.61474 0.18128 
  
 
5910021 3587250 0.800995 0.297284 0.616875 0.18412 
  
 
2223840 3598800 0.80597 0.300099 0.617949 0.188021 
  
 
3469040 3703165 0.810945 0.325539 0.627613 0.183332 
  
 
32633900 3882800 0.81592 0.369326 0.644058 0.171863 
  
 
0 3987050 0.820896 0.394738 0.653482 0.167414 
  
 
14700000 4164024 0.825871 0.437877 0.669262 0.156608 
  
 
0 4713000 0.830846 0.571695 0.716236 0.11461 
  
 
0 4832500 0.835821 0.600824 0.726021 0.1098 
  
 
0 4940000 0.840796 0.627028 0.734679 0.106117 
  
 
8221250 4980000 0.845771 0.636778 0.737865 0.107906 
  
 
0 5010027 0.850746 0.644097 0.740244 0.110502 
  
 
17648125 5058000 0.855721 0.655791 0.744021 0.111701 
  
 
124502 5384579 0.860697 0.735398 0.768951 0.091745 
  
 
0 5387899 0.865672 0.736207 0.769198 0.096474 
  
 
12537139 5497660 0.870647 0.762962 0.777257 0.09339 
  
 
0 5910021 0.875622 0.863479 0.806063 0.069559 
  
 
0 5925000 0.880597 0.86713 0.807065 0.073532 
  
 
320688 6009208 0.885572 0.887656 0.812637 0.072935 
  
 
312891 6150329 0.890547 0.922056 0.82175 0.068797 
  
 
4164024 6157500 0.895522 0.923804 0.822206 0.073317 
  
 
3587250 6169600 0.900498 0.926753 0.822973 0.077525 
  
 
2840112 6360826 0.905473 0.973366 0.834814 0.070658 
  
 
5010027 6395279 0.910448 0.981764 0.836892 0.073556 
  
 
3511200 6592000 0.915423 1.029717 0.848429 0.066994 
  
 
5497660 6690846 0.920398 1.053811 0.854015 0.066383 
  
 
3103017 6973750 0.925373 1.122772 0.869233 0.05614 
  
 
1627100 7262500 0.930348 1.193157 0.883596 0.046752 
  
 
1056965 7800960 0.935323 1.324411 0.907317 0.028007 
  
 
319872 8086497 0.940299 1.394013 0.918343 0.021955 
  
 
2004110 8221250 0.945274 1.42686 0.92319 0.022084 
  
 
2805751 8783676 0.950249 1.563956 0.941086 0.009163 
  
 
620840 10068000 0.955224 1.877021 0.969742 0.014519 
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2986800 11274337 0.960199 2.171076 0.985037 0.024838 
  
 
1190400 11992000 0.965174 2.346012 0.990512 0.025338 
  
 
1439600 12537139 0.970149 2.478895 0.99341 0.023261 
  
 
0 14358476 0.975124 2.922861 0.998266 0.023141 
  
 
0 14700000 0.9801 3.00611 0.998677 0.018577 
  
 
1152010 16982500 0.985075 3.562489 0.999816 0.014742 
  
 
1583479 17648125 0.99005 3.724741 0.999902 0.009852 
  
 
2074193 22895627 0.995025 5.003864 1 0.004975 
  
 
936668 32633900 1 7.37765 1 8.06E-14 
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APPENDIX G 
Lilliefors test results - Total Compensation variable 
(Owner-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
5750882 841502 0.004975 -1.17615 0.119767 0.114792 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
11113479 1169000 0.00995 -1.11931 0.131504 0.121554 D = 0.1279 
 
14375182 1233000 0.014925 -1.1082 0.133888 0.118962 
  
 
15168667 1276000 0.0199 -1.10074 0.135505 0.115605 
  
 
27882418 1476000 0.024876 -1.06602 0.143206 0.118331 
  
 
2204000 1498000 0.029851 -1.06221 0.144071 0.11422 
  
 
2972733 1505000 0.034826 -1.06099 0.144347 0.109521 
  
 
3431000 1632765 0.039801 -1.03882 0.149445 0.109644 
  
 
4473166 1649000 0.044776 -1.036 0.150101 0.105325 
  
 
5804425 1677000 0.049751 -1.03114 0.151238 0.101487 
  
 
3200000 1719510 0.054726 -1.02376 0.152974 0.098248 
  
 
9469600 1800000 0.059701 -1.00979 0.156298 0.096596 
  
 
4500000 1951000 0.064677 -0.98358 0.16266 0.097984 
  
 
4528000 2066000 0.069652 -0.96362 0.167618 0.097966 
  
 
5098000 2111000 0.074627 -0.95581 0.169583 0.094957 
  
 
1649000 2204000 0.079602 -0.93967 0.173693 0.094091 
  
 
1719510 2284420 0.084577 -0.92571 0.177298 0.09272 
  
 
2952413 2577700 0.089552 -0.87481 0.190838 0.101286 
  
 
5555850 2673200 0.094527 -0.85824 0.195381 0.100854 
  
 
5818676 2679000 0.099502 -0.85723 0.195659 0.096157 
  
 
4990476 2702000 0.104478 -0.85324 0.196764 0.092286 
  
 
12841316 2735157 0.109453 -0.84748 0.198363 0.088911 
  
 
11832192 2768750 0.114428 -0.84165 0.199992 0.085564 
  
 
8470000 2795000 0.119403 -0.8371 0.201269 0.081866 
  
 
9425500 2806500 0.124378 -0.8351 0.201831 0.077453 
  
 
8464420 2820400 0.129353 -0.83269 0.202511 0.073157 
  
 
4464926 2830000 0.134328 -0.83102 0.202981 0.068653 
  
 
2702000 2841556 0.139303 -0.82902 0.203548 0.064244 
  
 
3257750 2850000 0.144279 -0.82755 0.203963 0.059684 
  
 
3265438 2925300 0.149254 -0.81448 0.207685 0.058431 
  
 
2768750 2930587 0.154229 -0.81356 0.207948 0.053719 
  
 
8620000 2946000 0.159204 -0.81089 0.208715 0.049511 
  
 
4219000 2952413 0.164179 -0.80977 0.209035 0.044856 
  
 
3350000 2972733 0.169154 -0.80625 0.21005 0.040896 
  
 
5328500 2996434 0.174129 -0.80213 0.211238 0.037108 
  
 
6597833 3036833 0.179104 -0.79512 0.213271 0.034167 
  
 
5839000 3053000 0.18408 -0.79232 0.214088 0.030009 
  
 
7027000 3167122 0.189055 -0.77251 0.219907 0.030852 
  
 
4510200 3200000 0.19403 -0.7668 0.221599 0.02757 
  
 
5894250 3215000 0.199005 -0.7642 0.222374 0.023369 
  
 
7145200 3257750 0.20398 -0.75678 0.224591 0.020611 
  
 
12518750 3265438 0.208955 -0.75545 0.224991 0.016036 
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11134000 3350000 0.21393 -0.74077 0.229417 0.015487 
  
 
1233000 3381331 0.218905 -0.73533 0.231069 0.012164 
  
 
3167122 3431000 0.223881 -0.72671 0.233702 0.009821 
  
 
1498000 3461000 0.228856 -0.7215 0.2353 0.006444 
  
 
1677000 3498500 0.233831 -0.71499 0.237306 0.003475 
  
 
2996434 3589965 0.238806 -0.69912 0.242239 0.003433 
  
 
2946000 3642667 0.243781 -0.68997 0.245106 0.001325 
  
 
2806500 3652000 0.248756 -0.68835 0.245615 0.003141 
  
 
3498500 3702000 0.253731 -0.67967 0.248355 0.005376 
  
 
5962000 3720044 0.258706 -0.67654 0.249348 0.009358 
  
 
23418500 3786000 0.263682 -0.66509 0.252995 0.010687 
  
 
12776000 3926000 0.268657 -0.6408 0.260828 0.007829 
  
 
9750000 3951402 0.273632 -0.63639 0.262262 0.01137 
  
 
9165000 4029725 0.278607 -0.62279 0.26671 0.011897 
  
 
10848000 4132000 0.283582 -0.60504 0.272575 0.011007 
  
 
10593426 4183750 0.288557 -0.59606 0.275567 0.01299 
  
 
10323600 4219000 0.293532 -0.58994 0.277615 0.015918 
  
 
18318200 4222000 0.298507 -0.58942 0.277789 0.020718 
  
 
6949300 4242000 0.303483 -0.58595 0.278954 0.024528 
  
 
11419788 4434872 0.308458 -0.55247 0.290312 0.018146 
  
 
7397027 4464926 0.313433 -0.54726 0.292101 0.021332 
  
 
9145558 4473166 0.318408 -0.54583 0.292592 0.025816 
  
 
10410077 4500000 0.323383 -0.54117 0.294195 0.029188 
  
 
7885566 4510200 0.328358 -0.5394 0.294805 0.033553 
  
 
2820400 4528000 0.333333 -0.53631 0.295872 0.037462 
  
 
12067500 4577500 0.338308 -0.52772 0.298847 0.039462 
  
 
7394000 4640000 0.343284 -0.51687 0.302623 0.040661 
  
 
10747329 4671650 0.348259 -0.51138 0.304543 0.043716 
  
 
4640000 4748840 0.353234 -0.49798 0.309248 0.043985 
  
 
10132579 4824450 0.358209 -0.48486 0.313888 0.044321 
  
 
5814050 4841193 0.363184 -0.48195 0.31492 0.048264 
  
 
2066000 4854063 0.368159 -0.47972 0.315714 0.052446 
  
 
5974746 4907000 0.373134 -0.47053 0.318988 0.054146 
  
 
5693060 4990476 0.378109 -0.45604 0.32418 0.05393 
  
 
8248594 5015283 0.383085 -0.45174 0.325729 0.057355 
  
 
9248165 5084000 0.38806 -0.43981 0.330037 0.058022 
  
 
6728000 5098000 0.393035 -0.43738 0.330918 0.062117 
  
 
4183750 5100000 0.39801 -0.43703 0.331044 0.066966 
  
 
3215000 5134000 0.402985 -0.43113 0.333186 0.069799 
  
 
3652000 5153198 0.40796 -0.4278 0.334398 0.073562 
  
 
4671650 5224576 0.412935 -0.41541 0.33892 0.074015 
  
 
2735157 5309231 0.41791 -0.40072 0.344314 0.073597 
  
 
5432296 5328500 0.422886 -0.39737 0.345546 0.07734 
  
 
11469138 5343171 0.427861 -0.39483 0.346485 0.081376 
  
 
7511942 5376000 0.432836 -0.38913 0.34859 0.084246 
  
 
7148851 5432296 0.437811 -0.37936 0.352211 0.0856 
  
 
2925300 5464000 0.442786 -0.37386 0.354256 0.088531 
  
 
2841556 5504450 0.447761 -0.36684 0.356871 0.09089 
  
 
3036833 5555850 0.452736 -0.35791 0.360204 0.092533 
  
 
5309231 5621309 0.457711 -0.34655 0.364463 0.093248 
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5621309 5693060 0.462687 -0.3341 0.369152 0.093535 
  
 
4854063 5750882 0.467662 -0.32406 0.372945 0.094717 
  
 
2930587 5764479 0.472637 -0.3217 0.373838 0.098799 
  
 
5153198 5804425 0.477612 -0.31477 0.376468 0.101144 
  
 
3381331 5814050 0.482587 -0.3131 0.377102 0.105485 
  
 
8919500 5818676 0.487562 -0.3123 0.377407 0.110155 
  
 
12512500 5839000 0.492537 -0.30877 0.378748 0.113789 
  
 
5950000 5894250 0.497512 -0.29918 0.382401 0.115112 
  
 
5100000 5950000 0.502488 -0.28951 0.386097 0.11639 
  
 
9112000 5962000 0.507463 -0.28742 0.386894 0.120568 
  
 
1169000 5974746 0.512438 -0.28521 0.387742 0.124696 
  
 
1276000 6001036 0.517413 -0.28065 0.389491 0.127922 
  
 
1476000 6086000 0.522388 -0.2659 0.395158 0.12723 
  
 
1800000 6156840 0.527363 -0.25361 0.3999 0.127463 
  
 
3702000 6334666 0.532338 -0.22274 0.411868 0.12047 
  
 
1505000 6578000 0.537313 -0.18051 0.428377 0.108936 
  
 
1951000 6597833 0.542289 -0.17707 0.429729 0.11256 
  
 
3053000 6693400 0.547264 -0.16048 0.436252 0.111012 
  
 
4907000 6728000 0.552239 -0.15447 0.438618 0.11362 
  
 
4242000 6940010 0.557214 -0.11768 0.453162 0.104052 
  
 
11640000 6949300 0.562189 -0.11606 0.453801 0.108388 
  
 
22456476 7027000 0.567164 -0.10258 0.459149 0.108015 
  
 
12855000 7145200 0.572139 -0.08206 0.467298 0.104841 
  
 
13519000 7148851 0.577114 -0.08143 0.46755 0.109564 
  
 
36288627 7164110 0.58209 -0.07878 0.468603 0.113486 
  
 
4029725 7296360 0.587065 -0.05583 0.47774 0.109325 
  
 
4132000 7357668 0.59204 -0.04519 0.481979 0.11006 
  
 
4824450 7394000 0.597015 -0.03888 0.484493 0.112522 
  
 
5504450 7397027 0.60199 -0.03836 0.484702 0.117288 
  
 
6578000 7511942 0.606965 -0.01841 0.492656 0.114309 
  
 
6334666 7885566 0.61194 0.046437 0.518519 0.093421 
  
 
5015283 7935000 0.616915 0.055017 0.521938 0.094978 
  
 
3951402 8054056 0.621891 0.075681 0.530163 0.091727 
  
 
5343171 8120667 0.626866 0.087242 0.53476 0.092105 
  
 
8896872 8248594 0.631841 0.109445 0.543575 0.088265 
  
 
5224576 8308751 0.636816 0.119886 0.547713 0.089103 
  
 
2673200 8464420 0.641791 0.146905 0.558396 0.083395 
  
 
13807279 8470000 0.646766 0.147873 0.558779 0.087988 
  
 
10763000 8620000 0.651741 0.173907 0.569031 0.08271 
  
 
13289800 8702400 0.656716 0.188209 0.574644 0.082073 
  
 
5134000 8724000 0.661692 0.191958 0.576112 0.085579 
  
 
3461000 8896872 0.666667 0.221962 0.587828 0.078838 
  
 
2111000 8919500 0.671642 0.22589 0.589356 0.082285 
  
 
2795000 9102800 0.676617 0.257704 0.601682 0.074935 
  
 
16918000 9112000 0.681592 0.2593 0.602298 0.079294 
  
 
2577700 9145558 0.686567 0.265125 0.604543 0.082024 
  
 
9896446 9154000 0.691542 0.26659 0.605108 0.086435 
  
 
10177508 9165000 0.696517 0.268499 0.605842 0.090675 
  
 
13653776 9248165 0.701493 0.282934 0.611386 0.090106 
  
 
5084000 9425500 0.706468 0.313712 0.62313 0.083337 
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2679000 9469000 0.711443 0.321262 0.625994 0.085449 
  
 
3642667 9469600 0.716418 0.321366 0.626034 0.090384 
  
 
3786000 9528600 0.721393 0.331607 0.629907 0.091486 
  
 
6693400 9750000 0.726368 0.370033 0.644321 0.082047 
  
 
5376000 9896446 0.731343 0.395451 0.653745 0.077598 
  
 
3926000 9948000 0.736318 0.404399 0.65704 0.079278 
  
 
4577500 9979850 0.741294 0.409927 0.65907 0.082223 
  
 
5464000 10008040 0.746269 0.41482 0.660863 0.085406 
  
 
6086000 10026000 0.751244 0.417937 0.662003 0.08924 
  
 
8120667 10132579 0.756219 0.436435 0.668739 0.08748 
  
 
2284420 10177508 0.761194 0.444233 0.671563 0.089631 
  
 
15500960 10208000 0.766169 0.449525 0.673474 0.092696 
  
 
9979850 10323600 0.771144 0.469589 0.680676 0.090469 
  
 
9154000 10410077 0.776119 0.484598 0.686019 0.0901 
  
 
10026000 10563000 0.781095 0.51114 0.695373 0.085721 
  
 
1632765 10593426 0.78607 0.516421 0.69722 0.08885 
  
 
7296360 10747329 0.791045 0.543133 0.706481 0.084564 
  
 
10838899 10763000 0.79602 0.545852 0.707416 0.088604 
  
 
12279021 10832780 0.800995 0.557964 0.711565 0.08943 
  
 
6156840 10838899 0.80597 0.559026 0.711928 0.094042 
  
 
10008040 10848000 0.810945 0.560605 0.712467 0.098479 
  
 
39233900 11013100 0.81592 0.589261 0.722157 0.093764 
  
 
4222000 11113479 0.820896 0.606683 0.727969 0.092926 
  
 
22440000 11134000 0.825871 0.610244 0.72915 0.096721 
  
 
9948000 11322200 0.830846 0.642909 0.739858 0.090987 
  
 
10208000 11419788 0.835821 0.659846 0.745324 0.090497 
  
 
10563000 11469138 0.840796 0.668412 0.748065 0.092731 
  
 
20826250 11478728 0.845771 0.670076 0.748595 0.097176 
  
 
14069000 11640000 0.850746 0.698067 0.757432 0.093314 
  
 
32686125 11832192 0.855721 0.731424 0.76774 0.087981 
  
 
841502 12067500 0.860697 0.772265 0.780021 0.080675 
  
 
2850000 12137027 0.865672 0.784332 0.783577 0.082094 
  
 
17958139 12279021 0.870647 0.808977 0.790736 0.079911 
  
 
7935000 12512500 0.875622 0.849501 0.802199 0.073423 
  
 
9469000 12518750 0.880597 0.850585 0.8025 0.078097 
  
 
3720044 12533017 0.885572 0.853061 0.803187 0.082385 
  
 
6001036 12776000 0.890547 0.895234 0.814669 0.075878 
  
 
10832780 12841316 0.895522 0.906571 0.817683 0.077839 
  
 
11478728 12855000 0.900498 0.908946 0.818311 0.082187 
  
 
8054056 13289800 0.905473 0.984411 0.837543 0.067929 
  
 
12137027 13519000 0.910448 1.024191 0.847128 0.06332 
  
 
11322200 13556660 0.915423 1.030728 0.848666 0.066757 
  
 
13556660 13653776 0.920398 1.047584 0.852585 0.067813 
  
 
12533017 13807279 0.925373 1.074226 0.858639 0.066734 
  
 
11013100 14069000 0.930348 1.119651 0.868569 0.06178 
  
 
3589965 14375182 0.935323 1.172793 0.879561 0.055763 
  
 
4434872 15168667 0.940299 1.310512 0.904989 0.03531 
  
 
7164110 15500960 0.945274 1.368186 0.914373 0.030901 
  
 
8308751 16918000 0.950249 1.614131 0.946751 0.003498 
  
 
4748840 17958139 0.955224 1.794661 0.963646 0.008422 
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9102800 18318200 0.960199 1.857154 0.968355 0.008156 
  
 
8702400 20826250 0.965174 2.292458 0.98906 0.023886 
  
 
9528600 22440000 0.970149 2.572545 0.994952 0.024803 
  
 
8724000 22456476 0.975124 2.575404 0.994994 0.019869 
  
 
2830000 23418500 0.9801 2.742376 0.99695 0.016851 
  
 
6940010 27882418 0.985075 3.517146 0.999782 0.014707 
  
 
5764479 32686125 0.99005 4.35089 0.999993 0.009943 
  
 
4841193 36288627 0.995025 4.976151 1 0.004975 
  
 
7357668 39233900 1 5.48734 1 2.04E-08 
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APPENDIX G 
Lilliefors test results - Cash % variable 
(Owner-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
0.583716 0.168222 0.004975 -2.71277 0.003336 0.001639 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
0.762923 0.265755 0.00995 -2.27665 0.011404 0.001453 D = 0.1956 
 
0.729896 0.274825 0.014925 -2.23609 0.012673 0.002252 
  
 
0.56542 0.291887 0.0199 -2.15979 0.015394 0.004506 
  
 
0.595647 0.301869 0.024876 -2.11516 0.017208 0.007668 
  
 
1 0.312645 0.029851 -2.06697 0.019368 0.010482 
  
 
0.808347 0.314239 0.034826 -2.05985 0.019707 0.015119 
  
 
1 0.323914 0.039801 -2.01658 0.02187 0.017931 
  
 
0.782891 0.34492 0.044776 -1.92265 0.027262 0.017514 
  
 
0.88243 0.345351 0.049751 -1.92073 0.027383 0.022368 
  
 
1 0.348484 0.054726 -1.90672 0.028278 0.026448 
  
 
0.348484 0.353859 0.059701 -1.88268 0.029872 0.02983 
  
 
1 0.356685 0.064677 -1.87005 0.030739 0.033938 
  
 
1 0.360609 0.069652 -1.8525 0.031977 0.037675 
  
 
1 0.369069 0.074627 -1.81467 0.034787 0.03984 
  
 
1 0.391955 0.079602 -1.71233 0.043418 0.036184 
  
 
0.990398 0.399101 0.084577 -1.68038 0.046442 0.038136 
  
 
0.635074 0.39955 0.089552 -1.67837 0.046637 0.042915 
  
 
0.718162 0.404894 0.094527 -1.65448 0.049016 0.045512 
  
 
0.574529 0.40956 0.099502 -1.63361 0.05117 0.048332 
  
 
0.54604 0.41958 0.104478 -1.5888 0.056052 0.048425 
  
 
1 0.427734 0.109453 -1.55234 0.06029 0.049163 
  
 
1 0.460073 0.114428 -1.40774 0.079604 0.034824 
  
 
1 0.468588 0.119403 -1.36967 0.085396 0.034007 
  
 
1 0.489745 0.124378 -1.27506 0.101144 0.023234 
  
 
1 0.496743 0.129353 -1.24376 0.106793 0.02256 
  
 
1 0.498486 0.134328 -1.23597 0.108234 0.026094 
  
 
1 0.501697 0.139303 -1.22161 0.110927 0.028377 
  
 
0.708771 0.502911 0.144279 -1.21619 0.111957 0.032322 
  
 
0.705878 0.510055 0.149254 -1.18424 0.118159 0.031095 
  
 
0.697065 0.51869 0.154229 -1.14563 0.125974 0.028255 
  
 
0.312645 0.535786 0.159204 -1.06918 0.142494 0.01671 
  
 
1 0.536818 0.164179 -1.06457 0.143536 0.020643 
  
 
1 0.545384 0.169154 -1.02627 0.152383 0.016771 
  
 
0.836821 0.54604 0.174129 -1.02333 0.153076 0.021054 
  
 
0.862101 0.564092 0.179104 -0.94261 0.17294 0.006165 
  
 
1 0.56542 0.18408 -0.93667 0.174463 0.009616 
  
 
1 0.568525 0.189055 -0.92279 0.178059 0.010996 
  
 
0.78644 0.571553 0.19403 -0.90925 0.18161 0.01242 
  
 
0.626543 0.574529 0.199005 -0.89594 0.185143 0.013862 
  
 
0.702989 0.583716 0.20398 -0.85486 0.196314 0.007666 
  
 
0.781308 0.587211 0.208955 -0.83923 0.20067 0.008285 
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1 0.592438 0.21393 -0.81586 0.20729 0.006641 
  
 
1 0.594468 0.218905 -0.80678 0.209896 0.00901 
  
 
0.399101 0.595103 0.223881 -0.80394 0.210715 0.013165 
  
 
1 0.595337 0.228856 -0.8029 0.211017 0.017838 
  
 
1 0.595647 0.233831 -0.80151 0.211418 0.022413 
  
 
0.76591 0.59755 0.238806 -0.793 0.213889 0.024917 
  
 
0.501697 0.599578 0.243781 -0.78393 0.21654 0.027241 
  
 
0.624265 0.605246 0.248756 -0.75859 0.224049 0.024707 
  
 
0.850079 0.610207 0.253731 -0.73641 0.230742 0.022989 
  
 
1 0.610268 0.258706 -0.73613 0.230825 0.027882 
  
 
0.274825 0.615609 0.263682 -0.71225 0.238155 0.025526 
  
 
0.610207 0.624265 0.268657 -0.67354 0.250301 0.018356 
  
 
0.863077 0.626543 0.273632 -0.66336 0.253551 0.020081 
  
 
1 0.63283 0.278607 -0.63524 0.262635 0.015972 
  
 
1 0.635074 0.283582 -0.62521 0.265916 0.017666 
  
 
0.39955 0.636583 0.288557 -0.61846 0.268135 0.020422 
  
 
0.510055 0.638802 0.293532 -0.60854 0.271414 0.022118 
  
 
0.345351 0.647297 0.298507 -0.57055 0.284152 0.014356 
  
 
1 0.647369 0.303483 -0.57023 0.28426 0.019223 
  
 
0.291887 0.653375 0.308458 -0.54338 0.293435 0.015023 
  
 
0.718502 0.662314 0.313433 -0.50341 0.30734 0.006093 
  
 
0.610268 0.671881 0.318408 -0.46062 0.322534 0.004126 
  
 
0.535786 0.680994 0.323383 -0.41988 0.337288 0.013905 
  
 
0.853462 0.687487 0.328358 -0.39084 0.347958 0.019599 
  
 
0.932492 0.689884 0.333333 -0.38012 0.351926 0.018593 
  
 
0.489745 0.693448 0.338308 -0.36419 0.357859 0.019551 
  
 
1 0.697065 0.343284 -0.34801 0.363916 0.020633 
  
 
0.427734 0.699382 0.348259 -0.33765 0.367812 0.019554 
  
 
1 0.699601 0.353234 -0.33667 0.368182 0.014948 
  
 
0.468588 0.702989 0.358209 -0.32152 0.373908 0.015699 
  
 
0.314239 0.705578 0.363184 -0.30995 0.378301 0.015117 
  
 
1 0.705878 0.368159 -0.30861 0.378811 0.010652 
  
 
0.63283 0.706517 0.373134 -0.30575 0.379898 0.006764 
  
 
0.814325 0.707085 0.378109 -0.30321 0.380866 0.002756 
  
 
0.712485 0.708771 0.383085 -0.29567 0.383742 0.000658 
  
 
0.599578 0.712485 0.38806 -0.27906 0.390099 0.002039 
  
 
0.265755 0.712785 0.393035 -0.27772 0.390614 0.002421 
  
 
0.59755 0.718162 0.39801 -0.25368 0.399873 0.001863 
  
 
1 0.718502 0.402985 -0.25216 0.400461 0.002525 
  
 
1 0.720257 0.40796 -0.24431 0.403496 0.004464 
  
 
0.885982 0.725304 0.412935 -0.22174 0.412258 0.000677 
  
 
1 0.729206 0.41791 -0.20429 0.419063 0.001152 
  
 
0.592438 0.729896 0.422886 -0.20121 0.420268 0.002618 
  
 
0.391955 0.742764 0.427861 -0.14367 0.442881 0.015021 
  
 
0.802914 0.749004 0.432836 -0.11577 0.453919 0.021083 
  
 
1 0.752413 0.437811 -0.10052 0.459965 0.022154 
  
 
1 0.755649 0.442786 -0.08605 0.465713 0.022927 
  
 
0.699601 0.758567 0.447761 -0.073 0.470902 0.023141 
  
 
0.498486 0.762923 0.452736 -0.05352 0.478657 0.025921 
  
 
0.568525 0.76591 0.457711 -0.04017 0.483981 0.026269 
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0.647297 0.776047 0.462687 0.005161 0.502059 0.039372 
  
 
0.353859 0.778961 0.467662 0.018193 0.507258 0.039596 
  
 
0.680994 0.781308 0.472637 0.028686 0.511443 0.038806 
  
 
0.699382 0.782891 0.477612 0.035763 0.514264 0.036652 
  
 
1 0.784818 0.482587 0.044383 0.5177 0.035113 
  
 
0.636583 0.78644 0.487562 0.051633 0.520589 0.033027 
  
 
0.41958 0.802914 0.492537 0.125298 0.549856 0.057319 
  
 
1 0.808347 0.497512 0.149593 0.559457 0.061945 
  
 
1 0.814325 0.502488 0.176323 0.56998 0.067492 
  
 
1 0.819257 0.507463 0.198379 0.578626 0.071163 
  
 
1 0.823814 0.512438 0.218755 0.58658 0.074142 
  
 
1 0.834005 0.517413 0.264323 0.604234 0.086821 
  
 
1 0.836821 0.522388 0.276916 0.609078 0.08669 
  
 
1 0.844589 0.527363 0.311653 0.622348 0.094985 
  
 
1 0.848918 0.532338 0.331009 0.629681 0.097343 
  
 
1 0.850079 0.537313 0.336199 0.63164 0.094326 
  
 
1 0.852048 0.542289 0.345005 0.634955 0.092666 
  
 
1 0.852258 0.547264 0.345943 0.635307 0.088044 
  
 
1 0.853462 0.552239 0.351328 0.637329 0.08509 
  
 
1 0.860856 0.557214 0.384389 0.649655 0.092441 
  
 
0.595103 0.862101 0.562189 0.389959 0.651717 0.089527 
  
 
0.360609 0.862538 0.567164 0.391912 0.652438 0.085274 
  
 
1 0.863077 0.572139 0.394322 0.653328 0.081189 
  
 
1 0.86321 0.577114 0.394917 0.653548 0.076434 
  
 
0.369069 0.8653 0.58209 0.404263 0.65699 0.074901 
  
 
0.778961 0.869265 0.587065 0.421992 0.663484 0.07642 
  
 
0.823814 0.872695 0.59204 0.43733 0.669064 0.077024 
  
 
0.776047 0.88243 0.597015 0.480861 0.684692 0.087678 
  
 
0.844589 0.885982 0.60199 0.496745 0.690316 0.088326 
  
 
1 0.892255 0.606965 0.524794 0.700137 0.093171 
  
 
0.564092 0.892964 0.61194 0.527963 0.701237 0.089297 
  
 
1 0.913795 0.616915 0.621109 0.732736 0.115821 
  
 
0.758567 0.927873 0.621891 0.684064 0.753033 0.131142 
  
 
0.892255 0.932492 0.626866 0.704715 0.759506 0.132641 
  
 
0.860856 0.947861 0.631841 0.773438 0.780368 0.148527 
  
 
0.712785 0.990398 0.636816 0.963649 0.832389 0.195573 
  
 
0.755649 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.536818 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.784818 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.729206 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.545384 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.404894 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.323914 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.40956 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.356685 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
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1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.693448 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.706517 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.742764 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.8653 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.819257 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.707085 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.595337 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.496743 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.862538 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.892964 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.749004 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.502911 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.51869 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.638802 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.653375 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.168222 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.34492 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.605246 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.460073 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.852048 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.301869 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.913795 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.947861 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.615609 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.687487 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.647369 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.587211 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.689884 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.594468 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.752413 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.852258 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.705578 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.927873 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.720257 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.662314 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.869265 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
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0.671881 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.86321 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.848918 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
1 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.834005 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.725304 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.571553 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
  
 
0.872695 1 1 1.006583 0.842932 0.157068 
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APPENDIX G 
Lilliefors test results - Options % variable 
(Owner-controlled firms) 
         
 
Data Ordered S(x) Z F(x) |S(x)-F(x)| 
  
 
0.416284 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
Lilliefors Test 
Statistic 
 
0.237077 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 D = 0.2061 
 
0.270104 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.43458 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.404353 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.191653 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.217109 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.11757 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.651516 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.009602 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.364926 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.281838 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.425471 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.45396 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.291229 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.294122 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.302935 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.687355 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.163179 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.137899 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.21356 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.373457 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.297011 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
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0.218692 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.600899 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.23409 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.498303 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.375735 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.149921 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.725175 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.389793 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.136923 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.60045 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.489945 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.654649 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.708113 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.281498 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.389732 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.464214 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.146538 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.067508 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.510255 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.572266 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.531412 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0.685761 0 0.363184 -1.00658 0.157068 0.206116 
  
 
0 0.009602 0.368159 -0.96365 0.167611 0.200548 
  
 
0.36717 0.052139 0.373134 -0.77344 0.219632 0.153503 
  
 
0.185675 0.067508 0.378109 -0.70472 0.240494 0.137616 
  
 
0.287515 0.072127 0.383085 -0.68406 0.246967 0.136117 
  
 
0.400422 0.086205 0.38806 -0.62111 0.267264 0.120796 
  
 
0.734245 0.107036 0.393035 -0.52796 0.298763 0.094272 
  
 
0.40245 0.107745 0.39801 -0.52479 0.299863 0.098147 
  
 
0 0.114018 0.402985 -0.49675 0.309684 0.093301 
  
 
0 0.11757 0.40796 -0.48086 0.315308 0.092653 
  
 
0.114018 0.127305 0.412935 -0.43733 0.330936 0.081999 
  
 
0 0.130735 0.41791 -0.42199 0.336516 0.081395 
  
 
0.407562 0.1347 0.422886 -0.40426 0.34301 0.079876 
  
 
0.608045 0.13679 0.427861 -0.39492 0.346452 0.081409 
  
 
0.197086 0.136923 0.432836 -0.39432 0.346672 0.086164 
  
 
0 0.137462 0.437811 -0.39191 0.347562 0.090249 
  
 
0 0.137899 0.442786 -0.38996 0.348283 0.094503 
  
 
0.300399 0.139144 0.447761 -0.38439 0.350345 0.097416 
  
 
0.501514 0.146538 0.452736 -0.35133 0.362671 0.090065 
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0.431475 0.147742 0.457711 -0.34594 0.364693 0.093019 
  
 
0.352703 0.147952 0.462687 -0.345 0.365045 0.097641 
  
 
0.646141 0.149921 0.467662 -0.3362 0.36836 0.099301 
  
 
0.319006 0.151082 0.472637 -0.33101 0.370319 0.102318 
  
 
0.300618 0.155411 0.477612 -0.31165 0.377652 0.09996 
  
 
0 0.163179 0.482587 -0.27692 0.390922 0.091665 
  
 
0.363417 0.165995 0.487562 -0.26432 0.395766 0.091796 
  
 
0.58042 0.176186 0.492537 -0.21876 0.41342 0.079117 
  
 
0 0.180743 0.497512 -0.19838 0.421374 0.076138 
  
 
0 0.185675 0.502488 -0.17632 0.43002 0.072468 
  
 
0 0.191653 0.507463 -0.14959 0.440543 0.06692 
  
 
0 0.197086 0.512438 -0.1253 0.450144 0.062294 
  
 
0 0.21356 0.517413 -0.05163 0.479411 0.038002 
  
 
0 0.215182 0.522388 -0.04438 0.4823 0.040088 
  
 
0 0.217109 0.527363 -0.03576 0.485736 0.041628 
  
 
0 0.218692 0.532338 -0.02869 0.488557 0.043781 
  
 
0 0.221039 0.537313 -0.01819 0.492742 0.044571 
  
 
0 0.223953 0.542289 -0.00516 0.497941 0.044348 
  
 
0 0.23409 0.547264 0.040165 0.516019 0.031244 
  
 
0 0.237077 0.552239 0.053524 0.521343 0.030896 
  
 
0 0.241433 0.557214 0.073003 0.529098 0.028116 
  
 
0.404897 0.244351 0.562189 0.086051 0.534287 0.027902 
  
 
0.639391 0.247587 0.567164 0.100522 0.540035 0.027129 
  
 
0 0.250996 0.572139 0.115765 0.546081 0.026059 
  
 
0 0.257236 0.577114 0.143668 0.557119 0.019996 
  
 
0.630931 0.270104 0.58209 0.201208 0.579732 0.002357 
  
 
0.221039 0.270794 0.587065 0.204292 0.580937 0.006127 
  
 
0.176186 0.274696 0.59204 0.22174 0.587742 0.004298 
  
 
0.223953 0.279743 0.597015 0.244308 0.596504 0.000511 
  
 
0.155411 0.281498 0.60199 0.252155 0.599539 0.002451 
  
 
0 0.281838 0.606965 0.253676 0.600127 0.006838 
  
 
0.435908 0.287215 0.61194 0.277719 0.609386 0.002554 
  
 
0 0.287515 0.616915 0.279061 0.609901 0.007015 
  
 
0.241433 0.291229 0.621891 0.295667 0.616258 0.005633 
  
 
0.107745 0.292915 0.626866 0.303208 0.619134 0.007731 
  
 
0.139144 0.293483 0.631841 0.305748 0.620102 0.011739 
  
 
0.287215 0.294122 0.636816 0.308606 0.621189 0.015627 
  
 
0.244351 0.294422 0.641791 0.309946 0.621699 0.020092 
  
 
0.463182 0.297011 0.646766 0.321521 0.626092 0.020674 
  
 
0.215182 0.300399 0.651741 0.336672 0.631818 0.019924 
  
 
0.270794 0.300618 0.656716 0.337653 0.632188 0.024529 
  
 
0.454616 0.302935 0.661692 0.34801 0.636084 0.025608 
  
 
0 0.306552 0.666667 0.364186 0.642141 0.024526 
  
 
0 0.310116 0.671642 0.380125 0.648074 0.023568 
  
 
0 0.312513 0.676617 0.390841 0.652042 0.024574 
  
 
0.595106 0.319006 0.681592 0.419877 0.662712 0.01888 
  
 
0 0.328119 0.686567 0.460624 0.677466 0.009101 
  
 
0.676086 0.337686 0.691542 0.503405 0.69266 0.001118 
  
 
0.59044 0.346625 0.696517 0.543377 0.706565 0.010047 
  
 
0.643315 0.352631 0.701493 0.570233 0.71574 0.014248 
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0 0.352703 0.706468 0.570552 0.715848 0.009381 
  
 
0 0.361198 0.711443 0.608541 0.728586 0.017143 
  
 
0.306552 0.363417 0.716418 0.618463 0.731865 0.015447 
  
 
0 0.364926 0.721393 0.625211 0.734084 0.012691 
  
 
0.293483 0.36717 0.726368 0.635243 0.737365 0.010997 
  
 
0 0.373457 0.731343 0.663357 0.746449 0.015106 
  
 
0 0.375735 0.736318 0.673542 0.749699 0.01338 
  
 
0.257236 0.384391 0.741294 0.712249 0.761845 0.020551 
  
 
0.1347 0.389732 0.746269 0.736134 0.769175 0.022907 
  
 
0.180743 0.389793 0.751244 0.736406 0.769258 0.018014 
  
 
0.292915 0.394754 0.756219 0.758589 0.775951 0.019732 
  
 
0.404663 0.400422 0.761194 0.783931 0.78346 0.022266 
  
 
0.503257 0.40245 0.766169 0.793001 0.786111 0.019942 
  
 
0.137462 0.404353 0.771144 0.80151 0.788582 0.017437 
  
 
0 0.404663 0.776119 0.802896 0.788983 0.012863 
  
 
0 0.404897 0.781095 0.803942 0.789285 0.00819 
  
 
0.107036 0.405532 0.78607 0.806782 0.790104 0.004034 
  
 
0.250996 0.407562 0.791045 0.815862 0.79271 0.001666 
  
 
0.497089 0.412789 0.79602 0.839231 0.79933 0.00331 
  
 
0.48131 0.416284 0.800995 0.854861 0.803686 0.002691 
  
 
0.361198 0.425471 0.80597 0.895939 0.814857 0.008887 
  
 
0.346625 0.428447 0.810945 0.909247 0.81839 0.007445 
  
 
0.831778 0.431475 0.81592 0.922788 0.821941 0.006021 
  
 
0 0.43458 0.820896 0.936673 0.825537 0.004641 
  
 
0.65508 0.435908 0.825871 0.942612 0.82706 0.00119 
  
 
0 0.45396 0.830846 1.023331 0.846924 0.016079 
  
 
0 0.454616 0.835821 1.026266 0.847617 0.011796 
  
 
0 0.463182 0.840796 1.064567 0.856464 0.015668 
  
 
0.394754 0.464214 0.845771 1.069182 0.857506 0.011735 
  
 
0 0.48131 0.850746 1.145631 0.874026 0.02328 
  
 
0.539927 0.489945 0.855721 1.184243 0.881841 0.02612 
  
 
0.147952 0.497089 0.860697 1.216187 0.888043 0.027347 
  
 
0 0.498303 0.865672 1.221613 0.889073 0.023401 
  
 
0.698131 0.501514 0.870647 1.235972 0.891766 0.021119 
  
 
0 0.503257 0.875622 1.243765 0.893207 0.017585 
  
 
0 0.510255 0.880597 1.275058 0.898856 0.018259 
  
 
0.086205 0.531412 0.885572 1.369666 0.914604 0.029032 
  
 
0.052139 0.539927 0.890547 1.40774 0.920396 0.029849 
  
 
0.384391 0.572266 0.895522 1.552344 0.93971 0.044188 
  
 
0.312513 0.58042 0.900498 1.588805 0.943948 0.04345 
  
 
0.352631 0.59044 0.905473 1.633612 0.94883 0.043357 
  
 
0.412789 0.595106 0.910448 1.654475 0.950984 0.040537 
  
 
0.310116 0.60045 0.915423 1.678373 0.953363 0.03794 
  
 
0.405532 0.600899 0.920398 1.680382 0.953558 0.03316 
  
 
0.247587 0.608045 0.925373 1.712333 0.956582 0.031209 
  
 
0.147742 0.630931 0.930348 1.814671 0.965213 0.034864 
  
 
0.294422 0.639391 0.935323 1.852501 0.968023 0.0327 
  
 
0.072127 0.643315 0.940299 1.870045 0.969261 0.028963 
  
 
0.279743 0.646141 0.945274 1.882682 0.970128 0.024855 
  
 
0.337686 0.651516 0.950249 1.906719 0.971722 0.021473 
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0.130735 0.654649 0.955224 1.920729 0.972617 0.017393 
  
 
0.328119 0.65508 0.960199 1.922655 0.972738 0.012539 
  
 
0.13679 0.676086 0.965174 2.016583 0.97813 0.012956 
  
 
0.151082 0.685761 0.970149 2.059847 0.980293 0.010144 
  
 
0 0.687355 0.975124 2.066974 0.980632 0.005507 
  
 
0 0.698131 0.9801 2.115161 0.982792 0.002692 
  
 
0.165995 0.708113 0.985075 2.159794 0.984606 0.000469 
  
 
0.274696 0.725175 0.99005 2.236087 0.987327 0.002723 
  
 
0.428447 0.734245 0.995025 2.276646 0.988596 0.006429 
  
 
0.127305 0.831778 1 2.712772 0.996664 0.003336 
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APPENDIX H 
         Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results - Cash Component variable 
         
         Data Column# Data Column# Data Column# 
   3356882 1 2033000 2 2295000 1 Large Sample Approximation 
3473000 2 9425500 1 7171000 2 Test Statistic Z = 0.4594 
8478729 1 3282000 2 1478000 1 P-Value = 0.677   
3461000 2 8464420 1 2200000 2 
  
  
10492382 1 3648000 2 1752000 1 Sample RankSum SampSize 
4443000 2 4464926 1 2974000 1 1 25434 201 
8576667 1 2449000 2 5962000 1 2 5941 49 
3279000 2 2702000 1 6436000 1 
   16608081 1 11516597 2 7796000 1 
   5512000 2 2309000 1 8415000 1 
   2204000 1 7865000 2 9165000 1 
   7027000 2 2305000 1 10848000 1 
   2403000 1 4906000 2 4232600 1 
   7643000 2 1930000 1 5265600 1 
   3431000 1 8087000 2 6326200 1 
   7842000 2 2695000 1 6949300 1 
   3502000 1 9041000 2 3333291 1 
   8734000 2 4219000 1 5314779 1 
   5122000 1 4358000 2 5581237 1 
   2559009 2 3350000 1 5577577 1 
   3200000 1 1546223 2 6730031 1 
   4962903 2 4459000 1 2630000 1 
   3300000 1 3578358 2 5910000 1 
   4650075 2 5688000 1 7394000 1 
   4500000 1 1559367 2 4597000 1 
   6091220 2 5839000 1 4640000 1 
   4528000 1 2640832 2 4748000 1 
   2164000 2 7027000 1 1827000 1 
   5098000 1 1689904 2 2066000 1 
   3471000 2 3547000 1 3781000 1 
   1649000 1 7045700 2 4636000 1 
   5269000 2 3693000 1 5877000 1 
   1703000 1 8923800 2 5545000 1 
   5975000 2 5023000 1 1788000 1 
   1875000 1 8219700 2 2500000 1 
   3147000 2 9781000 1 3215000 1 
   3990000 1 9680100 2 3652000 1 
   2102500 2 11134000 1 4139000 1 
   3343000 1 9135100 2 2735157 1 
   1666000 2 1233000 1 3218296 1 
   2725000 1 2405000 2 4495388 1 
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3069000 2 1264000 1 6031442 1 
   12841316 1 4015000 2 7148851 1 
   2173000 2 1498000 1 2925300 1 
   11832192 1 5191000 2 1987956 1 
   2597000 2 1677000 1 1513819 1 
   8470000 1 12011000 2 3018431 1 
   3638658 1 4168300 1 9386000 1 
   1717655 1 4870100 1 2533000 1 
   1995711 1 5084000 1 4115000 1 
   3604053 1 2679000 1 5160000 1 
   3381331 1 2526000 1 5503000 1 
   5678000 1 3786000 1 4128000 1 
   5250000 1 4729000 1 6116000 1 
   5950000 1 5376000 1 7512000 1 
   5100000 1 3926000 1 8089000 1 
   9112000 1 3400000 1 8724000 1 
   1169000 1 4728000 1 2830000 1 
   1276000 1 4986000 1 5788000 1 
   1476000 1 5742000 1 4181000 1 
   1800000 1 1360000 1 2767000 1 
   3702000 1 7700000 1 6421000 1 
   1505000 1 8608000 1 
     1951000 1 9154000 1 
     3053000 1 10026000 1 
     4907000 1 1458000 1 
     4242000 1 5465000 1 
     6927000 1 5451000 1 
     8098000 1 6369000 1 
     12855000 1 3933000 1 
     13519000 1 6539000 1 
     13393000 1 6600000 1 
     3139000 1 4222000 1 
     3404000 1 7740000 1 
     3744000 1 9948000 1 
     4649000 1 10208000 1 
     6578000 1 10563000 1 
     3573333 1 12605000 1 
     5015283 1 14069000 1 
     2997402 1 15038000 1 
     4767471 1 717000 1 
     7658922 1 2850000 1 
     3724000 1 5421000 1 
     2020000 1 7935000 1 
     7412000 1 9469000 1 
     8447000 1 3399356 1 
     9691000 1 5688145 1 
     2800000 1 6668756 1 
     3461000 1 7891478 1 
     2111000 1 5213944 1 
     2795000 1 7127000 1 
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6850000 1 7811000 1 
     2577700 1 8059000 1 
     3205600 1 9430000 1 
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APPENDIX H 
         Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results - Options Component variable 
         
         Data Column# Data Column# Data Column# 
   2394000 1 603300 2 701434 1 Large Sample Approximation 
0 2 0 1 0 2 Test Statistic Z = 1.0675 
2634750 1 0 2 1468000 1 P-Value = 0.8571   
584018 2 0 1 231630 2 
  
  
3882800 1 0 2 1054500 1 Sample RankSum SampSize 
5857500 2 0 1 524500 1 1 25710 201 
6592000 1 10629765 2 0 1 2 5665 49 
1934963 2 0 1 16982500 1 
   11274337 1 0 2 4980000 1 
   1876640 2 948750 1 1335000 1 
   0 1 1738072 2 0 1 
   1310720 2 960438 1 0 1 
   569733 1 2444350 2 6360826 1 
   1205820 2 838750 1 5058000 1 
   0 1 2902000 2 11992000 1 
   2776242 2 5925000 1 0 1 
   971166 1 1323000 2 8086497 1 
   2579893 2 0 1 2082248 1 
   682425 1 1016250 2 3564321 1 
   4800000 2 0 1 4832500 1 
   0 1 2289871 2 1155535 1 
   0 2 869500 1 190400 1 
   6169600 1 0 2 6157500 1 
   0 2 909833 1 0 1 
   0 1 0 2 6150329 1 
   3109910 2 0 1 0 1 
   0 1 797140 2 5384579 1 
   0 2 0 1 3987050 1 
   0 1 1138254 2 0 1 
   0 2 963200 1 2193746 1 
   0 1 0 2 1057060 1 
   0 2 2201250 1 2371594 1 
   16510 1 0 2 3703165 1 
   0 2 2122200 1 4940000 1 
   1077413 1 1110415 2 1683750 1 
   0 2 2737750 1 0 1 
   1565850 1 1852206 2 0 1 
   4304575 2 0 1 532650 1 
   2475676 1 5537279 2 0 1 
   49200 2 0 1 2214000 1 
   2265476 1 2451215 2 6973750 1 
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1258200 2 1903122 1 1480500 1 
   0 1 426320 2 0 1 
   0 2 0 1 0 1 
   0 1 0 2 853600 1 
   0 2 0 1 1523014 1 
   0 1 0 2 2290800 1 
   1982651 1 6009208 1 1627100 1 
   3136408 1 8783676 1 1056965 1 
   934876 1 0 1 319872 1 
   1549145 1 0 1 2004110 1 
   0 1 1116667 1 2805751 1 
   3241500 1 0 1 620840 1 
   7262500 1 1964400 1 2986800 1 
   0 1 0 1 1190400 1 
   0 1 0 1 1439600 1 
   0 1 1177500 1 0 1 
   0 1 736000 1 0 1 
   0 1 1100000 1 1152010 1 
   0 1 2378667 1 1583479 1 
   0 1 924420 1 2074193 1 
   0 1 7800960 1 936668 1 
   0 1 1371850 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     0 1 174765 1 
     0 1 1831360 1 
     4713000 1 5387899 1 
     14358476 1 5910021 1 
     0 1 2223840 1 
     0 1 3469040 1 
     22895627 1 32633900 1 
     890725 1 0 1 
     728000 1 14700000 1 
     1080450 1 0 1 
     855450 1 0 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     2761333 1 8221250 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     954000 1 17648125 1 
     575700 1 124502 1 
     1237950 1 0 1 
     1500576 1 12537139 1 
     653200 1 0 1 
     6395279 1 0 1 
     2316000 1 320688 1 
     3598800 1 312891 1 
     2334000 1 4164024 1 
     0 1 3587250 1 
     0 1 2840112 1 
     0 1 5010027 1 
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10068000 1 3511200 1 
     0 1 5497660 1 
     6690846 1 3103017 1 
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APPENDIX H 
         Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results - Total Compensation variable 
         
         Data Column# Data Column# Data Column# 
   5750882 1 2636300 2 2996434 1 Large Sample Approximation 
3473000 2 9425500 1 7171000 2 Test Statistic Z = 0.8978 
11113479 1 3282000 2 2946000 1 P-Value = 0.8154   
4045018 2 8464420 1 2431630 2 
  
  
14375182 1 3648000 2 2806500 1 Sample RankSum SampSize 
10300500 2 4464926 1 3498500 1 1 25633 201 
15168667 1 13078765 2 5962000 1 2 5742 49 
5213963 2 2702000 1 23418500 1 
   27882418 1 11516597 2 12776000 1 
   7388640 2 3257750 1 9750000 1 
   2204000 1 9603072 2 9165000 1 
   8337720 2 3265438 1 10848000 1 
   2972733 1 7350350 2 10593426 1 
   8848820 2 2768750 1 10323600 1 
   3431000 1 10989000 2 18318200 1 
   10618242 2 8620000 1 6949300 1 
   4473166 1 10364000 2 11419788 1 
   11313893 2 4219000 1 7397027 1 
   5804425 1 5374250 2 9145558 1 
   7359009 2 3350000 1 10410077 1 
   3200000 1 3836094 2 7885566 1 
   4962903 2 5328500 1 2820400 1 
   9469600 1 3578358 2 12067500 1 
   4650075 2 6597833 1 7394000 1 
   4500000 1 1559367 2 10747329 1 
   9201130 2 5839000 1 4640000 1 
   4528000 1 3437972 2 10132579 1 
   2164000 2 7027000 1 5814050 1 
   5098000 1 2828158 2 2066000 1 
   3471000 2 4510200 1 5974746 1 
   1649000 1 7045700 2 5693060 1 
   5269000 2 5894250 1 8248594 1 
   1719510 1 8923800 2 9248165 1 
   5975000 2 7145200 1 6728000 1 
   2952413 1 9330115 2 4183750 1 
   3147000 2 12518750 1 3215000 1 
   5555850 1 11532306 2 3652000 1 
   6407075 2 11134000 1 4671650 1 
   5818676 1 14672379 2 2735157 1 
   1715200 2 1233000 1 5432296 1 
   4990476 1 4856215 2 11469138 1 
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4327200 2 3167122 1 7511942 1 
   12841316 1 4441320 2 7148851 1 
   2173000 2 1498000 1 2925300 1 
   11832192 1 5191000 2 2841556 1 
   2597000 2 1677000 1 3036833 1 
   8470000 1 12011000 2 5309231 1 
   5621309 1 10177508 1 11013100 1 
   4854063 1 13653776 1 3589965 1 
   2930587 1 5084000 1 4434872 1 
   5153198 1 2679000 1 7164110 1 
   3381331 1 3642667 1 8308751 1 
   8919500 1 3786000 1 4748840 1 
   12512500 1 6693400 1 9102800 1 
   5950000 1 5376000 1 8702400 1 
   5100000 1 3926000 1 9528600 1 
   9112000 1 4577500 1 8724000 1 
   1169000 1 5464000 1 2830000 1 
   1276000 1 6086000 1 6940010 1 
   1476000 1 8120667 1 5764479 1 
   1800000 1 2284420 1 4841193 1 
   3702000 1 15500960 1 7357668 1 
   1505000 1 9979850 1 
     1951000 1 9154000 1 
     3053000 1 10026000 1 
     4907000 1 1632765 1 
     4242000 1 7296360 1 
     11640000 1 10838899 1 
     22456476 1 12279021 1 
     12855000 1 6156840 1 
     13519000 1 10008040 1 
     36288627 1 39233900 1 
     4029725 1 4222000 1 
     4132000 1 22440000 1 
     4824450 1 9948000 1 
     5504450 1 10208000 1 
     6578000 1 10563000 1 
     6334666 1 20826250 1 
     5015283 1 14069000 1 
     3951402 1 32686125 1 
     5343171 1 841502 1 
     8896872 1 2850000 1 
     5224576 1 17958139 1 
     2673200 1 7935000 1 
     13807279 1 9469000 1 
     10763000 1 3720044 1 
     13289800 1 6001036 1 
     5134000 1 10832780 1 
     3461000 1 11478728 1 
     2111000 1 8054056 1 
     2795000 1 12137027 1 
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16918000 1 11322200 1 
     2577700 1 13556660 1 
     9896446 1 12533017 1 
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APPENDIX H 
         Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results - Cash % variable 
         
         Data Column# Data Column# Data Column# 
   0.583716 1 0.771157 2 0.76591 1 Large Sample Approximation 
1 2 1 1 1 2 Test Statistic Z = -1.2922 
0.762923 1 1 2 0.501697 1 P-Value = 0.0981   
0.85562 2 1 1 0.904743 2 
  
  
0.729896 1 1 2 0.624265 1 Sample RankSum SampSize 
0.431338 2 1 1 0.850079 1 1 24639 201 
0.56542 1 0.18725 2 1 1 2 6736 49 
0.628888 2 1 1 0.274825 1 
   0.595647 1 1 2 0.610207 1 
   0.74601 2 0.708771 1 0.863077 1 
   1 1 0.819009 2 1 1 
   0.842796 2 0.705878 1 1 1 
   0.808347 1 0.667451 2 0.39955 1 
   0.863731 2 0.697065 1 0.510055 1 
   1 1 0.735918 2 0.345351 1 
   0.73854 2 0.312645 1 1 1 
   0.782891 1 0.872347 2 0.291887 1 
   0.771971 2 1 1 0.718502 1 
   0.88243 1 0.810904 2 0.610268 1 
   0.347738 2 1 1 0.535786 1 
   1 1 0.403072 2 0.853462 1 
   1 2 0.836821 1 0.932492 1 
   0.348484 1 1 2 0.489745 1 
   1 2 0.862101 1 1 1 
   1 1 1 2 0.427734 1 
   0.662008 2 1 1 1 1 
   1 1 0.768137 2 0.468588 1 
   1 2 1 1 0.314239 1 
   1 1 0.597528 2 1 1 
   1 2 0.78644 1 0.63283 1 
   1 1 1 2 0.814325 1 
   1 2 0.626543 1 0.712485 1 
   0.990398 1 1 2 0.599578 1 
   1 2 0.702989 1 0.265755 1 
   0.635074 1 0.880986 2 0.59755 1 
   1 2 0.781308 1 1 1 
   0.718162 1 0.83939 2 1 1 
   0.328153 2 1 1 0.885982 1 
   0.574529 1 0.622605 2 1 1 
   0.971315 2 1 1 0.592438 1 
   0.54604 1 0.495242 2 0.391955 1 
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0.709235 2 0.399101 1 0.802914 1 
   1 1 0.904011 2 1 1 
   1 2 1 1 1 1 
   1 1 1 2 0.699601 1 
   1 2 1 1 0.498486 1 
   1 1 1 2 0.568525 1 
   0.647297 1 0.40956 1 0.852258 1 
   0.353859 1 0.356685 1 0.705578 1 
   0.680994 1 1 1 0.927873 1 
   0.699382 1 1 1 0.720257 1 
   1 1 0.693448 1 0.662314 1 
   0.636583 1 1 1 0.869265 1 
   0.41958 1 0.706517 1 0.671881 1 
   1 1 1 1 0.86321 1 
   1 1 1 1 0.848918 1 
   1 1 0.742764 1 1 1 
   1 1 0.8653 1 1 1 
   1 1 0.819257 1 0.834005 1 
   1 1 0.707085 1 0.725304 1 
   1 1 0.595337 1 0.571553 1 
   1 1 0.496743 1 0.872695 1 
   1 1 0.862538 1 
     1 1 1 1 
     1 1 1 1 
     1 1 0.892964 1 
     1 1 0.749004 1 
     0.595103 1 0.502911 1 
     0.360609 1 0.51869 1 
     1 1 0.638802 1 
     1 1 0.653375 1 
     0.369069 1 0.168222 1 
     0.778961 1 1 1 
     0.823814 1 0.34492 1 
     0.776047 1 1 1 
     0.844589 1 1 1 
     1 1 1 1 
     0.564092 1 0.605246 1 
     1 1 1 1 
     0.758567 1 0.460073 1 
     0.892255 1 0.852048 1 
     0.860856 1 1 1 
     0.712785 1 0.301869 1 
     0.755649 1 1 1 
     0.536818 1 1 1 
     0.784818 1 0.913795 1 
     0.729206 1 0.947861 1 
     0.545384 1 0.615609 1 
     1 1 0.687487 1 
     1 1 0.647369 1 
     1 1 0.587211 1 
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0.404894 1 0.689884 1 
     1 1 0.594468 1 
     0.323914 1 0.752413 1 
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APPENDIX H 
         Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results - Options % variable 
         
         Data Column# Data Column# Data Column# 
   0.416284 1 0.228843 2 0.23409 1 Large Sample Approximation 
0 2 0 1 0 2 Test Statistic Z = 1.2922 
0.237077 1 0 2 0.498303 1 P-Value = 0.0981   
0.14438 2 0 1 0.095257 2 
  
  
0.270104 1 0 2 0.375735 1 Sample RankSum SampSize 
0.568662 2 0 1 0.149921 1 1 25812 201 
0.43458 1 0.81275 2 0 1 2 5563 49 
0.371112 2 0 1 0.725175 1 
   0.404353 1 0 2 0.389793 1 
   0.25399 2 0.291229 1 0.136923 1 
   0 1 0.180991 2 0 1 
   0.157204 2 0.294122 1 0 1 
   0.191653 1 0.332549 2 0.60045 1 
   0.136269 2 0.302935 1 0.489945 1 
   0 1 0.264082 2 0.654649 1 
   0.26146 2 0.687355 1 0 1 
   0.217109 1 0.127653 2 0.708113 1 
   0.228029 2 0 1 0.281498 1 
   0.11757 1 0.189096 2 0.389732 1 
   0.652262 2 0 1 0.464214 1 
   0 1 0.596928 2 0.146538 1 
   0 2 0.163179 1 0.067508 1 
   0.651516 1 0 2 0.510255 1 
   0 2 0.137899 1 0 1 
   0 1 0 2 0.572266 1 
   0.337992 2 0 1 0 1 
   0 1 0.231863 2 0.531412 1 
   0 2 0 1 0.685761 1 
   0 1 0.402472 2 0 1 
   0 2 0.21356 1 0.36717 1 
   0 1 0 2 0.185675 1 
   0 2 0.373457 1 0.287515 1 
   0.009602 1 0 2 0.400422 1 
   0 2 0.297011 1 0.734245 1 
   0.364926 1 0.119014 2 0.40245 1 
   0 2 0.218692 1 0 1 
   0.281838 1 0.16061 2 0 1 
   0.671847 2 0 1 0.114018 1 
   0.425471 1 0.377395 2 0 1 
   0.028685 2 0 1 0.407562 1 
   0.45396 1 0.504758 2 0.608045 1 
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0.290765 2 0.600899 1 0.197086 1 
   0 1 0.095989 2 0 1 
   0 2 0 1 0 1 
   0 1 0 2 0.300399 1 
   0 2 0 1 0.501514 1 
   0 1 0 2 0.431475 1 
   0.352703 1 0.59044 1 0.147742 1 
   0.646141 1 0.643315 1 0.294422 1 
   0.319006 1 0 1 0.072127 1 
   0.300618 1 0 1 0.279743 1 
   0 1 0.306552 1 0.337686 1 
   0.363417 1 0 1 0.130735 1 
   0.58042 1 0.293483 1 0.328119 1 
   0 1 0 1 0.13679 1 
   0 1 0 1 0.151082 1 
   0 1 0.257236 1 0 1 
   0 1 0.1347 1 0 1 
   0 1 0.180743 1 0.165995 1 
   0 1 0.292915 1 0.274696 1 
   0 1 0.404663 1 0.428447 1 
   0 1 0.503257 1 0.127305 1 
   0 1 0.137462 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     0 1 0.107036 1 
     0 1 0.250996 1 
     0.404897 1 0.497089 1 
     0.639391 1 0.48131 1 
     0 1 0.361198 1 
     0 1 0.346625 1 
     0.630931 1 0.831778 1 
     0.221039 1 0 1 
     0.176186 1 0.65508 1 
     0.223953 1 0 1 
     0.155411 1 0 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     0.435908 1 0.394754 1 
     0 1 0 1 
     0.241433 1 0.539927 1 
     0.107745 1 0.147952 1 
     0.139144 1 0 1 
     0.287215 1 0.698131 1 
     0.244351 1 0 1 
     0.463182 1 0 1 
     0.215182 1 0.086205 1 
     0.270794 1 0.052139 1 
     0.454616 1 0.384391 1 
     0 1 0.312513 1 
     0 1 0.352631 1 
     0 1 0.412789 1 
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0.595106 1 0.310116 1 
     0 1 0.405532 1 
     0.676086 1 0.247587 1 
     
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
